Saint Peter (Guernsey)

At approximately 1830 hrs on 3 November 2013 the operator’s duty pilot received a request that the aircraft should be dispatched to carry out a search. The volunteer crew-members were alerted and made their way to the airport. Weather conditions in the Channel Islands were poor, with a southerly wind gusting up to 41 kt, turbulence, rain, cloud below 1,000 ft aal, and visibility of 3 to 6 km. On arrival at the aircraft’s hangar, the crew was established, consisting of a pilot, search director, and three observers. They donned immersion suits and life jackets and prepared for flight. The search director obtained details of the search request, which was to search for two fishermen near Les Écréhous (a group of rocks in the English Channel approximately 5 nm north-east of the north-eastern corner of Jersey). Some evidence suggested the men were in a small dinghy; other information was that they were in the water. The men were reported to be alive and communicating by mobile telephone. One crew-member carried out pre-flight preparations, although he did not check the fuel quantities or carry out a water drain check. When interviewed, he recalled having reported to the pilot that he had not checked the fuel. The aircraft was then pulled out of its hangar and the search director explained the details of the search request to the pilot and other crew-members. Bearing in mind the weather, the fact that it was dark, and the fishermen’s predicament, the pilot recognized the need for “a lot of urgency” about the task. In the context of the operation, he regarded the task as being routine, but the weather not so. The pilot “walked round” the aircraft, though he did not carry out a formal pre-flight inspection; it was the organization’s custom to ensure that the aircraft was ready for flight at all times. The technical log showed that the aircraft was serviceable, with no deferred defects, and that the wing tanks contained 55 USG each side and the tip tanks, 18 USG each side. The search director recalled asking the pilot whether he was content to fly in the prevailing conditions, and that the pilot stated that he was willing to fly. The crew boarded the aircraft. The observer in the front right-hand seat had recently obtained a Private Pilot’s Licence and this influenced the decision for him to be placed next to the pilot. The pilot reported that he carried out a “fairly rapid” start, although the normal pre-departure sequence was interrupted while a problem with switch selections, affecting the functioning of the search equipment in the aircraft’s cabin, was resolved. The pilot obtained clearance from ATC to taxi, enter the runway, and take off when ready. He described that he carried out engine power checks during a brief back-track, checking the magnetos and propeller controls at 2,100 rpm, before carrying out pre-takeoff checks. He did not refer to the written checklists provided in the aircraft but executed a generic set of checks from memory. Following an unremarkable takeoff, in the strong crosswind , the pilot corrected for drift and established a climb towards a cruising altitude of 900 ft. When interviewed, he described the conditions as being “awful” and “ghastly”, with turbulence from the cliffs contributing to occasional activation of the stall warner, even though the speed was “probably 100 plus knots” . At 900 ft, the aircraft was “in the bottom” of the cloud, which was unhelpful for the observers, so the pilot descended the aircraft to cruise at 500 or 600 ft, flying by reference to the artificial horizon, and making constant control inputs to maintain straight and level flight. He stated that, although he would normally have begun checking fuel flow, mixture settings, etc, shortly after establishing in the cruise, he found that the conditions required him to devote his full attention to flying the aircraft. As the aircraft passed north abeam the western end of Jersey, the rain and low cloud continued and the turbulence worsened, The pilot gained sight of red obstacle lights on a television mast on the north side of the island but had few other visual references. The pilot noticed a change in an engine note. He immediately “reached down to put the hot air on” which made little difference; the observer recalled that the pilot checked that the mixtures were fully rich at this time. The right-hand engine rpm then began surging. The pilot made a quick check of the engine instruments, before applying full throttle on both engines, setting both propellers to maximum rpm and beginning a climb. The observer noticed that the fuel pressure gauge for the right-hand engine was “going up and down” but did not mention this to the pilot; the pilot did not see the gauge indication fluctuating. Around this time the pilot switched the electric fuel pumps on. The pilot turned the aircraft towards Jersey and made a MAYDAY call to ATC; the search director made a similar call on the appropriate maritime frequency. These calls were acknowledged, and a life boat, on its way to Les Écréhous, altered course towards the aircraft’s position. Although the pilot was “amazed” at how few lights he could see on the ground, he perceived what he thought was the runway at Jersey Airport, and flew towards it. The aircraft reached approximately 1,100 ft amsl. The right-hand engine then stopped. The pilot carried out the shut-down checks, feathering the propeller as he did so. The aircraft carried on tracking towards Jersey Airport, descending towards the north side of the island. Some moments later, the left-hand engine’s rpm began to fluctuate briefly before it also stopped. The pilot later recalled being “fairly certain” that he “was trying to change tanks” but acknowledged that he could not recall events with certainty. He trimmed the aircraft for a glide, still heading towards the airport at Jersey, but with very limited visual references outside the cockpit. The crew-members prepared the cabin for a ditching or off-airport landing; the observers in the rear-most seats considered how they might deploy the aircraft’s life raft (stored behind their seats) should a ditching occur. The pilot’s next recollection was that the automated decision height voice call-out activated (he had selected it to announce at 200 ft radio height). He switched the landing lights on and maintained a “reasonable speed” in anticipation of landing or ditching. One crew-member recalled the pilot calling “brace, brace, brace”, while another recalled being instructed to tighten seat belts and brace. No brace position had been set out in the operations manual, or rehearsed in training, and the responses of the crew-members to this instruction varied. The pilot glimpsed something green in front of the aircraft, and flared for landing. The aircraft touched down and decelerated, sliding downhill and passing through a hedge. With the aircraft now sliding somewhat sideways, it came to a halt when its nose lodged against a tree, with significant airframe damage. The pilot made various cockpit selections safe and all the occupants vacated the aircraft, with some difficulty. The search director became entangled in his headset lead as he egressed but freed himself. The front seat occupants experienced difficulty because their door could not be opened. They climbed over the search director’s desk and vacated the aircraft via the door adjacent to the search director’s position (the rear-row observers simultaneously opened the pilot’s door from the outside). The pilot and crew made their way to nearby habitation where they were subsequently assessed by an ambulance crew; none were injured. The search director returned to the aircraft with fire-fighters, to ensure that pyrotechnics and the self-inflating life raft on board the aircraft did not pose a hazard. In his very frank account of the flight, the pilot acknowledged that a decision to turn back soon after departure would have been justified by the weather conditions. He added that before the engine power changed, his workload was already very high, on account of the task and conditions.

The crew, comprising a commander, co-pilot and cabin crewmember, reported for duty at 0620 hrs at Guernsey Airport. The commander was conducting line training of the co-pilot, a first officer who had recently joined the companyThe first sector was to be from Guernsey to Jersey. No problems were identified during the pre-flight preparation and the aircraft departed on time at 0705 hrs, with the commander acting as handling pilot. The short flight was without incident and the weather for landing was reported as good, with the wind from 210° at 16 kt, FEW cloud at 2,000 ft and visibility in excess of 10 km. The commander elected to carry out a visual approach to Runway 27 at Jersey, using a planned approach speed of 107 kt and flap 30 selected for landing. During the approach, the gear was selected down and the flight crew confirmed the three green ‘gear safe’ indication lights were illuminated, indicating that the gear was locked in the down position. The commander reported that both the approach and touchdown seemed normal, with the crosswind from the left resulting in the left main gear touching first. Just after touchdown both pilots heard a noise and the commander stated the aircraft appeared to settle slightly differently from usual. This made him believe that a tyre had burst. The cabin crew member also heard a noise after touchdown which she too thought was from a tyre bursting. The commander selected ground idle and partial reverse pitch and, as the aircraft decelerated through 70 kt, the co-pilot took over control of the ailerons, as per standard procedures, to allow the commander to take control of the steering tiller. The co-pilot reported that despite applying corrective inputs the aircraft continued rolling to the left. A member of ground operations staff, situated at Holding Point E, reported to the tower controller that the left landing gear leg of the aircraft did not appear to be down properly as it passed him. The aircraft continued to quickly roll to the left until the left wingtip and propeller contacted the runway. The aircraft remained on the runway, rapidly coming to a halt to the left of the centreline, approximately abeam Holding Point D. Both propellers continued to rotate and the commander selected the condition levers to the fuel shutoff position and pulled the fire handles to shut both engines down. The tower controller, seeing the incident, pressed the crash alarm and airfield emergency services were quickly in attendance.

The aircraft had departed Exeter on a flight to Guernsey when, during the climb to FL35, a slight smell of fumed was noticed in the cockpit. By the time the aircraft had passed SKERRY, by some four to five nm, smoke was seen coming from under the right hand instrument panel. The pilot asked the passenger to investigate the source, but he reported that he could see no burning. The pilot then informed Jersey control of their situation and advised that he was returning direct to Start Point, the nearest land on the coast. After changing to Exeter Radar, the pilot initiated a descent in case an immediate ditching should prove necessary, and briefed his passenger to don a life-jacket. He also directed the passenger to sit at the rear of the cabin, adjacent to the door, so that he would be ready to deploy the life-raft through the upper half of the door if they had to ditch. As the density of the smoke and fumes increased, the pilot elected to carry out a controlled ditching, fearing that if he tried to reach the coast he would be overcome by the fumes. However, he stated that he was reluctant to open the cabin air vents in case this escalated any hidden fire, and he did not turn off the master switch since he required the radios to maintain contact with Exeter Radar. The pilot transmitted a Mayday call, giving a full position report, and at 200 feet amsl he shut down both engines and feathered the propellers. He estimated the sea-well was between eight and ten feet but, since a strong wind was blowing (20 knots), he decided to land into-wind. The aircraft contacted the water at approximately 70 knots, plunging into a swell which generated an impact which the pilot later described as 'tremendous'.The aircraft, however, floated for some one and a half minutes before sinking, enabling both occupants to safely escape from the rear door. The pilot reported that, once in the water, it took them an estimated 20 minutes to get the life-raft inflated, but their life-jackets provided adequate support during this period. Although the pilot advised that flares and a handheld radio were being carried on board the aircraft, these were lost during the ditching. After approximately 45 minutes, an SAR helicopter from RAF Chivenor arrived on scene, recovered both survivors, and took them to hospital in Exeter. The pilot, who was wearing a lap and diagonal restraint, and the passenger, who was wearing only a lap strap, were largely uninjured.

The aircraft was operating British Island Airways flight UK 185, a scheduled night passenger service from Southampton (SOU) to Guernsey (GCI). It taxied out initially at 17:49 but during the takeoff run it was noticed that the starboard engine's rpm gauge indicated 14,550 rpm instead of 15,000 and that the torque reading on the same engine was below the datum appropriate to the use of water methanol injection. The commander, who was handling the aircraft, therefore decided to abandon the takeoff when the speed had reached about 60 knots and he returned the aircraft to the apron. A ground run carried out on the starboard engine produced normal full power indications and so the passengers were re-embarked and the flight departed for the second time at 18:21. The power output from the engines during this takeoff was satisfactory but when the aircraft had reached about 200 feet a rise in the torque indication of the starboard engine was observed. Climb power was set and the flight climbed to FL80 and continued on track to Guernsey. The descent into Guernsey was started when the aircraft was about 35 nm from the airport. Power was reduced on both engines but when the fuel flow was being trimmed back the starboard engine's turbine gas temperature (TGT), torque and fuel flow gauges showed an increase in their readings and because they continued to rise the engine was shut down and the propeller feathered. Guernsey Approach Control was informed of the situation and asked to have the emergency services standing by for the landing. The aircraft continued the descent but when it was about 5 nm from the runway it was advised by ATC that the airline had requested that it should land at Jersey airport instead of Guernsey. It was therefore decided to divert to Jersey and clearance was received from ATC to proceed on course at 1,500 feet above mean sea level (amsl). The aircraft changed to the Jersey Approach Control frequency and after ensuring that ATC was aware of the emergency the commander requested permission to make an ILS approach to runway 27 although the weather at the time was clear. The commander did not consider that it was necessary to brief the co-pilot about the approach and landing to Jersey as this had already been covered during a previous approach to the airport earlier in the day and he made no special reference to the single engine approach condition. Jersey radar positioned the aircraft on the ILS localiser and it became established at a range of about 5½ nm from the runway and commenced its descent shortly afterwards. In the vicinity of the outer marker the undercarriage was lowered followed by takeoff flap (5°). ATC cleared the aircraft to land and reported the wind as 270° at 10 knots. The aircraft continued its descent flying slightly above the ILS glide path with the airspeed increasing from about 120 knots to 137 knots. Power was reduced on the port engine to a very low value and the IAS began to decay at a rate of about one knot per second. When the aircraft was between 400 and 300 feet above the runway full landing flap (30°) was selected and both pilots considered that at this stage they were correctly positioned for the approach. The co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was about 105-110 knots when he selected full flap. (The recommended speed for the final approach was 99½ knots, ie 10 knots above VATI). The aircraft became displaced to the right of the runway centre line as it approached the threshold and the commander tried to realign it with the runway by making a sidestep manoeuvre to the left. The IAS had continued to decrease at a steady rate during the final stage of the descent and that at this point it was about 89 knots. When the commander realised that he was not going to be successful in his attempt to realign the aircraft with the runway centre line he called for full power. The aircraft was now alongside the runway threshold lights. The co-pilot advanced the throttle on the port engine and believing that the commander had also called 'overshooting' he selected the undercarriage to retract. The aircraft began to yaw and roll rapidly to the right resulting in the starboard wing tip and starboard main wheels almost simultaneously striking the ground well to the right of the runway edge. The aircraft subsided on to the grass as the undercarriage retracted, spun round to the right through approximately 180° and then slid backwards until it came to rest astride a small road on the northern perimeter of the airfield. All 53 occupants were evacuated safely, four of them were slightly injured.

The flying boat hit a submerged rock upon landing in the St Peter harbor, causing a rupture in the hull. The airplane sank but there were no casualties.