United States of America

The accident occurred during the second of a two-leg nonscheduled cargo flight. The initial leg of the flight departed the preceding evening. The pilots landed about 3.5 hours later for fuel and departed on the accident flight an hour after refueling. The flight entered a cruise descent about 39 miles from the destination airport in preparation for approach and landing. The pilots reported to air traffic control that they were executing a wide base and were subsequently cleared for a visual approach and landing. The landing clearance was acknowledged, and no further communications were received. No problems or anomalies were reported during the flight. The airplane was briefly established on final approach before radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 0.5 mile short of the runway and came to rest in a trucking company parking lot. A postimpact fire ensued. Damage to the landing gear indicated that it was extended at the time of impact. The position of the wing flaps could not be determined. Disparities in the propeller blade angles at impact were likely due to the airplane’s encounter with the wooded area and the impact sequence. No evidence of mechanical anomalies related to the airframe, engines, or propellers was observed. A review of air traffic control radar data revealed that the airplane airspeed decayed to about 70 to 75 kts on final approach which was at or below the documented aerodynamic stall speed of the airplane in the landing configuration. Although there was limited information about the flight crew’s schedules, their performance was likely impaired by fatigue resulting from both the total duration of the overnight flights and the approach being conducted in the window of the circadian low. This likely resulted in the flight crew’s failure to maintain airspeed and recognize the impending aerodynamic stall conditions.

The pilot reported that, while holding short of the runway, he set the parking brake while waiting for his takeoff clearance. Upon receiving takeoff clearance, he reached down to the parking brake handle and, "quickly pushed the parking brakes back in"; however, he did not visually verify that he disengaged the parking brake. During the takeoff roll, he noticed that the airplane was not accelerating beyond about 70 knots and decided to abort the takeoff. The airplane subsequently veered to the left, exited the departure end of the runway, and impacted an airport perimeter fence. The pilot reported that he must have not fully disengaged the parking brake before takeoff and that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the parking brake handle was partially extended, which likely resulted in the airplane’s decreased acceleration during the takeoff roll.

The crew was conducting an on-demand charter flight with eight passengers onboard. As the flight crew taxied the airplane to the departure runway, the copilot called air traffic control using his mobile phone to obtain the departure clearance and release. According to the pilot, while continuing to taxi, he stopped the airplane short of the runway where he performed a rudder bias check (the last item in the taxi checklist) and applied the parking brake without verbalizing the parking brake or rudder bias actions because the copilot was on the phone. After the pilot lined up on the runway and shortly before takeoff, the flight crew discussed and corrected a NO TAKEOFF annunciation for an unsafe trim setting. After the copilot confirmed takeoff power was set, he stated that the airplane was barely moving then said that something was not right, to which the pilot replied the airplane was rolling and to call the airspeeds. About 16 seconds later, the pilot indicated that the airplane was using more runway than he expected then made callouts for takeoff-decision speed and rotation speed. The pilot stated that he pulled the yoke back twice, but the airplane did not lift off. Shortly after, the pilot applied full thrust reversers and maximum braking, then the airplane exited the departure end of the runway, impacted a ditch, and came to rest 1,990 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. The airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire, and the crew and passengers were not injured.

After flying one flight leg earlier in the day, the pilot flew to an intermediate stop on the way to his home base to purchase fuel. A surveillance video recording from the fueling airport showed the airplane land and taxi to the self-serve fuel pump where the engines were shut down for about 10 minutes while the airplane was fueled. The pilot then had difficulty starting both engines over several minutes. After the engines were running, the airplane taxied to the runway and did not appear to stop for an engine run-up. The pilot performed a rolling takeoff, and the airplane lifted off after a roll of about 2,100 ft, slightly more than half the available runway length. A passenger reported that after liftoff, at an altitude of about 50 to 100 ft above ground level (agl), both engines lost partial power and began “stuttering,” which continued for the remainder of the flight. He further reported that the engines did not stop, but they were “not producing full RPM.” The airplane drifted left of centerline, which a witness described as a left yawing motion. The pilot corrected the drift and flew the runway heading over the grass on the left side of the runway; however, the airplane would not climb. After crossing the end of the runway, the pilot pitched the airplane up to avoid obstacles. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data indicated that the airplane climbed from about 20 to 120 ft agl in a gradual left turn. During this time the groundspeed decreased from about 80 knots to about 69 knots. The altitude then decreased to about 50 ft agl, the groundspeed decreased to about 66 knots, and the left turn decreased in radius until the recorded data ended about 100 ft west of the accident site. The airplane descended and
impacted a house. Witness descriptions of the airplane yawing to the left while over the runway and again during its final left turn suggest that the loss of engine power may not have been symmetric (that is, one engine may have suffered more of a loss than the other).

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

The flight crew was landing the transport-category airplane at a remote, gravel-covered runway. According to the captain, the terrain on the approach to the runway sloped down toward the approach end, which positioned the airplane close to terrain during the final stages of the approach. A video recorded by a bystander showed that while the airplane was on short final approach, it flew low on the glidepath and dragged its landing gear through vegetation near the approach end of the runway. The video showed that, just before the main landing gear wheels reached the runway threshold, the right main landing wheel impacted a dirt and rock berm. The captain said that to keep the airplane from veering to the right, he placed the No. 1 and No. 2 engine propellers in reverse pitch. The flight engineer applied asymmetric reverse thrust to help correct for the right turning tendency, and the airplane tracked straight for about 2,000 ft. The video then showed that the right main landing gear assembly separated, and the airplane continued straight down the runway before veering to the right, exiting the runway, and spinning about 180°, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. On-site examination of the runway revealed several 4-ft piles of rocks and dirt at the runway threshold, which is likely what the right main landing wheel impacted. Given that the airplane landing gear struck vegetation and rocks on the approach to the runway, it is likely that they were below the proper glidepath for the approach. The crew stated there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.

The pilot stated that, during takeoff in the float-equipped airplane, he saw the left float begin to move into his peripheral vision from the left cockpit window and the airplane began to yaw to the left. The left wing subsequently impacted the water and the airplane nosed over, separating the right wing from the fuselage. The passengers consistently reported choppy water conditions at the time of the accident; one passenger reported that white caps were visible on the ocean waves in the distance. The passengers said that, during the takeoff, the airplane impacted a swell or wave and nosed over abruptly, and the cabin rapidly filled with water. Examination of the float assembly revealed fractures in the left front flying wire attachment fitting and the right rear flying wire attachment strap and hole elongation in the left rear flying wire attachment fitting. Additionally, the bolts attaching the two left flying wire attachment fittings to the left float were bent, and the two flying wires that had been attached to the fractured attachment fitting and attachment strap were buckled. While some areas of corrosion were observed on the fractured left forward fitting, the total area of corrosion was a small percentage of the total cross-section, and the remainder of the fracture and associated deformation of the lug was consistent with ductile overstress fracture. Similar areas of corrosion were also observed on each of the intact flying wire attachment fittings. Post-accident testing completed by the float manufacturer revealed that buckling of flying wires similar to that observed on the accident airplane was only reproduced at strap and fitting failure loads above 9,000 pounds force; the design specification load was 3,453 pounds of force. This indicates that the small amount of corrosion present on the fractured flying wire attachment fitting did not reduce its loadcarrying capability below the design specification load of 3,453 pounds of force, and that both the flying wire attachment fitting and flying wire attachment strap fractured due to overload. Therefore, it is likely that the accident airplane floats were subject to forces that exceeded their design limitations, resulting in overload of the flying wires attached to the left float. It is also likely that, given the lack of damage on either float, the force was due to impact with an ocean wave or swell and not by striking an object.

While approaching class B airspace, the airline transport pilot was in communication with a controller who later stated that the pilot's speech was slurred, and the controller repeatedly asked if the oxygen system on the airplane was working properly. As the airplane approached a nearby airport, about 85 miles from his destination airport, the pilot stated he had the airport in sight and repeatedly requested a visual approach. The controller instructed the pilot to continue his flight to his destination, in a southwest direction. As the controller attempted to maintain communications, the pilot dropped off radar shortly after passing the nearby airport and subsequently landed at the nearby airport, which was not his destination airport. According to a surveillance video and impact marks on the runway, the airplane landed hard about halfway down the runway and slid to a stop on the left side of the runway. The airplane fuselage and wings were mostly consumed by postimpact fire. After authorities arrived onsite, the pilot was arrested for operating an aircraft under the influence of alcohol. The pilot was found to have a blood alcohol level of .288, which likely contributed to the pilot landing at the incorrect airport and his subsequent loss of airplane control during landing.

The commercial pilot was conducting a visual flight rules scheduled passenger flight with five passengers. During the return leg to the company’s base airport, the pilot requested, and was given clearance to, a short gravel runway of 1,858 ft that terminated at parallel cross-runways and had inbound airplanes. The wind was reported as variable at 3 knots, and the outside air temperature was 88°F which was 25° warmer than usual. The pilot stated that he conducted a steeper than normal approach and performed a normal 30° flap landing flare; however, the airplane floated halfway down the runway. He initiated a go-around by advancing the throttle to takeoff power and retracting the flaps to 20° as the main landing gear briefly touched down. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane arrived 0.1 mile from the runway threshold at 149 ft above ground level (agl) and 110 knots of ground speed, which was 32 knots faster than the short field landing approach speed listed in the pilot operating handbook. A witness in the air traffic control tower (the ground controller) stated that the airplane “bled off a lot of airspeed,” during the landing attempt and climbed out in a very flat profile. The tower local controller stated that after liftoff, the airplane’s right wing dropped and the airplane appeared to be turning right into conflicting landing traffic, so he twice instructed the airplane to “left turn out immediately.” The pilot stated that he attempted to comply with the tower controller’s instruction, but when he applied left aileron, the airplane appeared to stall, rolled rapidly right, and descended in a right-wing-low attitude. It subsequently impacted the surface between runways. A postimpact fire ensued, and the pilot helped the passengers egress. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact fire. Given the evidence, it is likely that the pilot decided to land on the short runway to expedite the arrival and did not perform an appropriate short field landing approach, which resulted in excessive airspeed and altitude over the runway threshold, a long landing flare, rapid deceleration, and a self-initiated go-around from a slow airspeed. Had the pilot initiated the go-around as he approached the runway with indications of an unstable visual approach, the airspeed would have been well above stall speed, which would have allowed for the desired positive climb out on runway heading. The pilot likely attempted to comply with the tower local controller’s urgent commands to turn while the airplane was near the limit of performance (the temperature was about 25 degrees warmer than average, which would have resulted in a higher density altitude than the pilot was accustomed to and degraded aircraft and engine performance). The pilot’s maneuvering resulted in the exceedance of the critical angle-of-attack of the high wing (right wing) during the left turn, and an aerodynamic stall.