United States of America

Shortly after takeoff at less than 200 feet above ground level the pilot reported an engine failure, and requested to return to the airport. The controller saw the airplane in a right turn, descending, and observed the airplane level its wings just prior to impact with the tips of trees. The airplane collided with terrain approximately 2,000 feet east of the approach end of runway 20L. A post crash fire ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. Examination of both engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components characteristic of the engines being powered, with the propellers out of feather at the time of impact, and a low power range. Examination of the propellers found the left propeller blades showed more damage then the blades from the right propeller. Both propellers were rotating with considerable rotational energy. However, examination showed that the left propeller had more power then the right.

A Douglas DC-3 airplane departed an island runway during dark night, VFR conditions without filing a flight plan. The airplane collided with a volcanic mountain at 1,500 feet msl on the runway heading, 4.5 miles from the airport. Earlier in the day, the airplane arrived from Anchorage, Alaska, without a flight plan, having flown along the Alaska Peninsula when VFR flight was not recommended. The crew of the airplane initially planned to remain overnight on the peninsula, but the captain received a request to transport cargo to Anchorage. The airplane was loaded with cargo and fuel, and departed. The crew did not file a flight plan. The end of the departure runway is positioned at the edge of an ocean bay. Beyond the end of the runway, open water and rising volcanic island terrain are present. In the area of intended flight, no illumination of the terrain, or any ground based lighting was present. An obstacle departure procedure for the departure runway recommends a right turn at 2 DME from the runway heading, and then a climb to 7,000 feet. Forty-five minutes after departure, a fire was spotted on the side of a volcano cone, and an ELT signal was detected in the area. No company flight following procedures were found for the accident flight, and the airplane was not reported overdue until the following day. The day after the accident, the airplane wreckage was located on steep, snow-covered terrain. Due to high winds and blowing snow, a rescue team could not get to the accident site until three days after the crash. The captain was the president, the director of operations, and the sole corporate entity of the company. No current maintenance records, flight logs, or pilot logs were located for the company. In the past, the captain's pilot certificate was suspended for 45 days following an accident in a DC-3 airplane when he ran out of gas. Also, the captain's medical certificate had previously been considered for denial after serving 49 months in federal prison for cocaine distribution, but after review, the FAA issued the captain a first class medical. FAA medical records for the captain do not contain any record of monitoring for substance abuse. The first officer's medical had also been considered for denial after an episode of a loss of consciousness. After a lengthy review and an appeal to the NTSB, the FAA issued the first officer a second-class medical. The first officer was part of the flight crew when the captain ran out of gas, and she had two previous aviation accidents. A toxicological examination of the captain, conducted by the FAA, found cocaine and metabolites of cocaine. A toxicological examination of the first officer found two different prescription antidepressant drugs. The FAA prohibits narcotic and mood-altering drug use by pilots.

The pilot and eight parachutists were returning from a skydive meet. The pilot had obtained a weather briefing, which advised of instrument meteorological conditions at the destination, and filed a VFR flight plan, but it was never activated. Witnesses heard, but could not see, a twin engine turboprop pass over the airport, heading north out over the Great Salt Lake. They described the weather conditions as being a low ceiling with 1/4-mile visibility, light snow, haze, and fog. They said it was almost dark. The airplane impacted the water approximately 1/2-mile off shore. It had been stripped of all avionics except for one transceiver and a handheld GPS receiver. One member of the skydive club, who had flown with the pilot, said he had previously encountered poor weather conditions and descended over the Great Salt Lake until he could see the ground, then proceeded to the airport. Another member related a similar experience, but said they descended over the Great Salt Lake in the vicinity of the accident site. The pilot was able to navigate in deteriorating weather conditions to Tooele Airport, using various landmarks. Examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers did not reveal evidence of any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

According to witnesses, the airplane collided with two deer shortly after touchdown. Following the collision, the airplane continued down the runway with the tires smoking, veered off the right side of the runway near the end, crossed a taxiway, impacted into a ditch and burst into flames. After the accident, the captain and first officer both reported that the thrust reversers failed to operate after they were deployed during the landing. Examination of the landing gear found all three gear collapsed. The right and left main tires had areas of rubber that were worn completely through. The flaps were found extended, and both thrust reversers were found in the stowed position. Examination of the cockpit found the throttles in the idle position, and the thrust reverser levers in the stowed position. Aircraft performance calculations indicate that the airplane traveled 1,500 feet down the runway after touchdown, in 4.2 seconds, before striking the deer. The calculations also indicate that the airplane landed with a ground speed of 124 knots. At 124 knots and maximum braking applied, the airplane should have come to a complete stop in about 850 feet. However, investigation of the accident site and surrounding area revealed heavy black skid marks beginning at the first taxiway turnoff about 1,500 feet down the 5,010 foot runway. The skid marks continued for about 2,500 feet, departed the right side of the runway and proceeded an additional 500 feet over grass and dirt. The investigation revealed that deer fur was found lodged in the squat switch on the left main landing gear, likely rendering the squat switch inoperative after the impact with the deer, and prior to the airplane’s loss of control on the runway. Since a valid signal from the squat switch is required for thrust reverser deployment, the loss of this signal forced the thrust reversers to stow. At this point, the electronic engine control (EEC) likely switched to the forward thrust schedule and engine power increased to near takeoff power, which led to the airplane to continue down the runway, and off of it. Following the accident, the manufacturer issued an Airplane Flight Manual revision that Page 2 of 8 ATL01FA021 changed the name of the “Inadvertent Stow of Thrust Reverser During Landing Rollout” abnormal procedure to “Inadvertent Stow of Thrust Reverser After a Crew-Commanded Deployment” and moved it into the emergency procedures section.
[This Brief of Accident was modified on April 5, 2010, based on information obtained during NTSB Case No. DCA08MA098.]

The captain stated that prior to departure the flight controls were tested, with no abnormalities noted, and the takeoff trim was set to the "middle of the takeoff range," without referring to any available pitch trim charts. During the takeoff roll, the pilot attempted to rotate the airplane twice, and then aborted the takeoff halfway down the 4,840 foot long runway, because the controls "didn't feel right." The airplane traveled off the departure end of the runway and through a fence, and came to rest near a road. The pilot reported no particular malfunction with the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the horizontal stabilizer was positioned at -4.6 degrees, the maximum nose down limit within the takeoff range. The horizontal stabilizer trim and elevator controls were checked, and moved freely through their full ranges of travel. According to the AFM TAKEOFF TRIM C.G. FUNCTION chart, a horizontal stabilizer trim setting of -7.2 was appropriate with the calculated C.G. of 20% MAC. Additionally, Learjet certification testing data stated that the pull force required at a trim setting of -6.0 degrees, the "middle of the takeoff range", was 33 pounds. With the trim set at the full nose down position (-1.7 degrees), 132 pounds of force was required.

The twin-engine turboprop airplane touched down about 1,900 feet beyond the approach end of the 6,000-foot runway. During the rollout, the pilot reduced power by pulling the power levers aft, to the flight idle stop. He then depressed the latch levers, and pulled the power levers further aft, beyond the flight idle stop, through the beta range, into the reverse range. During the power reduction, the pilot noticed, and responded to a red beta light indication. Guidance from both the manufacturer and the operator prohibited the use of reverse thrust on the ground with a red beta light illuminated. The pilot pushed the power levers forward of the reverse range, and inadvertently continued through the beta range, where aerodynamic braking was optimum. The power levers continued beyond the flight idle gate into flight idle, a positive thrust setting. The airplane continued to the departure end of the runway in a skid, and departed the runway and taxiway in a skidding turn. The airplane dropped over a 60-foot embankment, and came to rest at the bottom. The computed landing distance for the airplane over a 50-foot obstacle was 3,900 feet, with braking and ground idle (beta) only; no reverse thrust applied. Ground-taxi testing after the accident revealed that the airplane could reach ground speeds upwards of 85 knots with the power levers at idle, and the condition levers in the flight position. Simulator testing, based on FDR data, consistently resulted in runway overruns. Examination of the airplane and component testing revealed no mechanical anomalies. Review of the beta light indicating system revealed that illumination of the red beta light on the ground was not an emergency situation, but only indicated a switch malfunction. In addition, a loss of the reverse capability would have had little effect on computed stopping distance, and none at all in the United States, where performance credit for reverse thrust was not permitted.

The pilot and passenger departed on a night IFR flight. Weather en route was a mixture of instrument and visual meteorological conditions. When the airplane was 17 miles southwest of its destination, the pilot was cleared for an instrument approach. At 9 miles, the pilot reported the airport in sight, and canceled his IFR clearance. The airplane continued to descend towards the airport on a modified left base until radar contact was lost at 3,300 feet msl. The pilot was in radio contact with his wife just prior to the accident. He advised her that he was on base for runway 32. Neither the pilot's wife, nor ATC received a distress call from the pilot. The airplane was located the next morning about 100 feet below the top of a mountain. The accident site was 7.9 miles from the airport, and approximately 1,200 feet above the airport elevation. Ground based weather radar recorded light snow showers, in the general vicinity of the accident site about the time of the accident, and satellite imagery showed that the airplane was operating under a solid overcast. A level path was cut through the trees that preceded the main wreckage. Examination of both engines and the airframe revealed no pre impact failures or malfunctions.

The flight crew was returning from off-loading their cargo at a remote site on the west side of a mountain range. The return flight would provide an option of following a lower mountain pass, or flying over the mountainous terrain. Witnesses related that prior to the flight's departure, the marginal VFR weather conditions began to deteriorate very rapidly, with winds in excess of 50 knots, lowering ceilings, rain, and turbulence. An airmet, valid during the time of the accident, forecast high winds, mountain obscuration, and turbulence. The wreckage of the airplane was located near the crest of a 2,900 feet msl ridge. Wreckage debris was scattered on both sides of the ridge, and the airplane was destroyed by the high speed impact. Inspection of the wreckage disclosed no evidence any mechanical anomalies. A radar track analysis of a target airplane believed to be the accident airplane, depicted a track on a direct route of flight over the mountains from the departure airport towards the destination airport. Altitude data was not received from the target airplane's Mode C transponder, and therefore was extrapolated from the less reliable radar plot information. The maximum altitude plotted was approximately 10,800 feet, prior to a descent as the airplane neared the west side of the range. Mountains along the route of flight exceed 10,000 feet msl.

The airplane was flying a full instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 18 at a high altitude airport (elevation 6,445 feet), in a mountainous area, at night. The control tower was closed for the night. The airport was located in a national park, and, therefore, the runway lights were not left on during the night. During non-tower operation hours, the procedure for turning on the runway lights called for the pilot to key the microphone multiple times on the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF), which was the tower frequency. The copilot of the accident airplane made multiple attempts to turn on the runway lights using the UNICOM frequency, which had been the CTAF until about 6 months before the accident. The captain continued his landing approach below approach minimums without the runway lights being on. While in the landing flare, the captain reported that strong cross-winds and blowing snow created a "white-out" weather condition. The airplane touched down 195 feet left of the runway centerline in snow covered terrain between the runway and taxiway. Two ILS Runway 18 approach plates were found in the airplane. One was out of date and showed the UNICOM frequency as the CTAF. The other was current and showed the tower frequency as the CTAF. All four occupants escaped uninjured, among them the actress Sandra Bullock and the musician Bob Schneider.

The flight was maneuvering in instrument meteorological conditions and was observed on radar making climbing and descending turns prior to making a final descending turn and being lost from radar. Examination of the crash site showed the airplane had impacted the terrain in a about a 90-degree nose down attitude. The crash site was about .09 miles from the last radar contact, when the airplane was 2,000 feet above ground level. Post crash examination of the airplane structure, flight controls, engines, propellers, and airplane systems showed no evidence of pre-crash failure or malfunction.