United States of America

After extending the gear for landing, the down-and-locked indication (green light) for the left main gear was not illuminated. The crew performed the emergency checklist procedures for abnormal gear extension with no success. The aircraft subsequently landed with the left main landing gear retracted. Inspection of the landing gear revealed that the pin (part number MY20248-001), which is part of the forward gear door lock, was corroded and cracked at the point of rotation, preventing proper movement of the gear door uplock.

The pilot/owner was performing a post maintenance check flight about 20 miles off shore. He was receiving visual flight advisories from a terminal radar approach facility while in level flight about 4,900 feet msl. Subsequently, the airplane started slowing then descending in a right spiral, and radar contact was lost about 1,000 feet msl. The pilot's body was recovered from the ocean. According to the autopsy report, the pilot had experienced sudden cardiac death secondary to an acute myocardial infarction due to atherosclerotic coronary artery disease. Tramadol, a painkiller not approved by the FAA for flight, was detected in a drug screen and may have masked the chest pain.

Shortly after being cleared for takeoff on runway 18 (3,899 feet by 150 feet, dry concrete) at Merrill C. Meigs Field, Chicago, Illinois, the airplane impacted into Lake Michigan, approximately 300 feet south of the end of the runway. The tower controller said that at the 3/4 field point, the airplane had not rotated. 'All I can see are lights [from the airplane]. At the point where he would have been at the end of the runway, [I] lost the lights.' A witness on the airport said that when the airplane went by, it 'didn't sound like most King Airs do at that point.' There was a pulsating sound, but it was not heavy. The witness said that the airplane was 'bouncing up and down on the [gear] struts, and wasn't coming off the ground.' NTSB Materials examination of the pilot's control yoke showed that there were small distortions in the holes of the column and the rod where the control lock would be inserted. A small crack was observed around 1/4 of the control lock rod hole. The control lock was a substitute for the original airplane equipment. The examination of the control lock showed 'several shiny scratches ... parallel to the length of the pin.' A small deformation was observed near the top of the pin part of the control lock. The company flight department's third pilot said that when they flew the airplane, they always placed the control lock in the pilot's side cockpit wall pocket, along with a car key and a remote hanger door opener. The car key and the door opener were found in the wall pocket during the on-scene investigation. The control lock was
recovered from the lake, 7 days later.

While in cruise flight, at 6,000 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot attempted a restart of the engine, but only about one-half rotation of the left engine propeller was observed, and the engine was secured. The pilot stated that he was unable to maintain altitude and initiated a decent. He requested and was cleared for an instrument approach at an airport where the weather conditions were, 1/4 statute mile of visibility, fog, and a vertical visibility of 100 feet. On the approach, at the minimum descent altitude, the pilot executed a missed approach. As the airplane climbed, the pilot reported to the controller that the 'best altitude [he] could get was 2,200 feet.' A second approach was initiated to the reciprocal runway. While on the second approach, the pilot 'was going to fly the aircraft right to the runway, and told the controller so.' He put the gear down, reduced power, and decided there was 'no hope for a go-around.' He then 'flew down past the decision height,' and about 70-80 feet above the ground, 'added a little power to smooth the landing.' The pilot also stated, 'The last thing I remember was the aircraft nose contacting the runway.' A passenger stated that once the pilot could not see the runway, [the pilot] 'applied power, pitched the nose up,' and attempted a 'go-around' similar to the one that was executed on the first approach. Disassembly of the left engine revealed that the crankshaft was fatigue fractured between connecting rod journal number 2 and main journal number 2. Review of the pilot's operating handbook revealed that the single engine service ceiling, at a weight of 4,800 pounds, was 11,700 feet. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, was 295 feet per minute. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 1,625 feet, was 314 feet per minute. Review of the ILS approach plate for Runway 34 revealed that the decision height was 200 feet above the ground.

On October 25, 1999, about 1213 central daylight time (CDT), a Learjet Model 35, N47BA, operated by Sunjet Aviation, Inc., of Sanford, Florida, crashed near Aberdeen, South Dakota. The airplane departed Orlando, Florida, for Dallas, Texas, about 0920 eastern daylight time (EDT). Radio contact with the flight was lost north of Gainesville, Florida, after air traffic control (ATC) cleared the airplane to flight level (FL) 390. The airplane was intercepted by several U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Air National Guard (ANG) aircraft as it proceeded northwestbound. The military pilots in a position to observe the accident airplane at close range stated (in interviews or via radio transmissions) that the forward windshields of the Learjet seemed to be frosted or covered with condensation. The military pilots could not see into the cabin. They did not observe any structural anomaly or other unusual condition. The military pilots observed the airplane depart controlled flight and spiral to the ground, impacting an open field. All occupants on board the airplane (the captain, first officer, and four passengers) were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.
Crew:
Michael Kling,
Stephanie Bellegarrigue.
Passengers:
Payne Stewart,
Van Ardan,
Bruce Borland,
Robert Fraley.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain during climb to cruise on a night departure. The pilot of the on-demand cargo flight was brought in off reserve to replace the scheduled pilot who was ill. The flight was behind schedule because the cargo was late. When the instrument flight release created further delay, the pilot opted to depart into the clear, dark night under visual flight rules (VFR) with the intention of picking up his instrument clearance when airborne. When clearing the flight for takeoff, the tower controller issued a suggested heading of 340 degrees, which headed the aircraft toward mountainous terrain 11 miles north of the airport. The purpose of the suggested heading was never stated to the pilot as required by FAA Order 7110.65L. After a frequency change to radar departure control, the controller asked the pilot 'are you direct [the initial (route) fix] at this time?' and the pilot replied, 'we can go ahead and we'll go direct [the initial fix].' A turn toward the initial fix would have headed the aircraft away from high terrain. The controller then diverted his attention to servicing another VFR aircraft and the accident aircraft continued to fly heading 340 degrees until impacting the mountain. ATC personnel said the 340-degree heading was routinely issued to departing aircraft to avoid them entering Class B airspace 3 miles from the airport. The approach control supervisor said this flight departs daily, often VFR, and routinely turns toward the initial fix, avoiding mountainous terrain. When the pilot said that he would go to the initial fix, the controller expected him to turn away from the terrain. Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) was not enabled for the flight because the original, instrument flight plan did not route the aircraft through this approach control's airspace and the controller had not had time to manually enter the flight data. High terrain was not displayed on the controller's radar display and no safety alert was issued.

The pre-takeoff instrument flight rules clearance for the flight called for the airplane to climb and maintain 5,000 feet, and to expect flight level 220, 10 minutes after departure. The clearance was read back correctly by a member of the flight crew. Shortly after takeoff, a member of the flight crew asked air traffic control for a higher altitude, and then stated 'uh, you want us at twenty two hundred.' The approach controller transmitted 'should be at five thousand;' however, there were no further transmissions from the airplane. The airplane wreckage was located at an elevation of about 2,300 feet, approximately 4.8 miles west of the departure airport. The airplane impacted wooded up-sloping terrain. Several broken trees were observed, which led to the beginning of the debris path. The trees were broken at about the same height. A weather observation taken at an airport about 12 miles north-northwest of the accident site, about the time of the accident included: few Clouds at 300 feet and a ceiling of 1,700 feet overcast.

The pilot aborted the takeoff run after the airspeed indication rose to about 80 miles per hour, but would not go any higher. He could not stop the airplane, before it went off the end of the runway, over a berm, and into a drainage ravine. When the airplane was pulled out of the ravine, both pitot covers were still in place, around the pitot tubes. The runway was 4,553 feet long, calculated takeoff distance was about 2,525 feet, and calculated accelerate-stop distance was approximately 2,950 feet. Tire skid marks started around 3,600 feet from the approach end of the runway, and led to the wreckage. About a year earlier, another airplane was destroyed when it ran into the same ravine, which was located about 200 feet from the end of the runway.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) departed Lake Union seaplane base with four British Broadcasting Company passengers aboard the De Havilland DHC-2 'Beaver.' The passengers were engaged in aerial videography of an east/west geological fault line crossing from south Seattle through Blakely Harbor near the south end of Bainbridge Island. An onboard video recorder captured a voice instructing 'Keep as low as you can and slow as you can while we're doing this please... .' The PIC's first pass over the south end of Bainbridge Island was uneventful and the aircraft was maneuvered for a second pass. The PIC reported that approaching the upsloping, tree covered terrain he applied climb flaps and power but shortly thereafter realized the climb rate was less than he expected. He attempted a shallow left turn towards down sloping terrain and then leveled the wings as the aircraft descended into the treetops. The scenario was corroborated by two onboard video recordings. The pilot reported no powerplant or control system malfunction during the accident flight. He also reported encountering a downdraft condition over the tree covered terrain. Winds remained below 12 knots throughout the day at reporting stations near the accident site, and the video recordings showed no wind streaking and only sporadic whitecaps on the surface of Puget Sound during the transit from Seattle to the south end of Bainbridge Island.

The pilot received a weather briefing before departure and when near the destination airport, cleared for the NDB approach. The pilot reported the procedure turn inbound; published MDA is 1,300 feet msl. Witnesses on the airport reported heavy low fog and heard the pilot announce over the UNICOM frequency, 'Oh there is fog rolling into Starkville too?' One of the witnesses advised the pilot they could go to another airport due to the fog; the pilot responded he would execute the approach. The witnesses heard the engines operating at full power then heard the impact and saw a fireball. The airplane impacted the runway inverted, slid across the runway, and came to rest in grass off the runway. A post crash fire destroyed the airplane. Tree contact approximately 972 feet northwest of the runway impact location separated approximately 51 inches of the left wing. Examination of the engines, propellers, and flight controls revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The pilot had twice failed his airline transport pilot checkride. The designated examiner of the second failed flight test indicated the pilot was marginal in all flight operations. The NDB was checked after the accident; no discrepancies were noted.