Crash of an Antonov AN-26-100 in Talodi: 32 killed

Date & Time: Aug 19, 2012 at 0800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ST-ARL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Khartoum - Talodi
MSN:
26 06
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
26
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
32
Circumstances:
The aircraft was performing a flight from Khartoum to Talodi with a delegation of 26 members of the Sudanese Government, among them several Ministers, Generals and politicians. On approach to Talodi Airport in poor weather conditions due to a sand storm, the crew initiated a go-around procedure when the aircraft impacted the slope of Mt Hagar al Nar (244 metres high) located 1,500 metres south of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 32 occupants were killed.
The official list of the passengers and crew, all of whom died in the crash, is as follows:
Guidance and Religious Endowments Minister Ghazi al-Sadiq Abdel Rahim,
Justice Party chairman Makki Ali Balayil,
State minister at the Youth and Sports Ministry Mahjub Abdel Rahim Tutu,
State minister at the Ministry of Tourism, Antiquities and Wildlife Issa Daifallah,
Maj. Gen. Salah Ismail – Air Forces
Maj. Gen. Ahmed Musa Ahmed – the Police Forces
Maj. Gen. Ahmed Al-Tayeb Abu-Guroon – Security and Intelligence Organ
Brigadier Lugman Omer – Second Commander of the People's Defence Forces
Al-Saddiq Abdul-Majid Al-Makkawi – the People's Defence Forces
Awadal-Karim Siral-Khatim – Deputy Coordinator of the People's Defence Forces
Waeez Salaha Omer – Headquarters of the People's Defence Forces
Omer Mahjoub Ahmed – Deputy Coordinator of the People's Defence Forces
Salah-Eddin Mustafa – People's Defence Forces – Jabal Aulia Locality
Several officials from Khartoum (including Hamid Al-Aghbash – the National Assembly)
Five media representatives
Six crew members.
Probable cause:
Despite the fact that rebels announced officially two days later they shot down the aircraft, the Sudanese Government confirmed that visibility was low at the time of the accident with clouds at low height and poor weather conditions. As a result, officials said the accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) after the crew descended too low on final.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 at Al Anad AFB: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 25, 2011
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sanaa – Al Anad
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Sanaa Airport on a flight to Al Anad AFB (Kadamat Al Awdhali), carrying 11 passengers and four crew members, among them 8 Syrian engineers and 7 Yemen citizens. The aircraft crashed upon landing under unknown circumstances. Three Syrian and one Yemen citizen were killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 off Libreville

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2011 at 1025 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TR-LII
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port Gentil - Libreville
MSN:
75 04
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
SLN122A
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew departed Port Gentil on a cargo flight to Libreville on behalf of DHL Airways. On approach to Libreville-Léon Mba Airport, the captain informed ATC about hydraulic problems and initiated a go-around procedure. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea some 2,3 km southeast of the airport. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Due to the failure of the hydraulic system, the crew was unable to lower the gear.

Crash of an Antonovv AN-26B in Tallinn

Date & Time: Aug 25, 2010 at 1747 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SP-FDP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
EXN3788
MSN:
119 03
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
Tallinn - Helsinki
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5569
Captain / Total hours on type:
4432.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
738
Copilot / Total hours on type:
485
Aircraft flight hours:
21510
Circumstances:
On 25th August 2010 cargo aircraft An-26B, registration SP-FDP started from Tallinn-Lennart Meri-Ülemiste Airport to Helsinki. After uneventful flight preparations, the aircraft started its take-off roll on runway 08. Based on pilots statements and FDR/CVR recordings the aircraft entered runway 08 from taxiway B on the West end of the runway and lined up for takeoff. On 16:47:22 the aircraft started its takeoff roll. The calculated V1 was 182 and Vr was 201 km/h. 10 seconds later PF started rotation without Vr callout at 123 km/h. The aircraft pitch angle increased to 4.6˚ 2 seconds later. At 16:47:38 the navigator made V1 call-out at 160.5 km/h. 1 second later flight engineer called “Retracting” in Polish. The aircraft started to pitch down and 3 seconds later it contacted the runway and continued on its belly for 1,228 m before coming to its rest position 3 m right from the runway centerline. No persons were injured and no fire broke up. The occurrence was classified as an accident due to the substantial damage to the aircraft structures.
Probable cause:
The investigation determined the inadequate action of the flight engineer, consisting in early and uncommanded landing gear retraction, as a cause of the accident.
Contributing factors to the accident were:
1. Inadequate crew recourse management and insufficient experience in cooperation and coordination between crewmembers.
2. Start of aircraft rotation at low speed and with fast elevator movement to 17˚, which resulted in:
Lifting the aircraft sufficiently to close the WOW switch and allow the retraction of the landing gear at the speed not sufficient for the climb.
Providing misleading information to FE about the aerodynamic status of the aircraft.
3. Inadequate adjustment of the WOW switch, which allowed the gear retraction to be activated before the aircraft was airborne. The position of the landing gear selector on the central console is not considered as a contributing factor to the accident. However, investigation finds necessary to point it out as a safety concern, specifically in situations, where crewmembers are trained and/or used to operate the aircrafts with gear selector location according to the EASA Certification Standards CS-25. Positioning of the gear lever to the location which is compliant to EASA document CS-25, would create additional safety barrier to avoid similar occurrences, specifically in aircrafts where landing gear is operated by FE.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B in Tallinn

Date & Time: Mar 18, 2010 at 1018 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SP-FDO
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Helsinki – Tallinn
MSN:
105 03
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
EXN3589
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4695
Captain / Total hours on type:
2295.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
990
Copilot / Total hours on type:
495
Aircraft flight hours:
25941
Circumstances:
Exin Co was operating An-26B for regular cargo flight between Tallinn and Helsinki. The crew performed last maintenance check in Tallinn on previous day and made uneventful flight to Helsinki on 17th March afternoon. Next morning the aircraft took off from Helsinki for regular flight EXN3589 to Tallinn at 09:46 local time. The takeoff weight was 23,954 kg, 46 kg below the MTOW. Four crewmembers, company mechanic and one cargo attendant were on board. During takeoff crew used RU 19-300 APU for additional thrust as prescribed in AFM. The RU 19-300 was shot down after takeoff. The flight was uneventful until 08:14:50, 9.5 nm from the runway 26. When power levers were retarded to flight idle crew noticed engine vibration and smelled a smoke in the cockpit. The engine chip detector indicator in the cockpit was lit. After short discussion about which engine should be shot down the flight engineer shot down the left engine and the captain tried to start the RU19A-300 (APU) to gain more thrust. During the approach the air traffic controller noticed the aircraft deviation from the approach path to the left and notified the crew. According to the FDR and CVR data the crew was unable to maintain a proper approach path both in lateral and vertical dimensions. The attempts to start RU19A-300 engine failed. Visual contact with the RWY was established 0.5 nm from the threshold. The aircraft crossed the airport boundary being not configured for landing and with IAS 295-300 km/h. The flaps were extended for 10˚ over the threshold; the landing gear was lowered after passing the RWY threshold and retracted again. The aircraft made a high speed low path over the runway on ca 10-15 feet altitude with the landing gear traveling down and up again. Flaps were extended over runway, and then retracted again seconds before impact. At the end of the RWY the full power on right engine was selected, aircraft climbed 15-20 feet and started turning left. Crew started retracting flaps and lowered landing gear. Aircraft crossed the highway at the end of the RWY on altitude ca 30 feet, then descended again, collided with the treetops at the lake shore and made crash-landing on the snow and ice-covered lake waterline. Due to the thick ice the aircraft remained on the ice and glided 151 m on the ice with heading 238˚ before coming to full stop. After the impact the flight engineer shoot down the RH engine and power and released all engine fire extinguishers. All persons onboard escaped immediately through the main door. No emergency was declares and despite suggestions from FO go-around was not commanded.
Probable cause:
Causes of the accident:
1. The failure of the left engine lubrication oil system, leading to the failure of the rear compressor bearing and inflight engine failure.
2. The failure of the crew to maintain the approach path and adhere to single engine landing procedures.
Factors contributing to the accident:
1. Improper and insufficient crew training, inter alia complete absence of simulator training.
2. The lack of effective coordination between crewmembers.
3. The failure of the crew to start RU19A-300 (APU).
4. Adverse weather conditions.
5. Inadequate company supervision by Polish CAA, consisting in not noticing the lack.
of flight crew training and companies generally pour safety culture.
6. Inadequate company maintenance practices, leaving preexisting breather duct failure unnoticed.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Isiro: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 26, 2009 at 1616 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9Q-CSA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Goma – Isiro
MSN:
50 05
YOM:
1977
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Goma on a cargo flight to Isiro, carrying one loadmaster, three crew members and a load of 7 tons of cigarettes. On approach to Isiro-Matari Airport, the aircraft crashed 3 km short of runway. The loadmaster was seriously injured while three others occupants were killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Hanoi: 5 killed

Date & Time: Apr 8, 2008 at 0930 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
265
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Hanoi - Hanoi
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training flight at Hanoi-Gia Lâm Airport. On approach, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a rice paddy field located near Tả Thanh Oai, Thanh Tri district. The wreckage was found about 13 km southwest of the airport and all five occupants were killed.