Crash of a Gulfstream GIV in Fort Lauderdale

Date & Time: Aug 21, 2021 at 1340 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N277GM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Lauderdale – Las Vegas
MSN:
1124
YOM:
1989
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
20053
Captain / Total hours on type:
3120.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1617
Copilot / Total hours on type:
204
Aircraft flight hours:
12990
Circumstances:
The flight crew, which consisted of the pilot- and second-in-command (PIC and SIC), and a non-type-rated observer pilot, reported that during takeoff near 100 knots a violent shimmy developed at the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC aborted the takeoff and during the abort procedure, the NLG separated. The airplane veered off the runway, and the right wing and right main landing gear struck approach lights, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The passengers and flight crew evacuated the airplane without incident through the main cabin door. Postaccident interviews revealed that following towing operations prior to the flight crew’s arrival, ground personnel were unable to get the plunger button and locking balls of the NLG’s removable pip pin to release normally. Following a brief troubleshooting effort by the ground crew, the pip pin’s plunger button remained stuck fully inward, and the locking balls remained retracted. The ground crew re-installed the pip pin through the steering collar with the upper torque link arm connected. However, with the locking balls in the retracted position, the pin was not secured in position as it should have been. Further, the ground personnel could not install the safety pin through the pip pin because the pin’s design prevented the safety pin from being inserted if the locking balls and plunger were not released. The ground personnel left the safety pin hanging from its lanyard on the right side of the NLG. The ground personnel subsequently informed their ramp supervisor of the anomaly. The supervisor reported that he informed the first arriving crewmember at the airplane (the observer pilot) that the nose pin needed to be checked. However, all three pilots reported that no ground crewmember told them about any issues with the NLG or pins. Examination of the runway environment revealed that the first item of debris located on the runway was the pip pin. Shortly after this location, tire swivel marks were located near the runway centerline, which were followed by large scrape and tire marks, leading to the separated NLG. The safety pin remained attached to the NLG via its lanyard and was undamaged. Postaccident examination and testing of the NLG and its pins revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The sticking of the pip pin plunger button that the ground crew reported experiencing could not be duplicated during postaccident testing. When installed on the NLG, the locking ball mechanism worked as intended, and the pip pin could not be removed by hand. Although the airplane’s preflight checklist called for a visual check of the NLG’s torque link to ensure that it was connected to the steering collar by the pip pin and that the safety pin was installed, it is likely that none of the pilots noticed that the pip pin did not have its safety pin installed during preflight. Subsequently, during the takeoff roll, without the locking balls extended, the pip pin likely moved outward and fell from its position holding the upper torque link arm. This allowed the upper torque link arm to move freely, which resulted in the violent shimmy and NLG separation. The location of the debris on the runway, tire marks, and postaccident examination and testing support this likely chain of events. Contributing to the PIC and SIC’s omission during preflight was the ground crew’s failure to directly inform the PIC or SIC that there was a problem with the NLG pip pin. The ground crew also failed to discard the malfunctioning pip pin per the airplane’s ground handling procedures and instead re-installed the pip pin. Although the observer pilot was reportedly informed of an issue with a nose gear pin, he was not qualified to act as a required flight crewmember for the airplane and was on his cell phone when he was reportedly informed of the issue by the ramp supervisor. These factors likely contributed to the miscommunication and the PIC’s and SIC’s subsequent lack of awareness of the NLG issue.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command’s (PIC) and second-in-command’s (SIC) failure during preflight inspection to ensure that the nose landing gear’s pip pin was properly installed, which resulted in separation of the pip pin during takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the ground crew supervisor’s failure to inform the PIC or SIC of the anomaly concerning the pip pin following a towing operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in LaBelle: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 6, 2021 at 1520 LT
Registration:
C-FAAZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
LaBelle - LaBelle
MSN:
60-0148-065
YOM:
1973
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
65.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5252
Circumstances:
The pilot, who was the owner of the airplane, and the pilot-rated passenger, whose maintenance facility had recently completed work on the airplane, departed on the second of two local flights on the day of the accident as requested by the pilot, since he had not flown the airplane recently. Flight track and engine monitor data indicated that, about 15 minutes after takeoff, fuel flow and engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) values were consistent with a total loss of left engine power at an altitude about 2,500 ft. Engine power was fully restored about 4 minutes later. Between the time of the power loss and subsequent restoration, the airplane directly overflew an airport and was in the vicinity of a larger airport. It is likely that the left engine was intentionally shut down to practice one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Had the loss of power been unanticipated, the pilot would likely have initiated a landing at one of these airports in accordance with the airplane’s published emergency procedure, which was to land as soon as possible if engine power could not be restored; however, data indicated that engine power was restored, and the flight continued back to the departure airport. About 7.5 minutes later, about 6 nautical miles from the departure airport, engine data indicated a total loss of right engine power, followed almost immediately by a total loss of left engine power, at an altitude about 3,500 ft. A battery voltage perturbation consistent with starter engagement was recorded about 1 minute later, followed by a slight increase in left engine fuel flow; however, the data did not indicate that left engine power was fully restored during the remainder of the flight. The airplane continued in the direction of the departure airport as it descended and ultimately impacted a tree and terrain and came to rest upright. A witness saw the airplane flying toward her with the landing gear extended and stated that it appeared as though neither of the two propellers was turning. A doorbell security camera near the accident site captured the airplane as it passed overhead at low altitude. Sound spectrum analysis of the footage indicated that one engine was likely operating about 1,600 rpm while the other was operating at less than 1,000 rpm. The right propeller was found feathered at the accident site. An examination and test run of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left propeller blades exhibited bending, twisting, and chordwise polishing consistent with the engine producing some power at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine and engine-driven fuel pump did not reveal any anomalies. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilots were conducting practice OEI procedures and intentionally shut down the right engine. The loss of left engine power immediately after was likely the result of the pilot’s failure to properly identify and verify the “failed” engine before securing it, which resulted in an inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. Although partial left engine power was restored before the accident (as indicated by fuel flow values, damage to the left propeller, and sound spectrum analysis of security camera video), the left engine power available was inadequate to maintain altitude for reasons that could not be determined, and it is likely that the pilot was performing a forced landing when the accident occurred. It is also likely that the pilot’s decision to conduct intentional OEI flight at low altitude resulted in reduced time and altitude available for troubleshooting and restoration of engine power following the inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. The 67-year-old pilot was a Canadian national and had never applied for a Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the pilot was issued a category 1 license with knowledge of a previous condition and knowledge of currently taking Xarelto (rivaroxabam). No acute or historical cardiovascular event was found on autopsy. Toxicology testing detected the sedating antihistamine cetirizine just below therapeutic levels in the pilot’s blood. A very low concentration of the narcotic pain medication codeine was detected in the pilot’s blood and urine; codeine’s metabolite morphine was also detected in his urine. The mood stabilizing medication lamotrigine was detected but not quantified in the pilot’s blood and urine. Thus, the pilot was taking some impairing medications and likely had a psychiatric condition that could impact decision-making and performance; however, given the circumstances of the accident, including the presence of the pilot-rated passenger to operate the airplane, the effects from the pilot’s use of cetirizine, codeine, and lamotrigine were not likely factors in this accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadvertent shutdown of the left engine following an intentional shutdown of the right engine while practicing one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to conduct OEI training at low altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu off Naples

Date & Time: Dec 19, 2020 at 1216 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N662TC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sarasota - Key West
MSN:
46-8508095
YOM:
1985
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3462
Captain / Total hours on type:
890.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3462
Circumstances:
After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.
Probable cause:
The inadvertent activation of the unguarded ferry tank fuel selector valve, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in North Palm Beach

Date & Time: Oct 8, 2020 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8132Q
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
North Palm Beach - Claxton
MSN:
414-0032
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1987
Captain / Total hours on type:
897.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
149
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
6377
Circumstances:
The copilot, who was seated in the right seat, reported that after an uneventful run-up and taxi, the pilot, who was seated in the left seat, initiated the takeoff. The airplane remained on the runway past the point at which takeoff should have occurred and the copilot observed the pilot attempting to pull back on the control yoke but it would not move. The copilot then also attempted to pull back on the control yoke but was also unsuccessful. Observing that the end of the runway was nearing, the copilot aborted the takeoff by reducing the throttle to idle and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the runway into rough and marshy terrain, where it came to rest partially submerged in water. Postaccident examination of the airplane and flight controls found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Specifically, examination of the elevator flight control rigging, in addition to functional checks of the elevator, confirmed continuity and normal function. Additionally, the flight control lock was found on the floor near the rudder pedals on the left side of the cockpit. Due to a head injury sustained during the accident, the pilot was unable to recall most of the events that transpired during the accident. The pilot did state that he typically removed the control lock during the preflight inspection and that he would place it in his flight bag. He thought that a shoulder injury may have led to the control lock missing the flight bag, and why it was found behind the rudder pedals after the accident. Review and analysis of a video that captured the airplane during its taxi to the runway showed that the elevator control position was similar to what it would be with the control lock installed. While the pilot and copilot reported that they did not observe the control lock installed during the takeoff, the position of the elevator observed on the video, the successful postaccident functional test of elevator, and the unsecured flight control lock being located behind the pilot’s rudder pedals after the accident suggest that the control anomaly experienced by the pilots may have been a result of the control lock remaining inadvertently installed and overlooked by both pilots prior to the takeoff. According to the airframe manufacturer’s preflight and before takeoff checklists, the flight control lock must be removed during preflight, prior to engine start and taxi, and the flight controls must be checked prior to takeoff. Regardless of why the elevator control would not move during the takeoff, a positive flight control check prior to the takeoff should have detected any such anomaly. It is likely that the pilot failed to conduct a flight control check prior to takeoff. Further, the pilot failed to abort the takeoff at the first indication that there was a problem. Although delayed, the copilot’s decision to take control of the airplane and abort the takeoff likely mitigated the potential for more severe injury to the occupants and damage to the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection during which he failed to detect a flight control abnormality, and his failure to expediently abort the takeoff, which resulted in the co-pilot performing a delayed aborted takeoff and the subsequent runway overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell 500S Shrike Commander in Pembroke Park: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 28, 2020 at 0902 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N900DT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Pompano Beach – Opa Locka
MSN:
500-3056
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
27780
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8029
Aircraft flight hours:
10300
Circumstances:
The pilot-in-command seated in the right seat was providing familiarization in the multiengine airplane to the left seat pilot during a flight to a nearby airport for fuel. Shortly after takeoff, one of the pilots reported an engine problem and advised that they were diverting to a nearby airport. A witness along the route of flight reported hearing the engines accelerating and decelerating and then popping sounds; several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing no engine sounds. The airplane impacted a building and terrain about 10 minutes after takeoff. Very minimal fuel leakage on the ground was noted and only 23 ounces of aviation fuel were collected from the airplane’s five fuel tanks. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted for either engine or propeller; the damage to both propellers was consistent with low-to-no power at impact. Since the pilot could not have visually verified the fuel level in the center fuel tank because of the low quantity of fuel prior to the flight, he would have had to rely on fuel consumption calculations since fueling based on flight time and the airplane’s fuel quantity indicating system. Although the fuel quantity indications at engine start and impact could not be determined postaccident from the available evidence, if the fuel quantity reading at the start of the flight was accurate based on the amount of fuel required for engine start, taxi, run-up, takeoff, and then only to fly the accident flight duration of 10 minutes, it would have been reading between 8 and 10 gallons. It is unlikely that the pilot, who was a chief pilot of a cargo operation and tasked with familiarizing company pilots in the airplane, would have knowingly initiated the flight with an insufficient fuel load for the intended flight or with the fuel gauge accurately registering the actual fuel load that was on-board. Examination of the tank unit, or fuel quantity transmitter, revealed that the resistance between pins A and B, which were the ends of the resistor element inside the housing, fell within specification. When monitoring the potentiometer pin C, there was no resistance, indicating an open circuit between the wiper and the resistor element. X-ray imaging revealed that the conductor of electrical wire was fractured between the end of the lugs at the wiper and for pin C. Bypassing the fractured conductor, the resistive readings followed the position of the float arm consistent with normal operation. Visual examination of the wire insulation revealed no evidence of shorting, burning or damage. Examination of the fractured electrical conductor by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed that many of the individual wires exhibited intergranular fracture surface features with fatigue striations in various directions on some individual grains. It is likely that the many fatigue fractured conductor strands of the electrical wire inside the accident tank unit or fuel transmitter resulted in the fuel gauge indicating that the tanks contained more fuel than the amount that was actually on board, which resulted in inadequate fuel for the intended flight and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. The inaccurate fuel indication would also be consistent with the pilot’s decision to decline additional fuel before departing on the accident flight. While the estimated fuel remaining since fueling (between 15 and 51 gallons) was substantially more than the actual amount on board at the start of the accident flight (between 8 and 10 gallons), the difference could have been caused by either not allowing the fuel to settle during fueling, and/or the operational use of the airplane. Ultimately, the fuel supply was likely completely exhausted during the flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of power to both engines. Given the circumstances of the accident, the effects from the right seat pilot’s use of cetirizine and the identified ethanol in the left seat pilot, which was likely from sources other than ingestion, did not contribute to this accident.
Probable cause:
A total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the fuel exhaustion was the fatigue fracture of an electrical wire in the tank unit or fuel transmitter, which likely resulted in an inaccurate fuel quantity indication.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 510 Citation Mustang in Daytona Beach

Date & Time: Feb 20, 2020 at 1245 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N163TC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Daytona Beach - Daytona Beach
MSN:
510-0039
YOM:
2007
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2533
Captain / Total hours on type:
90.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7500
Aircraft flight hours:
2380
Circumstances:
The pilot was receiving a checkride from a designated pilot examiner for his single-pilot type rating in a turbine airplane. After a series of maneuvers, emergencies, and landings, the examiner asked the pilot to complete a no-flap landing. The pilot reported that he performed the Before Landing checklist with no flaps and believed that he had put the gear down. During touchdown, the pilot felt a "thump" and thought a tire had blown; however, he saw that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position, and he noted that the landing gear warning horn did not sound because he had performed a no-flaps landing. The examiner confirmed that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector who examined the airplane reported that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position and that the fuselage had sustained substantial damage. The landing gear was lowered and locked into place without issue after the airplane was lifted from the runway.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to lower the landing gear before landing. Contributing to the accident was the examiner's failure to check that the landing gear was extended.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421A Golden Eagle I in DeLand: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 29, 2019 at 1600 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N731PF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
DeLand - DeLand
MSN:
421A-0164
YOM:
1968
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
500
Captain / Total hours on type:
0.00
Aircraft flight hours:
858
Circumstances:
The owner of the airplane had purchased the airplane with the intent to resell it after repairs had been made. As part of that process, a mechanic hired by the owner had assessed the airplane’s condition, proposed the necessary repairs to the airplane’s owner, and had identified a pilot who would, once the repairs and required inspection annual inspection had been completed, fly the airplane from where it was located to where the owner resided. While the mechanic had identified a potential pilot for the relocation flight, he had not yet completed the repairs to the airplane, nor had he completed the necessary logbook entries that would have returned the airplane to service. The pilot-rated passenger onboard the airplane for the accident flight, was the pilot who had been identified by the mechanic for the relocation flight. Review of the pilot-rated passenger’s flight experience revealed that he did not possess the necessary pilot certificate rating, nor did he have the flight experience necessary to act as pilot-in-command of the complex, highperformance, pressurized, multi-engine airplane. Additionally, the owner of the airplane had not given the pilot-rated-passenger, or anyone else, permission to fly the airplane. The reason for, and the circumstances under which the pilot-rated passenger and the commercial pilot (who did hold a multi-engine rating) were flying the airplane on the accident flight could not be definitively determined, although because another passenger was onboard the airplane, it is most likely that the accident flight was personal in nature. Given the commercial pilot’s previous flight experience, it is also likely that he was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight. One witness said that he heard the airplane’s engines backfiring as it flew overhead, while another witness located about 1 mile from the accident site heard the accident airplane flying overhead. The second witness said that both engines were running, but they seemed to be running at idle and that the flaps and landing gear were retracted. The witness saw the airplane roll to the left three times before descending below the tree line. As the airplane descended toward the ground, the witness heard the engines make “two pop” sounds. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 4 miles from the departure airport, and the wreckage path through the trees was only about 75-feet long. While the witnesses described the airplane’s engines backfiring or popping before the accident, the postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, examination of both propeller blades showed evidence of low rotational energy at impact, and that neither propeller had been feathered in flight. Given the witness statement describing the airplane “rolling three times” before it descended from view toward the ground, it is most likely that the pilot lost control of the airplane and while maneuvering. It is also likely that the pilot’s lack of any documented previous training or flight experience in the accident airplane make and model contributed to his inability to maintain control of the airplane. Toxicology testing was performed on the pilot’s chest cavity blood. The results identified 6.7 ng/ml of delta-9-tetrahydracannabinol (THC, the active compound in marijuana) as well as 2.6 ng/ml of its active metabolite, 11-hydroxy-THC and 41.3 ng/ml of its inactive metabolite delta9-carboxy-THC. Because the measured THC levels were from cavity blood, it was not possible to determine when the pilot last used marijuana or whether he was impaired by it at the time of the flight. As a result, it could not be determined whether effects from the pilot’s use of marijuana contributed to the accident circumstances.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane, which resulted in a collision with terrain. Contributing was the pilot’s lack of training and experience in the accident airplane make and model.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-81Q at Jacksonville NAS

Date & Time: May 3, 2019 at 2142 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N732MA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Guantánamo Bay - Jacksonville
MSN:
30618/830
YOM:
2001
Flight number:
LL293
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2204.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
18
Aircraft flight hours:
38928
Aircraft flight cycles:
15610
Circumstances:
According to both pilots, the takeoff, climb, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. The No. 1 (left) thrust reverser was not operational and deferred for the flight in accordance with the airplane’s minimum equipment list. The captain was the pilot flying for the accident flight, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. The captain was also performing check airman duties for the first officer who was in the process of completing operating experience training. During the approach to Jacksonville Naval Air Station (NIP), the flight crew had two runway change discussions with air traffic controllers due to reported weather conditions (moderate to heavy precipitation) near the field; the pilots ultimately executed the area navigation GPS approach to runway 10, which was ungrooved and had a displaced threshold 997 ft from the threshold, leaving an available landing distance of 8,006 ft. As the airplane descended through 1,390 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilots configured it for landing with the flaps set at 30º and the landing gear extended; however, the speedbrake handle was not placed in the armed position as specified in the Landing checklist. At an altitude of about 1,100 ft msl and 2.8 nm from the runway, the airplane was slightly above the glidepath, and its airspeed was on target. Over the next minute, the indicated airspeed increased to 170 knots (17 knots above the target approach speed), and groundspeed reached 180 knots, including an estimated 7-knot tailwind. At an altitude of about 680 ft msl and 1.6 nm from the threshold, the airplane deviated further above the 3° glidepath such that the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights would have appeared to the flight crew as four white lights and would retain that appearance throughout the rest of the approach. Eight seconds before touchdown, multiple enhanced ground proximity warning system alerts announced “sink rate” as the airplane’s descent rate peaked at 1,580 fpm. The airplane crossed the displaced threshold 120 ft above the runway (the PAPI glidepath crosses the displaced threshold about 54 ft above the runway) and 17 knots above the target approach speed, with a groundspeed of 180 knots and a rate of descent about 1,450 ft per minute (fpm). The airplane touched down about 1,580 ft beyond the displaced threshold, which was 80 ft beyond the designated touchdown zone as specified in the operator’s standard operating procedures (SOP). After touchdown, the captain deployed the No. 2 engine thrust reverser and began braking; he later reported, however, that he did not feel the aircraft decelerate and increased the brake pressure. The speedbrakes deployed about 4 seconds after touchdown, most likely triggered by the movement of the right throttle into the idle reverse thrust detent after main gear tire spinup. The automatic deployment of the speedbrakes was likely delayed by about 3 seconds compared to the automatic deployment that could have been obtained by arming the speedbrakes before landing. The airplane crossed the end of the runway about 55 ft right of the centerline and impacted a seawall 90 ft to the right of the centerline, 9,170 ft beyond the displaced threshold, and 1,164 ft beyond the departure end of runway 10. After the airplane came to rest in St. Johns River, the flight crew began an emergency evacuation.
Probable cause:
An extreme loss of braking friction due to heavy rain and the water depth on the ungrooved runway, which resulted in viscous hydroplaning. Contributing to the accident was the operator’s inadequate guidance for evaluating runway braking conditions and conducting en route landing distance assessments.
Contributing to the continuation of an unstabilized approach were
1) the captain’s plan continuation bias and increased workload due to the weather and performing check airman duties and
2) the first officer’s lack of experience.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in the Dry Tortugas National Park

Date & Time: Apr 23, 2019 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N366TA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dry Tortugas - Key West
MSN:
208-0249
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2407
Captain / Total hours on type:
27.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9506
Circumstances:
The pilot landed the seaplane into an easterly wind, then noticed that the surface wind was greater than forecast. Unable to taxi to the beaching location, he elected to return to his destination. He maneuvered the airplane into the wind and applied takeoff power. He described the takeoff run as "bumpy" and the water conditions as "rough." The pilot reported that the left float departed the airplane at rotation speed, and the airplane subsequently nosed into the water. The pilot and passengers were assisted by a nearby vessel and the airplane subsequently sank into 50 ft of water. Inclement sea and wind conditions prevented recovery of the wreckage for 52 days, and the wreckage was stored outside for an additional 13 days before recovery by the salvage company. Extensive saltwater corrosion prevented metallurgical examination of the landing gear components; however, no indication of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure was found.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to attempt a takeoff in rough sea conditions, resulting in damage to the floats and the sinking of the seaplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair C-131B Samaritan off Miami: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 8, 2019 at 1216 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N145GT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nassau - Miami
MSN:
256
YOM:
1955
Flight number:
QAI504
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
23000
Captain / Total hours on type:
725.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
650
Copilot / Total hours on type:
305
Aircraft flight hours:
12701
Circumstances:
According to the first officer, during the first cargo flight of the day, the left engine propeller control was not working properly and the captain indicated that they would shut down the airplane and contact maintenance if the left engine propeller control could not be reset before the return flight. For the return flight, the engines started normally, and both propellers were cycled. The captain and the first officer were able to reset the left propeller control, so the airplane departed with the first officer as the pilot flying. The takeoff and initial climb were normal; however, as the airplane climbed through 4,000 ft, the left engine propeller control stopped working and the power was stuck at 2,400 rpm. The captain tried to adjust the propeller control and inadvertently increased power to 2,700 rpm. The captain then took control of the airplane and tried to stabilize the power on both engines. He leveled the airplane at 4,500 ft, canceled the instrument flight rules flight plan, and flew via visual flight rules direct toward the destination airport. The first officer suggested that they return to the departure airport, but the captain elected to continue as planned (The destination airport was located about 160 nautical miles from the departure airport). The first officer's postaccident statements indicated that he did not challenge the captain's decision. When the flight began the descent to 1,500 ft, the right engine began to surge and lose power. The captain and the first officer performed the engine failure checklist, and the captain feathered the propeller and shut down the engine. Shortly afterward, the left engine began to surge and lose power. The captain told the first officer to declare an emergency. The airplane continued to descend, and the airplane impacted the water "violently," about 32 miles east of the destination airport. The captain was unresponsive after the impact and the first officer was unable to lift the captain from his seat. Because the cockpit was filling rapidly with water, the first officer grabbed the life raft and exited the airplane from where the tail section had separated from the empennage. The first officer did not know what caused both engines to lose power. The airplane was not recovered from the ocean, so examination and testing to determine the cause of the engine failures could not be performed. According to the operator, the flight crew should have landed as soon as practical after the first sign of a mechanical issue. Thus, the crew should have diverted to the closest airport when the left engine propeller control stopped working and not continued the flight toward the destination airport.
Probable cause:
The captain's decision to continue with the flight with a malfunctioning left engine propeller control and the subsequent loss of engine power on both engines for undetermined reasons, which resulted in ditching into the ocean. Contributing to the accident was the first officer's failure to challenge the captain's decision to continue with the flight.
Final Report: