Gold River | Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives

The single engine airplane was conducting a visual flight rules repositioning flight from Louie Bay on Nootka Island, British Columbia (BC), to Gold River Water Aerodrome (CAU6), BC, with only the pilot on board. On arrival at CAU6, the pilot noted a rough sea state in the company’s primary landing area and elected to land in the secondary area, a tree-lined river to the east of the base. The aircraft was observed overflying the company dock to the north and then turning right, aligning with the southwest direction of the river. When descending on the alignment turn to final approach, the aircraft experienced an uncommanded yaw and roll. It
abruptly turned further right, heading west, and continued to descend toward the trees. It was reported that opposite aileron input, to try and arrest the uncommanded yaw and roll, increased the roll rate. At approximately 1720, the aircraft struck the forested area on the west side of the river, coming to rest approximately 75 feet from the river. There was no post-impact fire. The pilot received serious injuries, was extracted by local firefighting personnel, and attended to by local paramedics. He was then airlifted to hospital by a search and rescue helicopter.

Probable cause:

While on the right turn to final, the aircraft experienced an uncommanded yaw and roll. The application of aileron in the opposite direction made the condition worse. This is consistent with an aerodynamic stall.

Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver I in Hesquiat Lake: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 16, 2013 at 1023 LT

Type of aircraft:

De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver

Operator:

Registration:

C-GPVB

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Plain, Valley

Schedule:

Hesquiat Lake - Gold River

MSN:

871

YOM:

1956

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

17000

Circumstances:

At 1015 Pacific Daylight Time, the de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) floatplane (registration CGPVB, serial number 871), operated by Air Nootka Ltd., departed Hesquiat Lake, British Columbia, with the pilot and 5 passengers for Air Nootka Ltd.’s water aerodrome base near Gold River, British Columbia. Visibility at Hesquiat Lake was about 2 ½ nautical miles in rain, and the cloud ceiling was about 400 feet above lake and sea level. Approximately 3 nautical miles west of the lake, while over Hesquiat Peninsula, the aircraft struck a tree top at about 800 feet above sea level and crashed. Shortly after the aircraft came to rest, a post-crash fire developed. All 6 persons on board survived the impact, but the pilot and 1 passenger died shortly after. A brief 406 megahertz emergency locator transmitter signal was transmitted, and a search and rescue helicopter recovered the survivors at about 1600.

Probable cause:

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot flew just above the tree tops into instrument meteorological conditions and rising terrain, and the aircraft struck a tree that was significantly taller than the others.
2. The pilot and 1 passenger did not exit the aircraft before it was consumed in the postimpact fire.
3. Air Nootka did not have effective methods to monitor its pilots’ in-flight decision making and associated practices. As a result, Air Nootka had no way to detect and correct unsafe behavior or poor decision making such as occurred on this flight.
Findings as to risk:
1. If aircraft are not fitted with technology to reduce fuel leakage or to eliminate ignition sources, the risk of post-impact fire is increased.
2. If aircraft are not equipped with shoulder harnesses for all seating positions then there is an increased risk of injuries.
3. If aircraft are not equipped with some alternate means of escape such as push-out windows, then there is a risk that post-crash structural deformation will jam doors shut and restrict exit for the occupants.
4. If companies operating under self-dispatch do not monitor their operations, they risk not being able to identify unsafe practices that are a hazard to flight crew and passengers.
5. If flight data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.

Final Report: