Test

On 24th May, 2011 at 11:54 h, a Beechcraft C90 aircraft with nationality and registration marks N364UZ, operated by Shoreline Energy International Limited (SEIL), departed Old Kaduna (Military) airport on a test flight with a pilot and another person onboard with three hours fuel endurance. The test flight was on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. According to an eye witness, the aircraft sound was unusual and the aircraft seemed not to be gaining altitude after takeoff. Another eye witness (a local farmer), stated that he saw the aircraft moving up and down with increasing and decreasing engine sound. Thereafter, the aircraft impacted a mango tree, turned and crashed. The local farmer further stated that he and some military personnel tried all they could to rescue the occupants inside the aircraft but their efforts were not successful. At 11:59 h, the aircraft crashed on a farm-land 878 meters short of RWY 23 (military) and engulfed into flames. The two occupants were fatally injured. Dornier Aviation Nigeria AIEP (DANA) and Nigerian Air Force (NAF) fire-fighting personnel were dispatched immediately. There was no direct access between the runway and the accident site, which delayed the fire trucks from reaching the aircraft at accident site on time. The accident occurred in day light, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

On April 2, 2011, about 0934 mountain daylight time, an experimental Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation GVI (G650), N652GD, crashed during takeoff from runway 21 at Roswell International Air Center, Roswell, New Mexico. The two pilots and the two flight test engineers were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces and a post crash fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Gulfstream as part of its G650 flight test program. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The accident occurred during a planned one-engine-inoperative (OEI) takeoff when a stall on the right outboard wing produced a rolling moment that the flight crew was not able to control, which led to the right wingtip contacting the runway and the airplane departing the runway from the right side. After departing the runway, the airplane impacted a concrete structure and an airport weather station, resulting in extensive structural damage and a post crash fire that completely consumed the fuselage and cabin interior.

The airplane had not been flown for about 5 months and the purpose of the accident flight was a maintenance test flight after both engines had been replaced with higher horsepower models. Witnesses observed the airplane depart and complete two uneventful touch-and-go landings. The airplane was then observed to be struggling to gain altitude and airspeed while maneuvering in the traffic pattern. One witness, who was an aircraft mechanic, reported that he observed the airplane yawing to the left and heard noises associated with propeller pitch changes, which he believed were consistent with the "Beta" range. The airplane stalled and impacted trees in a wooded marsh area, about 1 mile from the airport. It came to rest about 80-degrees vertically. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions; however, the lack of flight recorders and the condition of the wreckage precluded the gathering of additional relevant information. Damage observed to both engines and both propellers revealed they were likely operating at symmetrical power settings and blade angles at the time of the impact, with any differences in scoring signatures likely the result of impact damage. The reason for the yawing and the noise associated with propeller pitch changes that were reported prior to the stall could not be determined.

The aircraft departed Voronezh-Pridacha Airport in the morning to conduct a test flight with six crew on board, two pilots from the manufacturer, two engineers and two pilots from the Myanmar Air Force to whom the aircraft should be delivered. In flight, the crew decided to perform an emergency descent. During this manoeuvre, the aircraft reached an excessive speed and lost part of its tail, stabilizers and elevators. It entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a snow covered field located near Garbuzovo, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all six occupants were killed. Tail parts, stabilizers and elevators were later found about 3 km from the point of impact. The airplane was operated by the Voronezh Aircraft Production Association. (VASO - Voronezhskoye Aktsionernoye Samoletostroitelnoe Obshestvo). First accident involving an Antonov AN-148.

On 12 February 2011, a CASA C212-100 aircraft, registered PK-ZAI, operated by Sabang Merauke Raya Air Charter (SMAC), departed from Hang Nadim Airport, Batam (BTH/WIDD) at 1318 LT (0618 UTC)1 for a test flight following an engine replacement to the engine number one. The test flight was conducted over Tanjung Pinang Island area. There were five persons on board consisted of two pilots, and three company engineers. At 0628 UTC the aircraft appeared on Tanjung Pinang Approach radar display and was flying toward Tanjung Pinang area. Tanjung Pinang Approach controller informed that the aircraft was identified flying over Tanjung Pinang at 2000 feet. At 0633 UTC the aircraft received clearance to climb to 4000 feet. At 0644 UTC the aircraft disappeared from Tanjung Pinang radar display. The last position of the aircraft identified on the radar display was on 16 miles radial 010º from Tanjung Pinang airport. Tanjung Pinang Approach controller could not communicate with the PK-ZAI. At 0705 UTC, the controller requested relay by another aircraft to search PK-ZAI. The other aircrafts could not communicate with PK-ZAI. At 0706 UTC Tanjung Pinang Approach controller received information from Indonesian Air Force Base at Gunung Bintan that an aircraft had crashed at Gunung Kijang forest, Bintan Island. After receiving the information, Tanjung Pinang Airport staff coordinated with SAR Bureau, local police, and Indonesian Army for search and rescue operation. The aircraft was found at Gunung Kijang forest, Bintan Island at coordinate 1° 10’ 45” N; 104° 34’ 22” E, about 30 km north of Tanjung Pinang Airport. All occupants were fatally injured in this accident. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a local post maintenance test flight from Nairobi-Wilson Airport. The crew consisted of two pilots and two engineers. During the takeoff roll from runway 07, the captain decided to abort. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, went through a fence, lost its nose gear and came to rest in a field. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft had recently been purchased in Germany and was flown to the United Kingdom on 11 December 2009 by the pilot of the accident flight. The new owner, who accompanied him for the flight from Germany, was a private pilot himself and was the passenger in the accident. The aircraft landed at Oxford on the evening of 11 December. The pilot reported to a maintenance organisation that there had been a problem with the brakes after landing and the aircraft was left parked outside a hangar. Minor maintenance was carried out on 20 December 2009 and on 9 January 2010 the aircraft was refuelled, but it was not flown again until the accident flight. On the morning of 15 January 2010 the pilot and his passenger met at Oxford Airport and prepared the aircraft for flight. The plan was to carry out an air test, although its exact nature was not established. The flight was pre‑notified to Royal Air Force (RAF) Brize Norton as an air test with a requested level of FL190. At 1344 hrs the aircraft taxied out to Holding Point C for Runway 19 at Oxford. The pilot reported ‘READY FOR DEPARTURE’ at 1400 hrs and was given a clearance for a right turn after takeoff with a climb initially to FL80. The pilot then requested the latest weather information and the tower controller provided the following information: ‘........TWO THOUSAND METRES IN MIST AND CLOUD IS BROKEN AT 200 FEET.’ At 1403 hrs the takeoff commenced and shortly after liftoff Oxford ATC suggested that the pilot should contact Brize Radar on 124.275 Megahertz (MHz). The pilot made contact with Brize Radar at 1404 hrs, two-way communication was established and the provision of a Deconfliction Service was agreed. On the radar screen the Brize Norton controller observed the ‘Mode C’ (altitude) return increase to around 1,500 ft and then noticed it decrease, seeing returns of 1,300 ft and 900 ft, before the secondary return disappeared. At 1406 hrs the Brize Norton controller contacted Oxford ATC to ask if the aircraft had landed back there and was advised that it had not done so, but that it could be heard overhead. The Brize Norton controller told Oxford ATC that they had a continuing contact, but no Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). The Oxford controller could still hear an aircraft in the vicinity and agreed with the Brize Norton controller to attempt to make contact. At 1407 hrs Oxford ATC made several calls to the aircraft but there was no reply. The Oxford controller told the Brize Norton controller there was no reply and was informed in return that there was no longer any radar contact either. The Brize Norton controller also attempted to call the aircraft at 1407 hrs but without success. At 1410 hrs the Oxford controller advised the Brize Norton controller that there was smoke visible to the west of the airfield and they would alert both the airport and local emergency services. In the meantime several witnesses saw the aircraft crash into a field to the west of Oxford Airport. A severe fire started soon afterwards and bystanders who arrived at the scene were not able to get close to the aircraft. The local emergency services were notified of the accident by witnesses at 1407 hrs.

The pilot flew the airplane to a maintenance facility and turned it in for a phase inspection. The next morning, he arrived at the airport and planned a local flight to evaluate some avionics issues. He performed a preflight inspection and then went inside the maintenance facility to wait for two avionic technicians to arrive. In the meantime, two employees of the maintenance facility test ran the engines on the accident airplane for about 30 to 35 minutes in preparation for the phase inspection. The pilot reported that he was unaware that the engine run had been performed when he returned to the airplane for the local flight. He referred to the flight management system (FMS) fuel totalizer, and not the aircraft fuel gauges, when he returned to the airplane for the flight. He believed that the mechanics who ran the engines did not power up the FMS, which would have activated the fuel totalizer, thus creating a discrepancy between the totalizer and the airplane fuel gauges. The mechanics who performed the engine run reported that each tank contained 200 pounds of fuel at the conclusion of the engine run. The B200 Pilot’s Operating Handbook directed pilots not take off if the fuel quantity gauges indicate in the yellow arc or indicate less than 265 pounds of fuel in each main tank system. While on final approach, about 23 minutes into the flight, the right engine lost power, followed by the left. The pilot attempted to glide to the runway with the landing gear and flaps retracted, however the airplane crashed short of the runway. Only residual fuel was found in the main and auxiliary fuel tanks during the inspection of the wreckage. The tanks were not breached and there was no evidence of fuel leakage at the accident site.

The single engine aircraft departed Managua-Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport for a local post maintenance check flight following an engine overhaul. On board were five engineers and pilots. On final approach, the engine failed. The pilot-in-command attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field and came to rest upside down about 800 metres short of runway threshold. All five occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Learjet 40 was being operated by two A&P mechanics for the purpose to taxi out for an engine test run on the n°1 engine. During taxi it was necessary to stop the aircraft for motor vehicle traffic. The mechanic advanced the throttles for taxi and to climb a 15 to 20 foot hill. When the mechanic attempted to reduce the throttles only the n° 2 engine could be retarded. The n°1 engine was at a high power setting and could not be reduced. The aircraft left 4 skid marks as the main tires were locked for approximately the length of a little more than a football field. The mechanics could not shut down the n°1 engine. Control of the aircraft was lost with the n°1 engine at a high power setting. The right wing impacted the corner of a hanger. The nose gear broke and an embankment stopped the aircraft. The mechanics were then able to shut down both engines and exited the aircraft with no injuries.