World

At 1018 hours EST, on Sunday 2 October 1994, the pilot submitted a flight plan by telephone to the Melbourne Regional Briefing Office of the Civil Aviation Authority. The flight plan indicated that Aero Commander 690 aircraft VH-SVQ would be conducting a regular public transport service, flight CD 111, from Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport to Lord Howe Island with an intermediate landing at Williamtown. The flight was planned to operate in accordance with instrument flight rules with a nominated departure time from Sydney of 1100 hours. The aircraft was crewed by one pilot. The aircraft departed Sydney at 1117, carrying baggage that had been off-loaded from another company service which was to operate direct from Sydney to Lord Howe Island that day. The flight to Williamtown apparently proceeded normally and the aircraft arrived at about 1140. The company had no ground-based representatives at Williamtown but the pilot was observed by other persons in the terminal building to converse with passengers before proceeding to the aircraft. No other person saw the pilot and the passengers board the aircraft. At 1206 the pilot informed Sydney Flight Service that the aircraft was taxiing at Williamtown for Lord Howe Island and that he intended climbing to flight level (FL) 210. Departure was subsequently reported as 1208 when the pilot reported tracking 060 on climb to FL230 which was the original planned cruising level. The pilot reported passing 20,000 feet on climb to FL210 at 1229 and shortly afterwards asked if VH-IBF, a company aircraft flown by the chief pilot and operating from Sydney direct to Lord Howe Island, had departed. The pilot was advised that it had departed. The radar trace showed that the climb was discontinued at 20,400 ft at 1231:22. Three seconds later the aircraft commenced descent. The last recorded radar trace for SVQ was at 19,800 ft at 1232:54. The pilot of SVQ did not report at the position ‘Shark’ at 1232 as scheduled in his flight plan, and at 1235 he notified that the aircraft had commenced a descent to FL130. At 1238, the pilot of SVQ asked Sydney Flight Service if IBF was listening on high frequency and was advised that the aircraft was not due on frequency for another 30 minutes. He requested that the pilot of IBF call him on the company VHF frequency and reported that the aircraft had just passed ‘Shark’ and he would shortly provide an estimate for the next position, ‘Shrimp’. At 1245, he provided an estimate for ‘Shrimp’ of 1310 and stated that the aircraft was maintaining FL160. No explanation of the amended level was given by the pilot or sought by Sydney Flight Service. The chief pilot subsequently stated that he contacted SVQ on company frequency at about 1240 and that the pilot of that aircraft reported a severe vibration which he thought was caused by airframe or propeller icing. He also confirmed that he had turned the propeller heat on. The chief pilot recalled that he asked the pilot of SVQ if the cockpit indication showed that the propeller heat was working normally, to which he replied ‘yes its working’. During this period, the chief pilot and the pilot of SVQ had also discussed crew rostering. Prior to contact with the chief pilot, the pilot of SVQ contacted the pilot of VH-SVV, another company aircraft which was operating a flight from Coffs Harbour to Lord Howe Island. At 1316, after SVQ had not reported at the ‘Shrimp’ position, Sydney Flight Service commenced communications checks but was unable to establish communications with SVQ directly or through any other aircraft. At 1325 an uncertainty phase was declared and the Melbourne Rescue Coordination Centre was subsequently notified at 1331. At 1401 the duty officer at the Melbourne Rescue Coordination Centre contacted the Lord Howe Island aerodrome terminal and left a message for the pilot of IBF to telephone the Centre. After the arrival of IBF at Lord Howe Island, the company managing director, who was also on board the aircraft, called the Melbourne Search and Rescue Centre at 1410 to inquire about SVQ. Arrangements were made by the company and Civil Aviation Authority search and rescue to organise search aircraft and a distress phase was declared at 1411. Subsequently, the crews of IBF and SVV reported hearing a radio transmission from the pilot of SVQ, stating that he had ‘lost it’. Attempts at the time by the chief pilot to contact SVQ were unsuccessful.

The airplane was en route at 14,000 feet msl when the manifold pressure dropped from 30 to 18 inches. Eleven minutes later the oil light came 'on'. The airplane continued under partial power at an airspeed of 90 knots, while descending at 100 to 300 feet per minute (fpm). By 9,500 feet msl the engine oil pressure dropped to zero. The pilot shut down the engine and made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico near a ship. The airplane remained afloat for 5 to 7 minutes. During this time, the emergency exit was opened, all occupants donned a life vest, exited, and boarded the life raft, which the pilot had deployed. All were rescued by personnel from the ship. The airplane was not recovered; therefore, the cause of the power loss was not determined.

The aircraft was transferred from Los Angeles to New Zealand via Hilo and Papeete, Tahiti. En route, while cruising at the altitude of 1,500 metres, the crew encountered technical problems with the left engine and decided to divert to Christmas Island. The left engine eventually failed and as the crew as unable to maintain a safe altitude because the aircraft was heavy (load of fuel to cross the Pacific), he decided to ditch the aircraft about 150 km north of Christmas Island. The aircraft sank four hours later and was lost. All eight occupants were rescued by the crew of a merchant ship eight hours later.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in the Ionian Sea while completing a night maritime patrol flight. All five crew members were killed.

While cruising by night on a cargo flight from Willemstad-Hato Airport to Miami-Intl Airport, the four engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the Caribbean Sea. Few debris floating on water and the dead body of the copilot were found about 210 km northwest of Curaçao Island. The aircraft was flying in poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity and turbulences when the accident occurred.

Crashed in the Caspian Sea about six minutes after takeoff when leaving the ground effect for unknown reasons. Crew fate unknown.

The crew was engaged in a training flight on behalf of the VAW-126 contingent of USS John Fitzgerald Kennedy. In unknown circumstances, the aircraft crashed in the sea about 4 miles away from the ship, some 75 miles north from Puerto Rico. All five crew members were killed.
Crew:
Lt Cdr Alan M. McLachlen,
Lt Michael F. Horowitz,
Lt Tristram E. Farmer,
Ltjg Thomas D. Plautz,
Ltjg Richard Siter Jr.

The aircraft had departed Exeter on a flight to Guernsey when, during the climb to FL35, a slight smell of fumed was noticed in the cockpit. By the time the aircraft had passed SKERRY, by some four to five nm, smoke was seen coming from under the right hand instrument panel. The pilot asked the passenger to investigate the source, but he reported that he could see no burning. The pilot then informed Jersey control of their situation and advised that he was returning direct to Start Point, the nearest land on the coast. After changing to Exeter Radar, the pilot initiated a descent in case an immediate ditching should prove necessary, and briefed his passenger to don a life-jacket. He also directed the passenger to sit at the rear of the cabin, adjacent to the door, so that he would be ready to deploy the life-raft through the upper half of the door if they had to ditch. As the density of the smoke and fumes increased, the pilot elected to carry out a controlled ditching, fearing that if he tried to reach the coast he would be overcome by the fumes. However, he stated that he was reluctant to open the cabin air vents in case this escalated any hidden fire, and he did not turn off the master switch since he required the radios to maintain contact with Exeter Radar. The pilot transmitted a Mayday call, giving a full position report, and at 200 feet amsl he shut down both engines and feathered the propellers. He estimated the sea-well was between eight and ten feet but, since a strong wind was blowing (20 knots), he decided to land into-wind. The aircraft contacted the water at approximately 70 knots, plunging into a swell which generated an impact which the pilot later described as 'tremendous'.The aircraft, however, floated for some one and a half minutes before sinking, enabling both occupants to safely escape from the rear door. The pilot reported that, once in the water, it took them an estimated 20 minutes to get the life-raft inflated, but their life-jackets provided adequate support during this period. Although the pilot advised that flares and a handheld radio were being carried on board the aircraft, these were lost during the ditching. After approximately 45 minutes, an SAR helicopter from RAF Chivenor arrived on scene, recovered both survivors, and took them to hospital in Exeter. The pilot, who was wearing a lap and diagonal restraint, and the passenger, who was wearing only a lap strap, were largely uninjured.

While in level flight the pilot reported both engines failed and all attempts to restart them were unsuccessful. The pilot then ditched the airplane in the ocean, and it sank and was not recovered. The pilot and three passengers were rescued 2 days later. According to fuel consumption estimates there should have been adequate fuel for the entire flight and a reserve.

During cruise flight the accident aircraft lost oil pressure in the n°2 engine. Flight could not be sustained using the remaining engine. According to the pilot, the remaining engine would overheat when power was applied. The crew descended to just above the water and tried to fly the aircraft in ground effect, but to no avail. They elected to ditch the aircraft. During the landing, the aircraft received substantial damage and was almost immediately flooded, causing the aircraft to sink. The crew escaped, but did not have time to retrieve emergency gear. They were rescued after about 20 hours in the water. Evidence revealed that the pilot did not have a pilot's certificate. No evidence could be found to indicate that the pilot had any experience in the accident aircraft or with any sea plane. Since the aircraft sank, a cause for the engine problems could not be determined.