Crash of an Aérospatiale SN.601 Corvette in Toulouse

Date & Time: Oct 16, 2000 at 0700 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-BUQN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Toulouse - Nantes
MSN:
03
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 33 at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport, at a speed of 50 knots, it is believed that the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft skidded on runway, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All eight occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Piper PA-61P Aerostar (Ted Smith 601) in Burlington

Date & Time: Oct 12, 2000 at 0931 LT
Registration:
C-FAWF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Burlington – Toronto
MSN:
61-0629-7963287
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15000
Captain / Total hours on type:
30.00
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that after rotation, he obtained a positive rate of climb. At 110 knots, with the landing gear retracted and the wing flaps at 10 degrees, he noticed a right roll, a drop in climb performance, and a drop of manifold pressure on the right engine to at least 34 inches. The left engine maintained 42 inches. The pilot decided that, due to a "very minimum climb rate, rising terrain ahead, [and] airspeed not increasing," he would land the airplane in a small field about 1/4 mile and 50 degrees to the left. The pilot abruptly lowered the nose of the airplane and raised the flaps to gain airspeed, then landed with a nose-high attitude and the landing gear partially extended. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed there was vertical compression to the belly area, the fuselage was spilt across the top at the aft end of the cabin, and both wings were damaged, with the left wing buckled downward just inboard of the engine. Examination also revealed that a clamp on the right engine intake manifold was loose. An estimated takeoff weight placed the airplane 74 pounds over the maximum allowed of 6,200 pounds. The type certificate holder estimated that with the airplane at 6,400 pounds, climbing at 110 kts, and with a partial power loss down to 26 inches on one engine, the rate of climb should have been 1,150 fpm with flaps and landing gear up, and 830 fpm with flaps 10 degrees and landing gear down. Higher terrain was to the east, and lower terrain was to the west. Terrain elevation for a straight-out departure was 25 feet above the runway at 0.5 nm, and 70 feet above the runway at 2.8 nm. The pilot reported his total flight experience as 15,000 hours, which included 13,000 hours in multi-engine airplanes, and 30 hours in make and model, all with the preceding 90 days.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper in-flight decision to perform a precautionary landing, and his failure to maintain airspeed after he experienced a partial loss of power on one engine. A factor was the partial loss of power on one engine due to an induction air leak.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair CL-604-2B16 Challenger in Wichita: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2000 at 1452 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FTBZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wichita - Wichita
MSN:
5991
YOM:
1994
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
6159
Captain / Total hours on type:
189.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6540
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
1226
Circumstances:
On October 10, 2000, at 1452 central daylight time, a Canadair Challenger CL-600-2B16 (CL604) (Canadian registration C-FTBZ and operated by Bombardier Incorporated) was destroyed on impact with terrain and postimpact fire during initial climb from runway 19R at Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as an experimental test flight. The pilot and flight test engineer were killed. The copilot was seriously injured and died 36 days later.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s excessive takeoff rotation, during an aft center of gravity (c.g.) takeoff, a rearward migration of fuel during acceleration and takeoff and consequent shift in the airplane’s aft c.g. to aft of the aft c.g. limit, which caused the airplane to stall at an altitude too low for recovery. Contributing to the accident were Bombardier’s inadequate flight planning procedures for the Challenger flight test program and the lack of direct, on-site operational oversight by Transport Canada and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E18S in Washington Court House: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2000 at 0145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N2067C
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Washington Court House – Wilmington
MSN:
BA-424
YOM:
1959
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
22500
Captain / Total hours on type:
17000.00
Circumstances:
The airplane was observed to depart normally for a positioning flight conducted during night visual meteorological conditions. In addition, the landing gear was observed to retract after takeoff. A witness who lived near the accident site heard a "loud" engine noise and observed the airplane just above the trees. The airplane then pitched down, impacted the ground, and exploded. The airplane impacted in a soybean field about a 1/2 mile from the departure end of the runway. Two pairs of ground scars were observed at the beginning of the debris path. The initial pair of ground scars were about 2 to 3 feet in length and were located about 380 feet south of the main wreckage. A pair of 10 to 12 foot long ground scars were located about 10 feet forward of the initial ground scars and they contained portions of the left and right engines; respectively. There was no impact damage observed to the portion of the soy bean field located in-between the second ground scar and the main wreckage. Prior to the flight, maintenance personnel replaced a frayed elevator trim cable. The work was supervised and checked by the accident pilot. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact failure; however, a significant portion of the airplane was consumed in a post crash fire. Examination of the propellers revealed damage consistent with engine operation at the time of impact. The pilot reported 22,500 hours of total flight experience, with over 17,00 flight hours in make and model.
Probable cause:
An undetermined event, which resulted in an off airport landing. A factor in this accident was the night light condition.
Final Report:

Crash of a Short SC.7 Skyvan 3 Variant 100 in Port Radium: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 8, 2000 at 1520 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FSDZ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Yellowknife – Kugluktuk – Port Radium – Yellowknife
MSN:
1953
YOM:
1977
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
22000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
280
Copilot / Total hours on type:
100
Circumstances:
At 1108 mountain daylight time on 08 October 2000, the Summit Air Charter's Short Brothers SC-7 Skyvan, serial number SH1953, departed on a visual flight rules six-hour flight from Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, to Kugluktuk, Nunavut, to Port Radium, Northwest Territories, and back to Yellowknife. The flight plan indicated a one-hour stop in Kugluktuk, with an estimated time of arrival at Yellowknife of 1710. The pilot-in-command was the chief pilot of Summit Air Charters Ltd. A cargo handler, who was also a pilot, was in the co-pilot's seat, and there was one passenger. When the aircraft failed to arrive at Yellowknife, Search and Rescue (SAR) were alerted and a search was begun. At 2202 SAR personnel confirmed that the SAR satellite was picking up an emergency locator transmitter signal in the vicinity of Port Radium. SAR aircraft were directed to the signal location and found the signal source but were not able to see the wreckage because of fog and freezing rain. The wreckage was found at 1309 the following day. The aircraft had struck the top of steeply rising hills along the east shore of Great Bear Lake, approximately 2.9 nautical miles northeast of the Port Radium airstrip. The crash site is approximately 440 feet above the lake surface and 250 feet above the airstrip elevation (see Appendix A). The aircraft was destroyed, and the three persons on board were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. Although the pilot and the aircraft were certified for instrument flight, the pilot apparently continued to fly in accordance with visual flight rules after encountering marginal weather conditions and reduced visibility.
2. For undetermined reasons, the pilot descended below the elevation of the terrain surrounding the airstrip, resulting in a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident.
Finding as to Risk:
1. Given the pilot's flying time during the 30 days before the accident, the pilot=s performance might have been affected by fatigue.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-26A Marquise in Martha’s Vineyard: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 6, 2000 at 2158 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N60BT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Trenton – Martha’s Vineyard
MSN:
358
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1946
Captain / Total hours on type:
253.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5400
Circumstances:
The pilot departed on a night cross-country flight without obtaining a weather briefing or flight plan. Arriving in the area of the destination airport, the weather was reported as, 2 statute miles of visibility and mist; overcast cloud layer at 100 feet. The pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance from the approach controller, and was vectored and cleared for the ILS 24 approach. The clearance included an altitude restriction of 1,500 feet msl, until the airplane was established on the localizer. As the pilot contacted the control tower, the tower controller issued a low altitude alert to the pilot. The pilot replied that he was climbing and the tower controller cleared the pilot to land, which the pilot acknowledged. No further pertinent radio transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 3/4-mile from the runway threshold, and about 50 feet right of the extended centerline. Review of the approach plate for the ILS 24 approach revealed that the minimum glide slope intercept altitude at the beginning of the final approach segment on the precision approach was 1,500 feet. The glide slope altitude at the final approach fix for the non-precision approach, which was located about 4 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 1,407 feet. The glide slope altitude at the middle marker, which was located about 0.6 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 299 feet. Review of radar data revealed that the airplane was observed at 700 feet, about 4 miles from the airport, and at 300 feet, about 1.5 miles from the airport. The pilot had accumulated about 1,946 hours of total flight experience, with about 252 hours in make and model. The pilot had attended initial and recurrent training for the make and model airplane; however, did not complete the training. The pilot, aged 61, was Charles B. Yates, member of the New Jersey Senate, who was flying to Martha's Vineyard with his wife and two of his three children.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to follow instrument flight procedures resulting in a collision with a tree. A factor related to the accident was the low cloud ceiling.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-9-31 in Reynosa: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 6, 2000 at 1655 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N936ML
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mexico City - Reynosa
MSN:
47501
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
AM250
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
85
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
10184
Captain / Total hours on type:
701.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1764
Copilot / Total hours on type:
40
Aircraft flight hours:
74277
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Mexico City, the crew started the descent to Reynosa-General Lucio Blanco Airport and encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls issued from the tropical storm 'Keith'. Following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft was too high on the glide and approaching at an excessive speed. It landed too far down the wet runway 31 and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage, struck several houses, went down an embankment and came to rest in a canal. All 90 occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was slightly injured. On the ground, four people were killed.
Probable cause:
Long landing and contact, after a high approach with excessive speed as a result of a non-precision approach, on a waterlogged runway and in adverse weather conditions (discharge of CB's in the area), with the aircraft departing from the opposite runway threshold (13).
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-72 in Luzamba

Date & Time: Oct 6, 2000
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TL-ACW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
36572090796
YOM:
1990
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Luzamba Airport, the crew encountered atmospheric turbulences. The captain increased engine power, causing the approach speed to increase as well. The aircraft, too high, landed too far down the runway. Realizing the situation after touchdown, the captain abandoned the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. While climbing, the crew was aware he should follow a downwind circuit at low height because of hostile actions in the area. During the second approach, the crew forgot to lower the landing gear so the aircraft landed on its belly and slid for about 350 metres before coming to rest on the runway. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The crew failed to follow the approach checklist and forgot to lower the landing gear during the second approach. As the landing gear were not lowered, an alarm sounded in the cockpit but the crew thought this was a mistake and failed to lower the gear or to initiate a second go-around procedure.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BK in Petrel

Date & Time: Oct 3, 2000
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
04 red
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
8 34 60 05
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing, the four engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 200 metres further. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Convair CV-580 in La Grande-4

Date & Time: Sep 27, 2000 at 1038 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GFHH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Montreal – Rouyn – La Grande-3 (LG-3) – La Grande-4 (LG-4) – Montreal
MSN:
109
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
APZ180
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15500
Captain / Total hours on type:
6000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
11000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4000
Aircraft flight hours:
78438
Circumstances:
The Hydro-Québec Convair 340 (580), registration C-GFHH, serial number 109, with 18 passengers and 4 crew members on board, made an instrument flight rules flight from La Grande 3 to La Grande 4, Quebec. The aircraft touched down on the snow-covered runway at La Grande 4 approximately 800 feet beyond the runway threshold. Shortly after the nose wheel touched down and the pilot set the propellers to reverse pitch, the aircraft drifted to the right. Despite the attempts of the pilot flying (the captain) to correct, the aircraft continued its course and exited the south side of Runway 09 at approximately 50 knots. The aircraft travelled 350 feet over soft, rocky ground and came to rest about 120 feet outside the runway edge, about 2500 feet from the runway threshold. The flight crew followed the procedure to shut down the engines, but the left engine would not stop. On the captain's order, the first officer went into the passenger cabin and ordered an evacuation. All passengers exited the aircraft via the window emergency exits over the right wing. The left engine eventually shut down on its own after about 15 minutes. Five persons sustained minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage but did not catch fire.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The steering control valve lever was not reassembled in accordance with the specifications and the drawings in the overhaul manual and the maintenance manual: the lever was assembled with two washers instead of one, and the circumference of the bushing was 0.0005 inch greater than the circumference of the hole in the lever. These two deficiencies created additional resistance that
impeded the pivoting of the aircraft steering wheel.
2. The nylon locknuts were reinstalled during the repair of the steering control valve, contrary to the recommendation that they be used only once. The locknuts then came loose in service, creating play in the parts of the valve.
3. Incorrect interpretation of the problem and the influence of previous experience using the nose-gear steering wheel led the crew to make the flight despite their concern about the aircraft's nose-gear steering system.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The maintenance personnel of Precision Aero Components Inc. used the (incomplete) maintenance manual instead of the overhaul manual to overhaul and repair the steering control valve,
contributing to the incorrect reassembly of the valve.
2. The steering control valve lever was not fitted with a grease fitting, and the outside of the bushing was not grooved to allow adequate lubrication, thereby risking corrosion and seizure of the bushing inside the lever.
3. The limited experience and the lack of formal training of the maintenance personnel concerning the repair and the overhaul on the steering control valve might have contributed to the incorrect
reassembly of the steering control valve.
4. The pilot flying cut the electrical power, as required by the hard landing procedure. The left engine could therefore not be shut down, causing a risk of injury when the passengers evacuated.
5. The pilot flying cut the electrical power after the aircraft exited the runway, as required by the hard landing procedure. The electrical power required to operate the public address and alarm systems was thereby lost, and the evacuation could not be ordered promptly.
6. The evacuation slide automatic deployment system was inadvertently deactivated, which could have delayed the evacuation and compromised passenger safety.
7. After separating from the engine, the left propeller blades entered the fuselage and damaged an unoccupied seat.
Other Findings:
1. The numerous changes in ownership of the Convair type certificate and the lack of technical support from the current holder caused maintenance problems for Convair operators and approved
maintenance organizations (AMOs), particularly for recently established AMOs.