Tokyo-Haneda

The crew was cleared to takeoff from runway 15L and started the takeoff procedure. After a course of about 1,000 meters, the airplane lifted off prematurely. It banked left, causing the left wing to struck the ground. Out of control, the airplane landed back onto the runway then went out of control. It veered off runway to the left and while contacting soft ground, all landing gear were torn off as well as all four engines. The airplane slid for about 800 meters before coming to rest. All 140 occupants were evacuated, three of them were injured. The aircraft was written off.

On January 13, 1977, a Japan Air Line (JAL) McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-62F, JA 8054, operated as an international charter cargo flight from Moses Lake, Washington, U.S.A., to Tokyo, Japan. An en route stop and crew change were scheduled at Anchorage, Alaska. The aircraft arrived at Anchorage at 0503. The incoming flightcrew reported that the only weather they encountered en route was a layer of fog on the final approach at 800 feet, and that they did not encounter any precipitation or icing. The aircraft was serviced and a walk-around inspection was performed by JAL maintenance personnel and contract mechanics. The two contract mechanics stated that there was ice on the inlet guide vanes, the engine cowlings, and the engine bullet noses, but no ice was reported on the airfoil surfaces. The JAL personnel stated that they did not see any ice on the aircraft. One contract mechanic advised the JAL representative that the engine anti-icing system should be used by the next crew to clear the ice in the engine inlets. No maintenance was performed on the aircraft. The outbound flightcrew was wakened about 0330, left the hotel by taxi about 0430, and arrived at the JAL dispatch office about 0 0500. The taxicab driver who brought the outbound crew to the airport stated that he became concerned by the captain's actions in the taxi and called his dispatcher to report his impressions. He stated that the captain's movements were uncoordinated; that his face was flushed and his eyes were glazed; that his conversation was garbled and incoherent; that his movements were jerky and unstable; and that he had trouble getting out of the cab and had to steady himself on the car door. About 0450 the taxi dispatcher called the operations agent for the contract maintenance company and reported that one of her drivers had taken an "intoxicated" JAL captain to the airport. The operations agent stated that "...it seemed logical that JAL would detect anything unusual and act accordingly." He further stated that a 0620, he notified his line manager of the conversation with the taxi dispatcher and that "I felt that if the captain was intoxicated JAL OPS...or his first officer would have stopped the flight immediately." The JAL dispatch personnel and the inbound JAL crew stated that they noted nothing unusual about the outbound crew. The dispatch briefing proceeded smoothly and no significant questions were asked by the outbound crew. The outbound crew consisted of an American captain and a Japanese first officer and flight engineer. They went to the aircraft about 0515 and boarded the aircraft with the two cattle handlers. The driver of the crew car, a friend of the captain, stated that "...he was in good condition as far as way's I've seen him sometimes and I made that statement before I ever heard any rumors that he was supposedly drunk or had been partying or whatever." A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that about 0603 the captain and first officer were checking the inputs to the inertial navigation system. They also checked the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) for local visibility, received their clearance, and began their prestart checklists about 0609. The weather on the ATIS report was in part: "...sky partially obscured, visibility one-quarter mile, fog...". The checklists were completed and the takeoff data reviewed. About 0615 the engines were started and the stickshaker (stall warning system) was tested. The after-start checklist was completed and the aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 24L. During the taxi, the flight engineer requested and received permission from the captain to turn the engine anti-ice system on because of the ice on the inlet guide vanes. The flight controls and spoilers were checked while taxiing and the flaps were extended to 23°. The taxi checklist was completed and the takeoff data, the flap settings, and the trim settings were again reviewed. The captain, in response to the challenge "anti-ice, de-ice, and rain removal," said, "Ok, we will use engine anti-ice." The de-ice system was reported "off'' by the flight engineer. The captain briefed the crew on the takeoff and abort procedures he would use. He commented that the runway was slippery and he didn't think they would abort. The captain taxied the aircraft southeast on the ramp, past the terminal toward runway 24L. He stopped on the ramp after being instructed to hold short of runway 24R. After several communications with the controller, the aircraft taxied onto runway 24R, and reported ''...ready for takeoff." The tower advised the captain that he was on runway 24R which the captain contradicted. The controller then issued taxi instructions to get the aircraft to runway 24L. The captain made a 180° turn on runway 24R before he finally taxied to the taxiway which leads to the approach end of runway 24L. The crew again reported that they were ready for takeoff at 0633:37. Takeoff was initiated and at 0634:32 the captain called "maximum power". At 0634:50 the captain announced, "I have" and at 0634:52, "80" (knots) was called by the copilot. At 0635:10, "Vee one" was called by the copilot and at 0635:16 rotation was called and acknowledged by the captain. At 0635:19.5 the captain called "Ten degrees" and at 0635:21.4 the first officer called V2. At 0635:26.2 a sound similar to aircraft buffet was recorded. This sound became more frequent and continued until the sounds of impact. At 0635:32 the first officer called "Gear up" and at 0635:33 the flight engineer said "Too much speed (steep)".' At 0635: 38 the engineer called "stall" simultaneously the stickshaker sounded and continued until 0635:39.3, when impact was recorded. A witness near the departure end of the runway saw the aircraft climb to an estimated altitude of about 100 feet above the ground, veer to the left, and then slide '... out of the air." The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all five occupants were killed as well as the 56 cows.

A McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62 passenger plane, JA8040, was destroyed when it crashed on takeoff from Moscow's -Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO), Russia. Five of the 14 crew members and ten of the 62 passengers survived the accident. JAL flight JL446 was a scheduled international flight from Copenhagen (CPH), Denmark to Tokyo-Haneda (HND), Japan with an en route stop in Moscow. The flight to Moscow was uneventful and the airplane landed at 18:17. After servicing of the aircraft startup and taxi clearance was received at 19:38. JL446 was cleared for takeoff from runway 25 at 19:49. On takeoff the DC-8 climbed to 100 m with a supercritical angle of attack and lost height abruptly. It hit the ground and burst into flames.

JA8030 started a take-off run on runway 33R of Tokyo International Airport under VFR conditions at approximately 1428 hours with the pilot-in-command Manshichi Harano, examinees Yoshiomi Motouchi and Shuji Daikoku, flight engineer Terumitsu Fujimaki, and Chief Examiner of the Civil Aviation Bureau of Ministry of Transport Yukiaki Kawata, on board for the purpose of conducting a practical examination necessary for change in type rating to Convair 880-22M. About the time the aircraft took a nose-up attitude, it began to yaw left and entered into a right side-slip. At approximately 1 500 m from the runway threshold marking, the right main landing gear started to go off the ground, and while the yaw and side-slip further increased, the under-surface of No. 1 engine began to contact the runway at approximately 1 600 m from the marking. The aircraft continued to side-slip with the nose coming down and deviated from the runway at approximately 1 700 m from the marking. The aircraft moved on the lawn area, crossed taxiway C-4, then while proceeding in the direction of approximately 35O left in reference to the runway bearing, moved the heading to approximately 145O left in reference to the runway bearing, thence yawed right and continued the side-slip. Although the aircraft was in a slight nose-up attitude during this period, it went abruptly into a nose-down and almost at that time a fire started near No. 3 engine. During this period the aircraft further proceeded with the left main landing gear, nose landing gear and Nos. 3, 2, 1 and 4 engines separated in this sequence, and came to a stop at a point approximately 2 100 m from runway 33R threshold marking and approximately 200 m from the runway centre line with a heading of 90° in reference to runway 33L. The fire expanded explosively and the aircraft was damaged by fire or burnt except for the aft fuselage, empennage and a portion of the main wings. All five persons on board died. The flight was performed on behalf of Japan Air Lines.

BOAC Flight 911 was a scheduled service from San Francisco (SFO) to Hong Kong (HKG) via Honolulu (HNL) and Tokyo (HND). The Boeing 707 was expected to arrive at Tokyo Airport at 16:45 on 4 March. However, due to poor meteorological conditions at Tokyo and because the precision approach radar (PAR) of the GCA was out of service, it diverted to Fukuoka (FUK) and landed there at 18:00. After staying overnight at Fukuoka, Flight 911 left for Tokyo at 11:25 and landed there at 12:43. The aircraft was prepared for the next leg to Hong Kong and a flight plan was filed for a flight in accordance with the instrument flight rules via Oshima on airway JG6 to Hong Kong at FL310. At 13:42 hours the crew contacted ATC requesting permission to start the engines and clearance for a VMC climb via Fuji-Rebel-Kushimoto. The aircraft left the ramp at 13:50. It was instructed to make "a right turn after take off", and departed Tokyo Airport at 13:58. After takeoff the aircraft flew over Gotemba City on a heading of approximately 298 deg at an altitude of approximately 4900 m and indicated airspeed of 320 to 370 knots. The aircraft, trailing white vapor, then suddenly lost altitude over the Takigahara area, and parts of the aircraft began to break away over Tsuchiyadai and Ichirimatsu. Finally over Tarobo at an altitude of approx. 2000 m, the forward fuselage broke away. The mid-aft fuselage together with the wing, making a slow flat spin to the right, crashed into a forest at the foot of Mount Fuji. The forward fuselage crashed into the forest approx. 300 m to the west of the above site and caught fire. All 124 occupants were killed.

Flight 402 was a scheduled international flight from Hong Kong to Tokyo and Vancouver. It took off from Hong Kong at 1614 hours Japan Standard Time and was routed via Taipei, Kagoshima and Ohshima. At 1908 hours it flew over "Spencer Victor" at 25 000 ft and started to descend gradually; at 1912 hours it crossed "Rice Victor" at 18 000 it and two minutes later entered the Kisarazu holding pattern at 14 000 ft where it waited for an improvement of the weather conditions at Tokyo International Airport (TIA). At 1942 hours the flight notified Tokyo air traffic control that if the weather conditions failed to improve within 15 minutes, it would divert to Taipei (alternate airport). Ten minutes later, at 1952 hours the flight was advised by Tokyo ATC that the RVR was 2 400 ft and the pilot then asked for a clearance for approach and landing. The approach clearance was given and the aircraft proceeded to descend to 3 000 ft, in the holding pattern. However, the weather conditions at TIA worsened and the aircraft did not proceed with the approach. The pilot requested a clearance to divert to Taipei at 1958 hours and commenced climbing. At 2005 hours, while heading for Tateyama en route to Taipei the flight was advised by Tokyo air traffic control that visibility at TIA had improved to 4 mile with RVR 3 000 ft. Consequently, the pilot requested a clearance to return to Kisarazu and began descending from 11 500 ft. At 2011 hours the aircraft arrived over Kisarazu at 3 000 ft and began another approach under instructions of the GCA. At this time the flight was quite normal. When the aircraft was 8 NM from touchdown at an altitude of 1 500 ft, it was advised that there was a light tailwind 150015 kt and was cleared to land on runway 33R. The rate of descent for final approach was begun about 5.3 NM from touchdown at approximately 2012:58 hours. The aircraft was on course and on the glide path with a ground speed of approximately 174 kt, gradually decreasing to approximately 140 kt at 2 NM and 114 kt after passing 1 NM. When the aircraft reached one mile from touchdown, the GCA final controller noted that the aircraft was slightly below the GCA glide path and advised "20 ft low, level off momentarily". Nevertheless, the aircraft continued its approach 20 ft below and in parallel with the GCA glide path. After the aircraft passed the P.M. (precision minimum), the aircraft requested the intensity of the lights to be reduced. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft made a sharp descent and its main landing gear wheel struck No. 14 approach light 2 800 ft from touch- down point approximately in an attitude of level flight. Following this first contact, the aircraft struck the approach lights one by one until No. 3 damaging or destroying them, and at approximately 2015 hours crashed against the sea wall with the bottom of the fore-fuselage. Then, the aircraft was thrown over near the end of runway 33R, destroyed and caught fire. All 10 crew members and 54 passengers were killed while eight others were injured.

While approaching Tokyo-Haneda Airport by night and in good weather conditions, at an altitude of about 2,000 feet, the three engine aircraft went out of control and crashed into the Tokyo Bay, about 12 km southeast of the airport. Lots of debris were quickly recovered as well as the tail that sank by a depth of 20 meters. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and none of the 133 occupants survived the crash, which was the worst in Aviation History to date. At the time of the accident, the crew was approaching the airport under VFR mode in good weather conditions and did not report any issues on the frequency.

While cruising at an altitude of 2,200 meters in marginal weather conditions, the airplane struck the slope of Mt Nakanoone located some 65 km northeast of Hamamatsu. SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. The wreckage was found on 29 December 1966 in an isolated area. Both pilots were killed.

The aircraft belly landed at Tokyo-Haneda Airport for unknown reason. All four crew members who were completing a training flight were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Hachijō-jima Airport, en route to Tokyo-Haneda Airport, the crew climbed in limited visibility due to foggy conditions when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain. As the airplane failed to arrive at destination, SAR were initiated at 1630LT and the wreckage was later found on the slope of a mountain located some 10 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 19 occupants were killed.