Private

The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff the engine lost power momentarily, just before losing power completely. The pilot performed an emergency landing in a nearby field. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the forced landing. The airframe, engine, and engine accessories were examined. Fuel was noted at the engine, and no anomalies were revealed that would have contributed to the accident. The cause of the loss of power could not be determined.

The pilot stated he experienced a high temperature in the right engine and a partial loss of engine rpm while at 9,000 feet mean sea level in cruise flight. He requested and received clearance from air traffic control to descend and divert to another airport. He leveled the airplane at 2,500 feet and both engines were operating; however, the right engine experienced a loss of rpm which made it difficult to maintain altitude. The pilot reduced power in both engines, turned the fuel boost pump on, opened the cowl flaps and the engine continued to run with a low rpm. The pilot elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean, instead of landing as soon as practical at the nearest suitable airport, as instructed in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). Additionally, he shut down the right engine before performing the troubleshooting items listed in the POH. He attributed his decision to ditch the airplane to poor single-engine performance and windy conditions. The wind at the destination airport was from 060 degrees at 6 knots and runway 8 was in use at the time of the accident. The airplane was not recovered.

The pilot was landing at a private strip at Wentworth. The runway was oriented 110/290° and had several level changes along its length which required all landings to be made in the 110° direction and all takeoffs in the 290° direction. Touchdown was required to take place on a level portion before the ground rose relatively steeply and levelled out again. The final part of the runway sloped gently down towards the end, which was bordered by a dry stone wall. The surface, from police photographs taken soon after the accident, showed it to be closely mown grass and firm, despite the indications of recent rain. The wind at the time was 220°/10 kt and the pilot reported that the approach was made directly into the setting sun, making it difficult to monitor the airspeed indicator. Touchdown was achieved on the first level portion of the runway and the brakes were applied very soon afterwards; however the pilot stated that there was no discernible braking action, despite applying firmer pressure on the brake pedals. Seeing that the stone wall at the end of the runway was approaching, he steered the aircraft to the right and towards a hedge, however he was unable to prevent the left wing striking the walland causing severe damage outboard of the engine. The pilot was uninjured and evacuated the aircraft normally. The police photographs indicate that the mainwheels were skidding on the wet grass almost throughout the landing roll of about 630 metres. Whilst the pilot acknowledged that his airspeed might have been somewhat high, he did not feel at the time of touchdown that his ground speed was unusual and he attributes the lack of braking action to the slippery runway surface.

About 14 minutes after departing on the cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane was observed on radar climbing through 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). At this time, the pilot radioed to air traffic control (ATC) that he was returning to the departure airport. About 7 seconds later, the pilot transmitted that he had lost an engine and again stated that he was returning to the departure airport. About 50 seconds later, the pilot transmitted, “We’re losing it.” There was no further communication with the pilot. Radar data revealed that at 14,800 feet msl the airplane began a right 360-degree turn at 8 degrees per second, and about 120 degrees into the turn, it began a descent averaging 5,783 feet per minute. The airplane remained in a right turn until radar contact was lost at 10,700 feet msl. The airplane impacted a 30-degree slope of a densely forested mountain about 2,940 feet msl in a near vertical, slightly right-wing-low attitude. A logger working in the area reported hearing a “very loud roaring sound,” like an airplane diving toward his location and that it seemed to be “really under power.” The logger described the weather as being “socked in,” with light rain and not much wind. Post accident examination revealed that propeller damage was the result of impact forces, with no indications of fatigue or propeller failure before impact. It was also noted that the left propeller was being operated under conditions of some power at impact, while the right propeller was not operating under conditions of significant power at impact. Based on these findings, it is most likely that the pilot experienced a partial loss of power of the right engine and, after incorrectly initiating a right turn into the failed engine, allowed the rate of turn to increase to the point that the airplane became uncontrollable before impact with terrain. The reason for the partial loss of engine power was not determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed San Juan-Isla Grande Airport on a private flight to Santo Domingo with two passengers and two pilots on board. On final approach to Santo Domingo-Las Américas-Dr. José Francisco Peña Gómez Airport, at an altitude of 2,000 feet and at a distance of 8 km from the airport, both engines failed simultaneously. As the crew realized he was unable to reach the airport, he attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a dense wooded area located about one km southeast of runway 35 threshold. All four occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff for a repositioning flight for the airplane’s upcoming annual inspection, numerous witnesses, including the two air traffic controllers, reported observing the airplane climbing out normally until it was about 1/2 mile beyond the runway. The witnesses stated that the airplane then underwent a short series of attitude excursions, rolled right, and descended steeply into a lagoon. All radio communications between the airplane and the air traffic controllers were normal. Ground-based radar tracking data indicated that the airplane's climb to about 500 feet was normal and that it was airborne for about 40 seconds. Postaccident examination of the airframe, systems, and engines did not reveal any mechanical failures that would have precluded continued normal operation. Damage to both engines’ propeller blades suggested low or moderate power at the time of impact; however, the right propeller blades exhibited less damage than the left. The propeller damage, witness-observed airplane dynamics, and the airplane’s trajectory were consistent with a loss of power in the right engine and a subsequent loss of control due to airspeed decay below the minimum control speed (referred to as VMC). Although required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved Airplane Flight Manual, no evidence of a cockpit placard to designate the single engine operating speeds, including VMC, was found in the wreckage. The underlying reason for the loss of power in the right engine could not be determined. The airplane's certification basis (Civil Air Regulation [CAR] 3) did not require either a red radial line denoting VMC or a blue radial line denoting the single engine climb speed (VYSE) on the airspeed indicators; no such markings were observed on the airspeed indicators in the wreckage. Those markings were only mandated for airplanes certificated under Federal Aviation Regulation Part 23, which became effective about 3 years after the accident airplane was manufactured. Neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the airplane manufacturer mandated or recommended such VMC or VYSE markings on the airspeed indicators of the accident airplane make and model. In addition, a cursory search did not reveal any such retroactive guidance for any twin-engine airplane models certificated under CAR 3. Follow-up communication from the FAA Small Airplane Directorate stated that the FAA has "not discussed this as a possible retroactive action... Our take from the accident studies is that because of the accident record with light/reciprocating engine twins, the insurance industry has restricted them to a select group of pilot/owners…" Toxicology testing revealed evidence consistent with previous use of marijuana by the pilot; however, it was not possible to determine when that usage occurred or whether the pilot might have been impaired by its use during the accident flight.

The evening prior to the accident, the pilot acquired a computer generated text weather briefing. On the day of the accident, the pilot acquired another computer generated text weather briefing, and then contacted the Flight Service Station (FSS) for an interactive telephonic weather briefing. The information provided in all three briefings indicated that a flight on a direct route between the pilot's point of departure and his planned destination would take him through an area of forecast rain showers, thunderstorms, and cloud tops significantly higher than his intended en route altitude. Although the FSS briefer recommended an alternate route, for which he provided weather information, after departure the pilot flew directly toward his destination airport. While en route, the pilot, who was not instrument rated, encountered instrument meteorological conditions, within which there was an 80 percent probability of icing. After entering the area of instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane was seen exiting the bottom of an overcast cloud layer with a significant portion of its left wing missing. It then made a high velocity steep descent into the terrain. A postaccident inspection of the airplane's structure did not find any evidence of an anomaly that would contribute to the separation of the wing structure, and it is most likely that the wing section separated as a result of the airplane exceeding its structural limitations after the pilot lost control in the instrument meteorological conditions.

The accident occurred during the Experimental Aircraft Association’s Airventure 2010 fly-in convention. Because of the high density of aircraft operations during the fly-in, the Federal Aviation Administration implemented special air traffic control procedures to accommodate traffic demand and maximize runway capacity. Arriving aircraft were issued landing instructions and clearances by a tower controller using a specified tower radio frequency. Departing aircraft were handled by another team of controllers operating on a separate radio frequency that was associated with a mobile operations unit located near the runway. Air traffic control data indicated that the accident airplane established contact with the tower controller and entered a left traffic pattern for runway 18R. As the accident airplane was turning from downwind to base leg, the controller handling departures cleared a Piper Cub for an immediate takeoff and angled departure (a procedure used by slower aircraft to clear the runway immediately after liftoff by turning across the runway edge). The accident pilot was not monitoring the departure frequency, and, therefore, he did not hear the radio transmissions indicating that the departing Piper Cub was going to offset to the left of the runway after liftoff. The accident pilot reported that, while on base leg, he became concerned that his descent path to the runway would conflict with the Piper Cub that was on takeoff roll. He stated that he overshot the runway centerline during his turn from base to final, and, when he completed the turn, his airplane was offset to the right of the runway. The pilot stated that, at this point, he decided not to land because of a perceived conflict with the departing Piper Cub that was ahead and to the left of his position. The pilot reported that he initiated a go-around, increasing engine power slightly, but not to takeoff power, as he looked for additional traffic to avoid. He estimated that he advanced the throttle levers "probably a third of the way to the stop," and, as he looked for traffic, the stall warning stick-shaker and stick-pusher systems activated almost simultaneously as the right wing stalled. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a nose down, right wing low attitude. A postaccident review of available air traffic control communications, amateur video of the accident sequence, controller and witness statements, and position data recovered from the accident airplane indicated that the Piper Cub was already airborne, had turned left, and was clear of runway 18R when the accident airplane turned from base to final. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane flight manual states that, in the event of a go-around, the pilot should first advance engine thrust to takeoff power and then establish Vref (reference landing approach speed). The pilot's decision not to select takeoff power during the go-around directly contributed to the development of the aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

The pilot was conducting the first leg of a positioning flight in an experimental, amateur built, tail-wheel turboprop airplane. During landing, the airplane touched down to the right of the runway centerline and departed the right side of the runway. The pilot then added engine power to attempt an aborted landing. The airplane lifted off the runway, pitched up at a steep angle, stalled, and impacted the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions; however, a postcrash fire consumed the majority of the wreckage. The airplane's pitch trim actuator was observed in the landing position, which was the full nose-up position and would have resulted in a steep nose-up attitude during climb-out, if not corrected by the pilot. The pilot had accumulated about 1,930 hours of total flight experience; however, he only had 5 total hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

During the 3.5-hour flight preceding the accident flight, the airplane used about 156 gallons of the 196 gallons of usable fuel. After landing, the airplane was topped off with 156 gallons of fuel for the return flight. During the preflight inspection, a line serviceman at the fixed based operator observed the right main fuel tank sump become stuck in the open position. He estimated 5 to 6 gallons of fuel were lost before the sump seal was regained, but the exact amount of fuel lost could not be determined. The lost fuel was not replaced before the airplane departed. Data from an on board GPS unit indicate that the airplane flew the return leg at an altitude of about 4,500 feet mean sea level for about 4 hours. About 4 minutes after beginning the descent to the destination airport, the pilot requested to divert to a closer airport. The pilot was cleared for an approach to runway 18R at the new destination. While on approach to land, the pilot reported to the air traffic control tower controller, “we exhausted fuel.” The airplane descended and crashed into a forested area about 1/2 mile from the airport. Post accident examination of the right and left propellers noted no leading edge impact damage or signatures indicative of rotation at the time of impact. Examination of the airplane wreckage and engines found no malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot did not report any problems with the airplane or its fuel state before announcing the fuel was exhausted. His acceptance of the approach to runway 18R resulted in the airplane flying at least 1 mile further than if he had requested to land on runway 18L instead. If the pilot had declared an emergency and made an immediate approach to the closest runway when he realized the exhausted fuel state, he likely would have reached the airport. Toxicological testing revealed cyclobenzaprine and diphenhydramine in the pilot’s system at or above therapeutic levels. Both medications carry warnings that use may impair mental and/or physical abilities required for activities such as driving or operating heavy machinery. The airplane would have used about 186 gallons of fuel on the 4-hour return flight if the engines burned fuel at the same rate as the previous flight. The fuel lost during the preflight inspection and the additional 30 minutes of flight time on the return leg reduced the airplane’s usable fuel available to complete the planned flight, and the pilot likely did not recognize the low fuel state before the fuel was exhausted due to impairment by the medications he was taking.