Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The crew was returning to Miramar NAS following a routine training mission in Grand Junction. On final approach to Miramar NAS by night, the aircraft crashed near the interstate 15, about 2,400 metres short of runway 24R. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed. A weather observation taken from the base at 2045LT reported five-mile visibility with light fog or haze, and a cloud ceiling at 800 feet.
Crew:
Lt Col T. Nicholson,
Lt Col Robert Zeisler.
Passengers:
Sgt Francisco Cortez,
Cpl Jeremy Lindroth.

The aircraft departed Ankara, Turkey, on a cargo flight to Kabul, Afghanistan, with an intermediate stop in Baku, Azerbaijan. In Ankara, the airplane was loaded with 39,980 kg of cargo. At Baku Airport, 47 tons of fuel were added, bringing the takeoff weight to 189 tons, and the centre of gravity to 29,3% MAC, which was within the prescribed limits. During the eight-hour stopover the crew decided to rest in the aircraft instead of a hotel. As the aircraft started taxiing to the runway the flight engineer was heard saying that he would select the flaps at 30 degrees and slats at 14 degrees for takeoff. This however was not done. Prior to takeoff the position of the flaps was not verified by any of the crew members. Takeoff was thus commenced with flaps and slats retracted and the stabilizer trimmed at the takeoff position -4 degrees (corresponding to actual takeoff weight, CofG and flaps at 30°). At a speed of 210 km/h the pilot pulled on the control column to lift off the nose gear. At a calculated unstick speed of 265 km/h the angle of attack reached 9 degrees but the plane did not lift off the runway. Accelerating through 290 km/h the angle of attack of the aircraft reached 14,5 degrees, setting off the angle of attack warning on the flight deck. Some 1750 meters down the runway, the aft fuselage struck the runway. Seventy meters further on, at a speed of 300 km/h and an angle of attack of 19,4°, the Ilyushin lifted off the runway. The air traffic controller who witnessed the departure advised the crew to abort the takeoff, but the captain apparently continued. The airplane rolled to the left until the wing contacted the runway. Then the flight engineer noted his error and, without informing the captain, began extending the flaps and slats. Again without informing the captain, the flight engineer brought back the power levers of the four engines to idle. After three seconds he moved them from idle to the 'engine shutdown' position. The captain three times yelled "takeoff" but the engines were already shut down. After flying for 490 meters the aircraft struck the ground and crashed.

During the takeoff roll on runway 34 at Jeddah-King Abdulaziz Airport, ATC informed the crew about a fire on the left main gear. The captain rejected takeoff and was able to stop the aircraft within the remaining distance. All 273 occupants evacuated safely but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The captain and first officer were conducting a CFR Part 135 on-demand charter flight, returning two passengers to the accident airplane's base airport. The multi-destination flight originated from the accident airport, about 16 hours before the accident. On the final leg of the flight, the flight encountered stronger than anticipated headwinds, and the first officer voiced his concern several times about the airplane's remaining fuel. As the flight approached the destination airport, the captain became concerned about having to fly an extended downwind leg, and told the ATCT specialist the flight was low on fuel. The ATCT specialist then cleared the accident airplane for a priority landing. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, while the crew was attempting to lower the airplane's wing flaps in preparation for landing, they discovered that the flaps would not extend beyond 8 degrees. After the landing gear was lowered, the captain told the first officer, in part: "The gear doors are stuck down.... no hydraulics." The captain told the first officer: "Okay, so we're gonna do, this is gonna be a ref and twenty...All right, probably not going to have any brakes..." According to a ATCT specialist in the control tower, the airplane touched down about midway on the 6001-foot long, dry runway. It continued to the end of the runway, entered the overrun area, struck a chain link fence, crossed a road, and struck a building. During a postaccident interview, the captain reported that during the landing roll the first officer was unable to deploy the airplane's emergency drag chute. He said that neither he nor the first officer attempted to activate the nitrogen-charged emergency brake system. The accident airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers. A postaccident examination of the accident airplane's hydraulic pressure relief valve and hydraulic pressure regulator assembly revealed numerous indentations and small gouges on the exterior portions of both components, consistent with being repeatedly struck with a tool. When the hydraulic pressure relief valve was tested and disassembled, it was discovered that the valve piston was stuck open. The emergency drag chute release handle has two safety latches that must be depressed simultaneously before the parachute will activate. An inspection of the emergency drag chute system and release handle disclosed no pre accident mechanical anomalies.

The airplane collided with terrain 200 yards short of the runway during an emergency landing following a loss of engine power. The pilot was on an intermediate leg of a ferry trip. Approximately 300 miles from land, the fuel flow and boost pump lights illuminated. Then, the right engine failed. The pilot flew back to the nearest airport; however, approximately 200 yards from the runway, the airplane stalled and the right wing dropped and collided with the ground. The fuel system had been modified a few months prior to the accident to allow for a ferry fuel tank installation. Post accident examination of the airplane could not find a reason for the power loss.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Madrid-Getafe AFB when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances near Parla, about 8 km south of the airbase. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The emergency medical services (EMS) airplane was destroyed by terrain impact and post impact fire about 7 nautical miles (nm) west of its destination airport, Dodge City Regional Airport (DDC), Dodge City, Kansas. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight departed the Wichita Mid-Continental Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, about 0215 central standard time and was en route to DDC. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed when the accident occurred about 0257 central standard time. The flight had been on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, but the pilot cancelled the IFR flight plan about 34 nm east of DDC and initiated a descent under visual flight rules. Radar track data indicated that the airplane maintained a magnetic course of about 265 degrees during the flight from ICT to DDC. The rate of descent was about 850 to 950 feet per minute. During the descent, the airplane flew past the airport on a 270 degree course. Witnesses in the area reported hearing the engine noise of a low-flying airplane followed by the sound of impact. One of the witnesses described the engine noise as sounding like the engines were at "full throttle." The on-site inspection revealed that the airplane impacted the terrain in a gear-up, wings-level attitude. The inspection of the airplane revealed no anomalies to the airframe or engines. A review of the pilot's 72-hour history before the accident revealed that it had been 14 hours and 32 minutes from the time the pilot reported for duty about 1225 central standard time until the time of the accident. It had been 20 hours 57 minutes from the time the pilot awoke (0600) on the morning before the accident until the time of the accident. No evidence of pilot impairment due to carbon monoxide, drugs, or medical incapacitation was found. The accident occurred during a time of day that was well past the pilot's normal bedtime and also at a time of day when the physiological need to sleep is especially strong. The findings from a Safety Board's human performance analysis indicates that the pilot was likely fatigued. A review of 14 CFR 135.267 indicated that the pilot had adhered to the flight time limitations and rest requirements specified in the regulation.

The twin engine aircraft departed Linz-Hörsching Airport on a taxi flight to Stuttgart with five passengers and two pilots on board. During the takeoff roll on runway 27, at a speed of 105 knots, the crew started the rotation. Immediately after liftoff, the aircraft adopted a high nose attitude with an excessive angle of attack. It rolled to the left, causing the left gear door and the left propeller to struck the runway surface, followed shortly later by the right propeller. After the speed dropped, the aircraft stalled and crash landed on the runway. It slid for few dozen metres and came to rest 2,752 metres past the runway threshold. All seven occupants were evacuated, one passenger suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was operating as a scheduled flight from Kish Island, Iran to Sharjah, UAE with the captain initially as the pilot flying (PF). During the cruise and just prior to descent, the captain unexpectedly handed over control of the aircraft to the First Officer prior to the approach to Sharjah. The first officer did not accept this willingly and stated that he was not confident of his ability to conduct a VOR/DME approach into Sharjah. This statement was not consistent with his previous experience and could indicate either a cultural or professional issue. The captain insisted the first officer fly the aircraft and encouraged and instructed him during the approach. At 11:24 hours local time, the aircraft contacted Dubai Arrivals and was cleared from 9000 ft to 5000 ft and instructed to expect a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Sharjah International Airport. At 11:29 hours the aircraft was further cleared to 2500 ft and cleared for the approach. The aircraft was under its own navigation and the daylight conditions were fine with excellent visibility. At 11:35 hours the aircraft was instructed to contact Sharjah Tower and the pilot reported that the aircraft was established on the VOR final approach for runway 12. The Tower cleared IRK7170 to land and advised that the wind was calm. At that point the aircraft was slightly above the approach profile. The initial speed for the approach was at least 50 kt high at approximately 190 kt with no flap and no landing gear. The aircraft should have been configured with landing gear down and flap 10° during the approach and stabilized at 130 kt prior to the MDA. Approaching the MDA at flight idle setting, the autopilot was disengaged and the first Officer called for flap 10 at 186 kt (limiting speed of 180 kt) and flap 25 was selected by the Captain, a setting uncalled for by the Pilot Flying at 183 kt (limiting speed of 160 kt), and the landing gear was called for and selected at approximately 185 kt (limiting speed of 170 kt). The captain then took control of the aircraft and shortly afterwards the ground range selectors were heard by Cockpit Voice Recorder to be lifted and the power levers moved from the flight idle stop into the ground control range. The left propeller then went to full reverse whilst the right propeller remained in positive pitch within the ground control range. The aircraft descended in an extreme nose low left bank attitude until impact. The aircraft crashed 2.6 nm from the runway onto an unprepared sandy area adjacent to a road and residential buildings. The aircraft broke apart on impact and a fire started immediately. Three passengers suffered injuries while 43 other occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Dubai, the crew started the descent to Colombo-Bandaranaike Airport by night and good weather conditions, using a GPS and DME systems. After being cleared to descend to FL150, the crew received the QNH and QFE values for Colombo: 1009 mb (hectopascals) and 756 mm Hg. The copilot mistakenly input 765 mm Hg instead of 756 mm Hg in the altimeters. At a distance of 14 km from the airport, the aircraft was 60 metres above the sea. It continued to descend until the undercarriage struck the water surface at a distance of 10,7 km from the runway 04 threshold. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure but shortly later, at a height of about 60-90 metres, he continued the approach. Assuming the undercarriage may have been damaged, he decided to carry out a belly landing. The aircraft landed 50 metres to the right of the main runway and 450 metres past its threshold. The aircraft then slid for a distance of 2,230 before coming to rest. All seven occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.