Minsk-2

The cause of the crash of BAe-125-800B RA-02807 during the ILS approach procedure at night, in weather conditions that met ICAO CAT I, was the failure to take timely action by the crew to carry out a missed approach, or divert to an alternate, when the ground could not be seen while descending below decision height during a transition to visual flight, and the lack of a proper response and action required when the TAWS alarm repeatedly sounded, which led to the collision of the aircraft with obstacles (forest) and land in a controlled flight (CFIT), its destruction and death of people on board.

Contributing factors were:
- Deficiencies in the type of retraining and training of the flight crew, especially in the use of automatic flight modes, and flight director;
- Erroneous actions of the captain, which led to an execution of the approach with the wrong ILS frequency set on the left set;
- Lack of preparation of the commander of the plane for an approach in weather conditions that meet CAT I ICAO.
Values of meteorological conditions in the flight log were in most cases were falsified;
- Poor communication and crew resource management (CRM) of the flightcrew;
- Poor control of the level of training of the crew by the airline's management and lack of organization in the airline's flight operations;
- Psychological characteristics of the pilots, unrecorded in the formation of the crew and, possibly, reduced efficiency of the captain in a stressful situation because of chronic ischemic heart disease with coronary artery problems, which was not detected when passing aviation medical checks.

The accident involving aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of lift of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after liftoff from the runway, the left wing tip contacting the ground, the subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of lift of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollutes" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel icing, while the aircraft was parked at the airport and during taxiing for the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight. The situation could be aggravated when exceeding the values recommended by the operations manual of the angular velocity when lifting the nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated" wings when it is impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally. Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future. An Airworthiness Directive on the need to include anti-icing systems on the wing in the final stage of taxiing at the actual weather conditions was issued by Transport Canada after the accident. This probably could have prevented the accident.

It was determined that the aircraft remained parked on the apron at Minsk-2 Airport for about a week prior to the flight and has not been deiced prior to takeoff. During initial climb, some ice detached from both wings and entered both engines, causing them to flame out.

It was determined that both artificial horizons failed during initial climb for undetermined reasons. The combination of this instrument failure and a limited visibility caused the pilots to suffer a spatial disorientation and then a loss of control.