Postal (mail)

The twin engine airplane departed São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport at 0440LT on a postal service (flight TTL5561) to Londrina with two pilots on board. About an hour into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the autopilot disconnected while the crew was encountering technical problems with the elevator trim system. The captain asked the copilot to pull out the circuit breaker but this instruction was not understood immediately. Nevertheless, the copilot executed this request few seconds later. Shortly later, the aircraft nosed down and the Vmo alarm sounded, indicating to the crew that the aircraft's speed was above the maximum operating speed. The crew reduced the engine power to 10% but the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 366 knots in an open field located 38 km south of Paranapanema. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and both pilots were killed. Some debris were found at a depth of three metres.

The aircraft was on a scheduled freight flight from Bloemfontein to George. Poor weather conditions prevailed over the George area and the pilots had to execute an instrument guided approach for the landing. The ground based Instrument Landing System (ILS) on Runway 29 at George Aerodrome was intermittently unreliable during the approach. The pilots decided to execute a missed approach. During the missed approach the pilots did not comply with the published missed approach procedure and with a combination of strong winds and possible erroneous heading indications they lost situational awareness. They flew the aircraft into a valley and crashed into the side of the mountains North-East of the George Aerodrome. The passenger was Hansie Cronje, a former South African cricket captain who had missed a South African Airlines flight.

The aircraft was on a scheduled courier flight from St. John=s, Newfoundland and Labrador, to Goose Bay. The aircraft touched down at 0456 Atlantic standard time and, during the landing roll on the snow-covered runway, the aircraft started to veer to the right. The captain's attempt to regain directional control by the use of full-left rudder and reverse on the engines was unsuccessful. The aircraft continued to track to the right of the centreline, departed the runway, and struck a hard-packed snow bank. There were no injuries to the two crew members. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

The twin engine aircraft departed Varginha-Major-Brigadeiro Trompowsky Airport on a mail flight to Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport with two pilots on board. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the right engine lost power. The aircraft lost height and crash landed in an open field. It slid for about 100 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

A Piper PA-31-350, registration C-GNIE, serial number 31-7552047, was on a scheduled (APO1023) instrument flight rules mail service flight between Rouyn Airport, Quebec, and Val-d'Or Airport, Quebec, at approximately 1845 . After checking for prevailing weather conditions at the destination airport, the pilot decided to make a visual approach on runway 36. The pilot reported by radio at two miles on final approach for runway 36 and then stated that he was going to begin his approach again after momentarily losing visual contact with the runway. This was the last radio contact with the aircraft. No emergency locator transmitter signal was received by the flight service station specialist. Emergency procedures were initiated, and searches were conducted. The aircraft was found by a search and rescue team about three hours after the crash. The aircraft was lying about two miles southeast of the end of runway 36; it was substantially damaged. The pilot suffered serious injuries.

The airplane was in cruise flight at 16,000 feet, in instrument meteorological conditions. About two minutes after the crew ceased cross-feeding due to a fuel imbalance, the left engine experienced a total loss of power. About one minute later, the co-pilot indicated to the pilot-in-command (PIC) that the airplane was losing airspeed, and about 15 seconds later, the co-pilot remarked "keep it up, keep it up." Shortly thereafter, the airplane departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The airplane was destroyed by fire and impact forces. Examination of the left engine revealed no evidence of any pre-impact failures that would have accounted for an uncommanded in-flight shut-down. A SIGMET for potential severe clear icing was effective for airplane's flight path; however, the flight crew did not report or discuss any weather related problems around the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, the airplane was above its single-engine service ceiling. The PIC had accumulated approximately 6,000 hours of total flight experience, of which, about 500 hours were as PIC in make and model. The co-pilot had approximately 600 hours of total fight experience, of which, 300 hours were in make and model.

After departure from San Juan, the pilot of N405MN contacted the FAA San Juan Approach Control, was identified on radar by the controller, and told to climb to 7,000 feet. About 1 minute later, the pilot is told to proceed direct to St. Croix. About 4 minutes later, the pilot requested radar vectors to St. Croix, and was told to fly heading 140 degrees. Radar data showed the flight leveled at the cruise altitude of 7,000 feet at about 0444. At about 0453:36, the pilot requested a lower altitude, and was cleared to 2,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the pilot. The flight began descent from 7,000 feet at about 0454. At 0454:29, the aircraft's transponder reports the flight is at 6,500 feet. At 0454:41, the transponder reports the flight is at 5,600 feet, and at 0454:49, at 4,000 feet. At 0454:53, the transponder reports the flight is at 1,100 feet. The flight is not observed on radar after this. No other aircraft or radar returns are observed near the flight as it began it's descent. One main landing gear tire, wheel, and brake assembly; the left wing lower skin from the area above the wing flap; the left wing baggage compartment door; the right nose baggage compartment door; the cabin floor cover; and some items from the U.S. mail cargo, were recovered floating in the ocean, at points north of the last observed radar contact with the airplane, on the day of the accident and in the days after the accident. The recovered components had damage from being separated from the airplane. None of the recovered components had any fire, heat, or soot damage. The remainder of the airplane was not located and recovered. The depth of the sea in the area of the accident site was reported by the Coast Guard to be about 6,000 feet. U.S. Post Office personnel reported the flight carried 1,517 pounds of U.S. mail. No hazardous materials were in the mail. A 75-pound pouch of mail was recovered from the ocean and identified as having been placed on N405MN. The weather at the time of the accident was reported to scattered clouds with visibility 10 miles.

The operating company were involved in a Royal Mail contract to deliver mail from Aberdeen to Shetland Islands each day. The crew involved in the accident had flown LN-PBB from Stauning Airport in Denmark to Aberdeen in preparation for a two week period of duty delivering the mail; they arrived at Aberdeen at 1700 hrs on 5 September 1999. The next morning, the crew arrived for duty at approximately 0540 hrs and completed their normal checks of LN-PBB. Shortly after this, the mail arrived and was escorted to the aircraft by the company ground crew. The mail bags were sorted and loaded into the aircraft by the flight and ground crew under the supervision of the commander; the mail had been weighed by Royal Mail and the commander was given written confirmation of the total weight of 1,196 kg. At the completion of the loading, the commander was satisfied that the load was secure and correctly distributed. Prior to departure for Sumburgh Airport, the commander had checked the weather and was aware that it was 'poor' at Sumburgh but the indications were that it would improve; additionally, the weather at Kirkwall Airport was clear if they needed to divert. The aircraft appeared fully serviceable during start, taxi and take off from Aberdeen at 0640 hrs; for the flight to Sumburgh, the commander was the handling pilot. Cruise was at Flight Level (FL)90and, about half way to Sumburgh, ATC advised the crew of the latest weather at Sumburgh which indicated that they would not be able to land there. However, there was a preceding aircraft heading for the same destination and the commander elected to continue towards Sumburgh. Then, once the preceding aircraft crew had declared that they were diverting to Aberdeen, the commander decided to divert to Kirkwall. The diversion was uneventful and the aircraft landed at 0807 hrs. At Kirkwall, the crew uplifted sufficient fuel to bring the total up to the same with which they had left Aberdeen (1,200lb) and waited for a weather improvement at Sumburgh. By approximately 0930hrs, the crew were advised by Kirkwall ATC that the weather had improved at Sumburgh and they prepared the aircraft for departure. Take off was at 0950 hrs with the co-pilot as handling pilot. Cruise was at FL 70 and was uneventful up to the approach and landing. The airport was using Runway 27 as that is the only runway with full ILS. The ATIS information at 1020 hrs was broadcasting the following information: surface wind 340°/07 kt; 9,000 metres in rain; cloud few at 300 feet, scattered at 1,000 feet and broken at 1,600 feet; temperature 12°, dew point 12°; tempo cloud broken 1,500 feet with a wet runway. In accordance with ATC instructions, the crew commenced their descent to 2,000 feet amsl where they were instructed to intercept the ILS from a heading of 300°. Once fully established on the ILS, the commander noted that the co-pilot was having a little difficulty maintaining the aircraft on both the localizer and glide slope. The co-pilot was not sure of the height at which they broke cloud but the commander estimated that they were at 500 feet agl. At this point, the co-pilot considered that they were slightly high and fast; subsequently, the commander estimated the aircraft airspeed as 140 kt as they became visual with the runway. During the final approach, the air traffic controller gave three separate wind reports of 010°/11 kt, 010°/11 kt and010°/10 kt; these reports were based on the two minute mean surface winds. As the aircraft crossed the runway threshold, the co-pilot called out that he had too much speed and that "it wasn't going to work". With no reply from the commander, the co-pilot took this lack of response as an indication that the commander was content. For his part, the commander was concentrating on the runway aspect and, although he heard a comment from the co-pilot, did not make any response. The crew considered that touchdown was approximately halfway down the runway and the co-pilot was aware of the aircraft bouncing before a second touchdown; neither pilot could recall the speed at touchdown. Both pilots applied full foot braking but with little apparent result in retardation. Then, as the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the commander took control and applied full power; this was because he was aware of the concrete blocks positioned off the end of the runway as a sea defence and wished to clear them. The aircraft was now yawed slightly left and positioned to the left of the runway centreline. It left the runway surface, travelled across grass and a public road and came to rest on the concrete blocks.

A witness heard the aircraft pass King Island aerodrome at 0455 EST at the same time as he noticed the pilot-activated 10/28 runway lights illuminate. The pilot reported to Melbourne Control that he would be completing a runway 10, non-directional beacon (NDB) approach. A short time later he broadcast that the aircraft was at the minimum descent altitude, which is 640 feet above mean sea level (AMSL) for a runway 10 NDB approach. He also broadcast that there was a complete cloud cover. The aircraft did not enter a missed approach procedure but was heard to fly towards the south-east from overhead the NDB, which is located 1.3 km south-south-west of the centre of runway 10/28. A second witness, located near the NDB site, reported observing the aircraft's lights to the south-east. At 0507 a farmer heard the aircraft pass low over his house shortly before it crashed into trees, 3.5 km south-east of the aerodrome. The first responders arrived at the accident site at about 0530. The pilot had not survived.

The aircraft departed at night from runway 4R on a flight to transport mail. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was in the left seat, a pilot-rated cargo loader was in the right seat, and another cargo loader was aboard the aircraft, but was not in a seat. During takeoff, the aircraft entered a turn and flew into gradually rising terrain. The initial impact point was about 15 feet higher than the runway elevation and about 0.3 miles abeam the departure end of the runway. Investigation revealed that the company allowed pilot-rated cargo loaders to fly the aircraft from the right seat during positioning and ferry flight segments (to build multiengine flight time) as part of their compensation. There was evidence that at the time of the accident, the aircraft was being piloted on this flight from the copilot's position. The right side of the instrument panel was equipped with only EGT gauges (no flight instruments on the copilot's side). There were cloud layers in the vicinity, no moon illumination, and no visible ground lighting in the direction of flight. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure was identified during the investigation. Except at the pilot and copilot positions, the airplane had no other seat and/or restraint system. The operator stated that the pilot was not authorized to carry company personnel or passengers without the required seating.