Moscow oblast

Loss of control at liftoff due to a loss of lift caused by a stall consecutive to an excessive accumulation of ice/frost on the critical surfaces despite the aircraft had been deiced/anti-iced prior to takeoff. The following findings were identified:
- The aircraft was deiced in a two-step procedure - deicing with Type I then anti-icing with Type IV. The treatment was completed at 1618LT, 19 minutes prior to the accident,
- At the time of the accident, there were moderate to strong snow falls at the airport,
- The crew did not receive the full meteorological bulletin prior to departure and failed to determine the correct holdover time,
- Referring to the actual weather conditions, the crew failed to proceed with a second deicing/anti-icing procedure,
- Lack of adequate check by crew members and/or the airline representatives regarding the quality of the anti-icing treatment,
- The crew failed to comply with AFM relating to the actual weather conditions,
- The takeoff was started at a speed that was 12 knots below the reference speed, increasing the stall condition with leading edges that were slightly contaminated with frost/ice.

The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing. The Commission concluded that the flight engineer’s erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- A low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader in the crew, which was manifested in the crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach and landing,
- Emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base,
- Lack of effective control, including according to the data of flight recorders over flight operations with LIBAVIA,
- In the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew of the IL-62M aircraft" there are no control functions on the part of other crew members for the actions of the flight engineer at the stage of aircraft landing and the status of the reverse on/off alarm,
- The absence in the training programs of the simulator of exercises for practicing the actions of crew members in case of erroneous actions by the flight engineer when the reverse is turned on,
- Lack of equipment for the flight engineer’s workplace with a radio headset, lack of procedures in the "Instructions for Interaction and the Work Technology of the Crew Members of the Il-62M Aircraft" for the use of a radio headset for flight personnel in flights with a reduced crew,
- Excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, which created additional difficulties when listening to the commands given by the captain,
- Fuzziness (illegibility) of the commands given by the PIC and the lack of response of the PIC to the non-confirmation of the commands given by him to the flight engineer.

Loss of control in icing conditions.

It is believed that the engine lost power on approach because of the poor fuel quality.