Ferry

The aircraft was completing a ferry flight from Ujung Tanjung/Pekanbaru home base to Tangar airstrip, Center of Kalimantan, with reference flight approval number D09-038960 and Security Clearance number AU05-033328, person on board was one pilot and one engineer. On 29 December 2009, the aircraft departed from Ujung Tanjung, transit at Jambi and stop overnight at Pangkal Pinang Airport, Bangka with total flight time was 3 hours. On the next day 30 December 2009, the aircraft continuing flight from Pangkal Pinang to Rahadi Oesman Airport, Ketapang, West Kalimantan and overnight at Ketapang with total flight time is 1:40 hours. On the next day 31 December 2009, the aircraft plan to continued flight to Tangar Airstrip. The aircraft was airworthy prior departure and dispatched from Ketapang with the following sequence:
a. The pilot requested for start the engine at 01:17 UTC4 (08:17 Local Time);
b. At 01:24 the pilot requested for taxi, and the ATC gave clearance via taxiway “A”. The pilot requested intersection runway 17 and approved by ATC
c. The ATC requested for reported when ready for departure, and the pilot reported ready for departure, then the ATC gave the departure clearance.
d. At 01:25, the aircraft was departed and crashed at 01:26 striking the roof of the hospital and broken down into pieces at the parking area in which have had approximate 1.5 Kilometer to the left side from the flight path centreline. The aircraft was substantially damage and the crew on board consist of one pilot in command and one aircraft maintenance engineer; both of them were fatally injured.

On December 17, 2009 at approximately 7:30 pm local (2330UTC), N28RK a Dassault Sud, Falcon Fan Jet, Mystere 20, Series D aircraft which departed Joaquin Balaguer Int’l Airport (MDJB) in the Dominican Republic, for Ft Lauderdale Executive Airport, (FXE) Ft Lauderdale, Florida, USA, crashed in a remote area of Matthew Town, Great Inagua, Bahamas. The accident occurred approximately 11.5 miles due east of Great Inagua International Airport at coordinates N 20˚ 58’ 30” latitude and W 073˚ 40’ 00.7” longitude. The aircraft made contact with the terrain on a heading of approximately 105 degrees magnetic. The accident occurred in area that was not accessible by land and the investigation team had to be airlifted by helicopter to the site. Witnesses on the island of Great Inagua reported hearing a loud bang that rattled doors and windows of their homes, but they did not report seeing the aircraft fall from the sky. The aircraft was under the command of Captain Harold Roy Mangels and First Office Freddy Castro. The aircraft reportedly departed Aruba, in the Netherland Antilles and made a fuel stop at Dr. Joaquin Balaguer Int’l Airport, Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. The final destination filed by the crew was Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport, Ft Lauderdale Florida. The accident occurred approximately 6 mile off the filed flight path. ATC records and instructions were for the aircraft N28RK to maintain 28,000 ft (FL280). The aircraft transponder was reported as inoperative. It begun a rapid descent, with no report of an emergency declared or mayday call out. Investigation of the crash site indicates the airplane made contact with the terrain at a high rate of speed and approximately a 45 degree angle. The aircraft was destroyed on impact. The crew of a United States Coast Guard helicopter was on a training mission in the Great Inagua area at the time of the accident. They reported hearing a loud bang and noticed a huge explosion and fireball emanating from the ground in an area close to their location. The crew of the US Coast Guard helicopter reported that they did not see any in-flight fire prior to the fireball that they saw. The post impact fire engulfed approximately five (5) acres of trees and brush in the National Wildlife Refuge at Great Inagua. The coast guard helicopter crew stated that they discontinued their training mission and went to the site to investigate. Upon arrival at the site the crew reported that they lowered rescue personnel to the ground to investigate and search for survivors, but, due to the heat and extent of the fire on the ground, they had to discontinue the search. They reported the accident to authorities at Great Inagua. This information was further passed along to the National Transportation Safety Board who alerted the accident investigation unit of the Bahamas Civil Aviation Department. Night time conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The crew of the aircraft received fatal injuries. A search of the area discovered no distinguishable human remains. Approximately less than 1% of what is believed to be possible human flesh / internal body parts were recovered. In addition clothing (piece of a pant with belt buckle fastened) was recovered, which possibly may have been worn by a member of the crew at the time of the accident. All recovered remains and clothing retrieved were gathered by officers of the Royal Bahamas Police Force that accompanied the investigation team and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory at the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Nassau Bahamas for DNA analysis and possible identification. The aircraft broke into many pieces after contact with the terrain. Debris was spread over a large area of rough terrain. What remained of the aircraft post impact was either not found or possibly further destroyed by the post impact fire. The “four corners” of the airplane were confirmed in the area downstream of where the initial ground impact occurred. However, engine cowling parts were found prior to the point of initial ground impact. This may suggest an aircraft over-speed condition prior to ground impact. Less than 10% of the aircraft was recovered. An explosion occurred when N28RK made contact with the terrain. A post impact fire ensued. Approximately 5 acres of the national park was destroyed by the fire. Parts of the aircraft including personal effect, aircraft parts and furnishing, seat and seat cushions were also destroyed in the post impact fire.

Shortly after takeoff in the pressurized twin-engine airplane, the pilot was cleared to climb and maintain 16,000 feet. The pilot reported passing through instrument conditions with heavy snow and that he cleared the tops of the clouds at 7,000 feet. The pilot was then cleared to climb and maintain flight level (FL) 230. Radar data showed the airplane's altitude and course varied throughout the flight after having reached FL 230. Several times during the flight the air traffic controller questioned the pilot regarding his altitude and/or course. Each time the pilot responded that he was at the correct altitude and/or course. The radar data showed that after each of these conversations, the airplane would return to the assigned altitude and/or course. The controller then informed the pilot that, because radar showed the airplane’s altitude fluctuating between FL 224 and FL 237, he was going to have to descend out of positive controller airspace. The pilot acknowledged this transmission. The controller instructed the pilot to descend to 17,000 feet. The last transmission from the pilot was when he acknowledged the descent. Radar data showed that one minute later the airplane was at FL 234. During the last minute and 12 seconds of radar data, the airplane reversed its course and descended from FL 233 to FL 214, at which time radar data was lost. Witnesses reported hearing loud engine sounds and seeing the airplane in a spiraling descent until ground impact. Post accident inspection of the engines did not identify any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Most of the fuselage was consumed by fire; however, flight control continuity was established. Given the pilot’s experience and the flight’s altitude and course variations the investigation considered that the pilot may have suffered from hypoxia; however, due to the post impact fire the functionality of the airplane’s pressurization system could not be observed and no conclusive determination could be made that the pilot as impaired.

The pilot stated that during the landing gear retraction he heard a loud bang, followed by three to four smaller bangs. The first officer confirmed that the left engine was the affected engine and immediately began feathering the propeller. Once the propeller had been feathered, the captain confirmed the action by looking outside and noticing the propeller in the feathered position. The captain further reported that the right engine was producing the maximum power available and was indicating 55 inches of manifold pressure. Unable to achieve airspeed of greater than 95 to 96 knots indicated, the captain attempted to return to the airport for an emergency landing; however, he was unable to maintain altitude and attempted to land on an airport perimeter road, impacting the airport fence and a sand berm in the process. A cursory examination of the engine and system components revealed no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction.

The accident flight was a part of a ferry flight from Kuwait to USA. The flight departed from Keflavik, Iceland with planned destination Narsarsuaq, Greenland. The commander did not get visual contact with the runway on the instrument approach to Narsarsuaq and the flight diverted towards Kangerlussuaq, Greenland. During the flight towards Kangerlussuaq, the amount of fuel became critical low and the aircraft landed on the Greenlandic icecap. The aircraft was destroyed during the landing attempt. The commander suffered minor injuries. The accident occurred in daylight and under visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

The aircraft departed Bangui on a ferry flight to Harare with an intermediate stop in Brazzaville, carrying five technicians and two pilots. After being parked at Bangui Airport for almost a year without flying, the aircraft should be transferred to Harare for maintenance purposes. While in cruising altitude over DRC, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a dense wooded area near Massamba, Bandundu Province. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 7 occupants were killed.

On June 9, 2008, about 1401 eastern daylight time, an Aero Commander 500S, N501AP, registered to and operated by Gramar 500, Inc., experienced a loss of engine power in both engines and was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean about 1/2 mile south of North Bimini, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Nassau International Airport (MYNN), Nassau, Bahamas, to Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The airplane was destroyed due to salt water immersion, and the airline transport rated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The pilot stated that when the flight was past Bimini, the right engine started running rough and losing power. He turned southeast to enter a left base for runway 09 at South Bimini Airport, and the left engine also began to run rough and lost power. The pilot ditched the aircraft, evacuated into a life raft, and was rescued by a pleasure boater. The pilot also stated that 25 gallons of fuel were added while at MYNN, for a total fuel supply of 90 gallons. Both engines were test run 8 days after the accident using a test propeller. Both engines ran to near maximum RPM. One magneto from each engine was replaced prior to the test run.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Moscow to Chelyabinsk where a load of 9 tons of various goods was deplaned, the aircraft was ferried to Perm. One minute after takeoff from Chelyabinsk Airport runway 09, while climbing in marginal weather conditions, the crew declared an emergency and reported smoke in the cockpit. After being cleared to return, the crew completed a circuit. During a third turn to the left, while in a left bank of 15° and at a speed of 335 km/h, both left engines failed and their propellers autofeathered. About 40 seconds later, the aircraft entered a right turn then descended to the ground and crashed in an open field located 11 km from Chelyabinsk Airport, bursting into flames. The accident occurred 8 minutes after takeoff. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 9 occupants were killed.

Following a maintenance program in Chişinău, the aircraft was ferried back to Khartoum via Antalya. On board were four passengers, four crew members and a load consisting of 2 tons of oil and various equipments. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the transponder and was cleared for an immediate return. Too low on final approach, the aircraft struck the ILS antenna and crashed in a field located 200 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. All 8 occupants, among them 4 technicians, were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.