New York

The co-pilot was performing a nighttime approach and landing to runway 25. No runway condition reports were received by the flight crew while airborne, and a NOTAM was in effect, stating, “thin loose snow over patchy thin ice.” After landing, the co-pilot called out that the airplane was sliding and the wheel brakes were ineffective. The captain took the controls, activated the air brakes, and instructed the co-pilot to deploy the drag chute. The crew could not stop the airplane in the remaining runway distance and the airplane overran the runway by approximately 100 feet. After departing the runway end, the landing gear contacted a snow berm that was the result of earlier plowing. The captain turned the airplane around and taxied to the ramp. Subsequent inspection of the airplane revealed a fractured nose gear strut and buckling of the fuselage. The spring-loaded drag chute extractor cap activated, but the parachute remained in its tail cone container. Both flight crewmembers reported that the runway was icy at the time of the accident and braking action was “nil.” The airport manager reported that when the airplane landed, no airport staff were on duty and had not been for several hours. He also reported that when the airport staff left for the evening, the runway conditions were adequate. The runway had been plowed and sanded approximately 20 hours prior to the accident, sanded two more times during the day, and no measurable precipitation was recorded within that time frame. The reason that the drag chute failed to deploy was not determined.

The private pilot was continuing a cross-country flight after having stopped for fuel. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot said both engines started running rough, and he turned the airplane toward the nearest airport and descended. The pilot reported that he did not think the airplane would make it to the airport, and that due to the rugged terrain, he felt it was better to ditch the airplane in a large lake he was flying over. The pilot reported there were no mechanical anomalies prior to the loss of engine power. He said he felt that fuel contamination was the cause of the engine problem, and that not fueling during heavy rain might have prevented the problem. Fuel samples were taken from the fuel supply where he added fuel, and the equipment used to fuel the airplane. No other instances of fuel contamination were reported, and according to the FAA inspector the fuel samples were tested, and found to be clean. The airplane was not recovered from the lake, and has not been examined by the NTSB.

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.

The pilot purchased the multiengine airplane about 18 months prior to the accident, and was conducting his first flight in the airplane, as he flew it from Georgia to Massachusetts. While en route, the airplane experienced a failure of the left engine. The airplane began maneuvering near an airport, as its groundspeed decreased from 173 miles per hour (mph) to 90 mph, 13 mph below the minimum single engine control speed. A witness reported that the airplane appeared to be attempting to land, when it banked to the left, and descended to the ground. The airplane impacted on a road, about 3 miles east-southeast of the airport. A 3-inch, by 2.5- inch hole was observed on the top of the left engine crankcase, and streaks of oil were present on the left gear door, left flap, and the left side of the fuselage. The number two connecting rod was fractured and heat distressed. The number 2 piston assembly was seized in the cylinder barrel. The airplane had been operated about 30 hours, during the 6 years prior to the accident, and it had not been flown since its most recent annual inspection, which was performed about 16 months prior to the accident. In addition, both engines were being operated beyond the manufacturer's recommended time between overhaul limits. The pilot did not possess a multiengine airplane rating. He attended an airplane type specific training course about 20 months prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 452 hours of total flight experience, with 0 hours of multiengine flight experience.

The purpose of the flight was for the flight instructor to provide multiengine airplane training, in a late 1930's vintage amphibious airplane, to his brother, a single engine airplane rated private pilot. No published performance data was available for the airplane, and according to the flight instructor, much of what he knew about the performance of the airplane he learned from previous flights. Just after takeoff on the accident flight, and about 600 feet above ground level (agl), and as the pilot was retracting the landing gear and starting a left turn to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern, the flight instructor retarded the right throttle in order to simulate a failure of the right engine. The pilot executed the procedures for an in-flight engine failure and the instructor looked out of the window to check for traffic in the airport traffic pattern. The flight instructor then heard the pilot state "I am at blue line but losing altitude." The flight instructor continued to scan for traffic and moved the right throttle forward to about the "half throttle" position. The pilot could not recall if he had adjusted either of the power controls after the initial application of power for takeoff. The airplane continued to descend, impacted the ground, and caught fire.

The airplane departed from a maintenance facility, after installation of the right engine, with an unknown quantity of fuel. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported that he had "lost" an engine. He requested vectors for the departure airport, then amended his request to an alternate destination. From the original distress call to the last recorded radar target, approximately 2 ½ minutes, the airplane descended from 2,500 feet to 700 feet and slowed from 190 knots to about 87 knots. Several witnesses described the engine sound as "rough", and "cutting in and out" before the airplane descended out of view and sounds of impact were heard. The left wing was consumed by post-crash fire. Forty gallons of fuel were drained from the right inboard and nacelle tanks. Only trace amounts of fuel were visible in the right outboard tank. Both fuel selectors were found in the outboard tank position. Examination of flight times and ground-maintenance run times revealed that the engines were run for approximately 3 hours with the outboard tanks selected. The outboard tanks each held 40 gallons, for a total of 80 gallons. According to the pilot's operating manual, the fuel consumption rate at the maximum endurance power setting was 28 gallons per hour.

The airplane, which was not operating on a flight plan, was proceeding in clear skies to an airport where the passenger was joining his wife. After crossing a lake near the destination, the airplane flew over rising terrain, along a saddleback, until it struck a stand of old-growth trees that jutted above new-growth trees. During the last 48 seconds of radar coverage, the airplane climbed 600 feet with no erratic course deviations. From the accident location, the airport would have been about 5 nautical miles off the airplane's right wing. The pilot had 32,000 hours of flight experience. The passenger was under investigation for fraud, and attempted to obtain life insurance prior to the flight. The passenger had also loaned money to the pilot, and was receiving "flight services" in lieu of cash payment when the pilot failed to pay back the loan. A .380 caliber pistol magazine was found at the accident site with two rounds of ammunition missing; however, no weapon was located at the site, and no weapon of that caliber was known to be associated with either the pilot or the passenger. Premature ventricular complexes (PVCs) were found on electrocardiograms performed in conjunction with the pilot's airman medical certificate applications in 2002 and 2004. The pilot's autopsy report indicated "severe calcific... coronary disease, with 90 percent narrowing of the left anterior descending coronary artery and 75 percent narrowing of the right coronary artery." Cause of death, for both the pilot and passenger, was listed as "undetermined." The autopsy reports also noted that, "due to the inability to perform a complete autopsy...of either of the two aircraft occupants, it cannot be determined whether either the pilot or the passenger were alive or dead at the time of the crash." Post accident inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies.

The copilot was flying an ILS approach at an airspeed of Vref plus 10 knots, and the captain made visual contact with the runway about 350 feet agl. The airplane then drifted high on the glideslope, and the copilot decreased engine power. The sink rate subsequently became too great. By the time the captain called for a go-around, the airspeed had deteriorated, and the stick shaker activated. Although power was applied for the go-around, the airplane impacted the runway in a level attitude before the engines spooled up. The airplane came to rest in snow, about 20 feet off the left side of the runway, near mid-field.

The commercial pilot/owner was on a cross-country flight from Orlando, Florida, to Salisbury, Maryland, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot stated that all five fuel tanks were topped off and verified as full before departure. The fueler, in a written statement, reported that he added 100 gallons of fuel and that the fuel tank levels were topped off. In addition to the main tanks, the airplane was equipped with two large-capacity auxiliary tanks (31.5 gallons of useable fuel each) and a locker tank, and the airplane's total useable fuel capacity was 183 gallons. As the airplane approached Maryland, the pilot requested weather for White Plains, New York (HPN) and then changed his destination to HPN. As he approached the New York area at 21,000 feet, air traffic control (ATC) instructed the pilot to fly a published arrival procedure and to maintain an altitude of 16,000 feet. The pilot stated that, due to poor weather and air traffic congestion, he became concerned about possible delays and informed ATC that he had "minimal fuel." He did not declare an emergency. ATC then issued the pilot a descent clearance, and he reduced both throttles to idle. In preparation to level off at the new altitude, the pilot increased power on both throttles, and the right engine stopped producing power. The pilot was unable to maintain the assigned altitude and told the controller that he had "lost an engine, and needed vectors to the nearest runway." The left engine stopped producing power about 2 minutes later. The pilot ditched the airplane and exited the airplane before it sank. The airplane was not recovered. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane before the flight.