East Midlands

The twin engine aircraft departed East Midlands runways 27 on a ferry flight to Manchester. During initial climb by night, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 160 knots and disintegrated in a field near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

British Midland Airways Flight BD092 took off from London-Heathrow Airport at 1952LT on a flight to Belfast, Northern Ireland. Some 13 minutes later, while climbing through FL283, moderate to severe vibration was felt, accompanied by a smell of fire in the cockpit. The outer panel of one of the n°1 engine fan blades detached, causing compressor stalls and airframe shuddering. Believing the n°2 engine had been damaged the crew throttled it back. The shuddering stopped and the n°2 engine was shut down. The crew then decided to divert to East Midlands Airport. The flight was cleared for an approach to runway 27. At 900 feet, 2.4 nm from the runway threshold, the n°1 engine power suddenly suffered a decrease in power. As the speed fell below 125 knots, the stick shaker activated and the aircraft struck trees at a speed of 115 knots. The aircraft continued and impacted the western carriageway of the M1 motorway 10 meters lower and came to rest against a wooded embankment, 1'023 meters short of runway threshold. 47 passengers were killed while all other occupants were injured, some of them seriously.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Stansted to East Midlands, carrying approximately 800 kilos of various goods. As the aircraft was on approach 1 nm from touchdown, ATC advised that the RVR for landing had reduced to 900 meters and, very soon afterwards, notified a further deterioration to 800 meters. Immediately after this last ATC transmission, the pilot transmitted 'National Six Four Six got to go-around'. Ten seconds later he transmitted 'crashing...National'. The aircraft subsequently struck the ground at a point approximately 350 meters to the right of the runway 09 centerline and 750 meters beyond the threshold. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The BMA Fokker F-27 aircraft was engaged on crew training at East Midlands Airport (EMA). The commander, who was an experienced training captain, occupied the right pilot's seat and a first officer undergoing training for conversion to captaincy occupied the left seat as handling pilot. Another captain refreshing on type sat on the jump seat behind the pilots' seats, the intention being that he should move into the left seat after the first officer's training period. The weather was: wind 150 degrees at 7 kts, visibility 4 km and cloud 7 oktas stratus, base 1000 feet. The surface temperature was 2 °C and the QNH 1030. The training session began with a practice abandoned takeoff after which the aircraft took off at 13:08 and flew three practice ILS approaches followed by touch-and-go landings on runway 09, climbing to 2000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) after each takeoff. The runway in use was then changed and the aircraft flew a simulated asymmetric ILS approach to runway 27 followed by a missed approach (go-around) with the left engine throttled back. The runway was then changed again and an ILS approach to runway 09 was flown with the left engine still throttled back. This approach was followed by a touch-and-go landing during which both engines were brought up to full power. Very soon after becoming airborne the training captain again simulated failure of the left engine and the aircraft was climbed to 2000 feet amsl. Soon after the aircraft levelled off, the handling pilot commented on the large amount of rudder required to counteract the simulated failure of the left engine after takeoff. The training captain then said that he was deliberately putting more drag on the left side than would have been the case if the propeller had auto-feathered so that the climb performance corresponded better with that of an aircraft with passengers on board. He went on to say that if the handling pilot could cope with that extra drag, he could expect to control the aircraft if the failed engine auto-feathered because the rudder pedal force would then not be quite so great. The crew then began a procedural NDB approach to runway 09, for which instrument screens were fitted in front of the handling pilot. It was intended that the aircraft should be landed after the NDB approach for the pilot in the jump seat to take over as handling pilot. Decision altitude for the approach was 740 feet and touchdown altitude was 305 feet. It was company practice for beacon passage to be identified by the movement of the radio compass needle and, as the aircraft passed about one third of a mile north of the marker beacon inbound, descending through approximately 1300 feet amsl, the handling pilot said "Over the beacon now". No audio signal from the marker beacon was heard on the cockpit voice recorder. The landing checklist was completed during the following 20 seconds, including confirmation that the undercarriage was down, fuel heaters were off, two blue propeller lights were illuminated and fuel was trimmed up. 48 seconds after passing the beacon the aircraft reached decision altitude, and the training captain asked the handling pilot "How long and where is it?", to which the handling pilot replied "Got about a minute and ten seconds to go - should be straight in front". 22 seconds later and some 36 seconds before impact the training captain said "Why are we at 650 feet?" and pointed out that the handling pilot had allowed the aircraft to descend below decision altitude when he was, for training purposes, still in IMC. The handling pilot responded by saying "Intend going around then", or words to that effect. The training captain then said "Yes, well I'll let you see it now. There it is". As the training captain was saying this, the sound of an engine power increase was heard on the CVR, and, about 25 seconds before impact, the rpm of one engine was increased to 14,800 rpm, a setting 200 rpm below maximum continuous power. 10 seconds later the training captain was heard to say "Hang on, that's the - that's the field there. See it?" The handling pilot then said "Hold tight", at which point, some 13 seconds before impact, the CVR recorded the sound of another engine increasing power to 14,800 rpm. A moment later the handling pilot said "Haven't got it", and the training captain said "I've got it". The F-27 yawed to the left before banking steeply to the right. The aircraft struck the ground on the northern side of the Castle Donington motor racing circuit in a nose-down attitude, banked to the left and with considerable left sideslip. After the accident an accumulation of mixed rime and glaze ice was found on the leading edges of the wings and tail surfaces which had formed rough-surfaced horns one inch high above and below the airflow stagnation point. No ice was found on the flaps or landing gear.

The Shorts 360 aircraft was scheduled to fly from Dublin (DUB) to East Midlands Airport (EMA) as Aer Lingus flight 328. During the pre-flight briefing the crew learned that at East Midlands the precision radar was unserviceable and that, although the visual approach slope indicators (VASI) had been withdrawn, the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) were operational. The en-route weather was reported as being overcast for the whole journey, with cloud tops at FL70 and a probability of icing when flying in the cloud. There had also been a pilot's report of severe icing between FL30 and FL70 in the Birmingham area, some 30 nm south-west of East Midlands Airport. The terminal area forecast for East Midlands suggested a brisk north-easterly wind and a cloud base of 1200 feet. The aircraft took off at 17:25. The crew report that they exercised the wing and tail de-icing system during the climb to FL 90, the level which had been assigned for the flight, and that at that level they were above the layers of stratiform cloud. Following an uneventful flight, via Wallasey, to the NDB at Whitegate, they were taken under radar control directly towards the airport and given descent clearance, eventually to 3000 feet, to intercept the ILS approach path for runway 09. During the descent and before entering the cloud tops at about FL60, the crew switched on the aircraft's anti-ice system, which heats the windscreen, engine air intakes, propellers, static air vents and pitot probes but, in accordance with normal operating procedure, they did not use the wing and tail de-icing system. At this time, the freezing level (0°C isotherm) was at 1000 feet, the temperature at FL 60 was minus 6°C and the air was saturated. Whilst in the cloud, which according to the non-handling pilot was particularly dense, ice thrown from the propellers was heard striking the side of the aircraft fuselage, and it was suggested that the propeller rpm be increased to expedite the removal of the ice. Both pilots state that, at some time during the descent, they visually checked the aircraft for ice but saw none. Nevertheless, several other flights during that evening have since reported the occurrence of severe icing. Having levelled at 3000 feet, still in and out of cloud, the aircraft was directed by radar to intercept the ILS and was fully established on the glideslope and centreline by 10 nm, at which point the final descent was initiated. A normal approach was established and continued, past the outer marker beacon situated at 3.9 nm from touchdown, down to around 1000 feet above the runway threshold height. The crew state that up to this point they had neither experienced any significant turbulence nor observed any ice forming on the aircraft. The last meteorological information passed to the crew gave the wind as 060 degrees /15 kt, however, over the previous hour the wind speed in the area, although not automatically recorded at the airport, is reported as gusting up to 30 kt. As the aircraft descended through about 1000 feet, it suddenly rolled very sharply to the left without apparent cause. With the application of corrective aileron and rudder the aircraft rolled rapidly right, well beyond the wings level position. This alternate left and right rolling motion continued with the angles of bank increasing for some 30 seconds, causing the commander to believe that the aircraft might roll right over onto its back. The angles of bank then gradually decreased. During this period and the subsequent few seconds the aircraft established a very high descent rate approaching 3000 feet/min. Subsequently, with the aid of full engine power, the airspeed increased and the rate of descent was arrested just as the aircraft struck an 11 KV power cable. It continued through another similar cable, two of the supporting wooden poles and the tops of two trees, before coming to rest nose into a small wood edging a field of barley, some 460 metres from the impact with the first power cable. The cockpit and passenger cabin were relatively undamaged and there was no fire. The aircraft came to rest lying virtually upright and the passengers, and subsequently the crew, successfully evacuated from the front and rear emergency exits.

The Varsity aircraft was a twin engined training aircraft used by the Royal Air Force until 1974 when it was sold into private ownership. It was currently owned and operated by an aircraft preservation group who maintained the aircraft to its service specification. For this reason it carried the military designation "WJ897" on the fuselage and wings although it was registered as G-BDFT. The aircraft had been granted a Permit to Fly and was restricted to display and demonstration flying and the practising for such displays. Thirteen members of the society had boarded the aircraft earlier that morning at RAF Syerston in Nottinghamshire, where the aircraft was hangared, for the short flight to East Midlands Airport (EMA). This flight was uneventful and, after landing, the aircraft was refuelled with 436 imperial gallons of aviation gasoline (Avgas 100 LL) increasing the total fuel on board to 510 imp gals. It was intended to fly to Liverpool Airport (LPL) to take part in an air display that afternoon. It was arranged that aerial photographs of the Varsity would be taken during the flight to Liverpool using a Cessna 180. This aircraft was to rendezvous with the Varsity at 3000 feet amsl in the area of Blithfield Reservoir some 20 miles to the west of East Midlands Airport. The Varsity engines were normally started using a ground electrical supply. On this occasion, the left engine was reluctant to start and after it initially fired, it faltered and stopped, emitting smoke from the exhaust. For fear of exhausting the batteries with repeated attempts to start, the right engine was started first. The left engine was then motored over before another start attempt was made, this time successfully. The passengers on the Varsity were told that the left engine had been over primed on the first attempt to start. The Varsity took off at 09:32 and the approach controller at East Midlands Airport provided bearing and range information to the Varsity pilot to help him locate the Cessna 180 and, at 09:47 hrs, both aircraft changed to a discrete radio frequency. The Varsity was then flown in formation on the right hand side of the Cessna in a series of wide orbits of the Blithfield Reservoir. During this time, the left engine of the Varsity was seen to emit occasional puffs of smoke accompanied by loud bangs. When the photographer requested that the Varsity climb slightly above the Cessna and lower its undercarriage, the Varsity pilot reported that he was having trouble with the right engine. The Cessna pilot replied that it looked to him as if the problem was in fact with the left engine, as he could see puffs of smoke as if the engine were running too rich. When the Varsity pilot replied that it might be engine icing, the Cessna pilot noted that his intake temperature was indicating in the range where there was no risk of intake icing on his engine. The undercarriage of the Varsity was lowered briefly before being retracted again with the pilot's comment that he "could not accept the drag and might have to abort the photography". Towards the end of the photographic flying, the right engine started to backfire as well. At 10:05, the Varsity pilot called East Midlands Airport on the approach frequency requesting a direct return to the airport because he had some engine problems and might have to declare an emergency. In reply the approach controller passed the Varsity a course to steer to East Midlands and asked whether the Varsity could maintain height. The pilot answered that "at the present we are able to but it's with some difficulty". The Varsity steadily losing height and, at 10:07, the pilot informed the controller that the left engine of the Varsity had stopped. Thirty seconds later the Varsity co-pilot radioed "we're going to have to put it down in the nearest field, we're down to 400 feet and losing power on both engines so we are going into the...". The undercarriage of the Varsity was lowered and, at a very low height, the left wing was then seen to drop and the aircraft rolled over, the nose dropped and it crashed inverted. Just before impact the left mainplane severed 11,000 volt electricity supply wires. As the aircraft broke-up on impact, the rear part of the fuselage together with the empennage fell into a drainage ditch some 10 feet deep. The three survivors were seated in rearward facing seats in this part of the fuselage. Two were able to escape from the fuselage but the third was hampered by a broken leg and received severe burns when a wire fence prevented him from leaving the accident area.

During the takeoff roll on runway 01 (805 meters long grassy runway), the twin engine aircraft encountered serious difficulties to gain the necessary speed of 85 knots. It overran, rolled through a cornfield, crossed a motorway and came to rest against a dirt bank, bursting into flames. All four occupants were injured, the pilot seriously. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The aircraft was engaged on a mail flight from London-Gatwick Airport to East Midlands Airport. During the initial descent in preparation for landing at its destination, the attendant in the cabin reported that the mechanical indicators on one of the cabin doors were showing an unlocked condition. Shortly afterwards the right hand rear door (baggage door) came open, detached from its hinge mountings and became lodged on the leading edge of the right horizontal tailplane. The aircraft became uncontrollable and went into an increasingly steep dive which terminated in several abrupt pitch oscillations. Both the mainplanes and the horizontal tailplanes were subjected to overstressing in upload which resulted in their detachment from the fuselage. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 28R at London-Heathrow Airport, while climbing to a height of 1,000 feet, the engine n°4 failed and caught fire. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an emergency landing on the same runway. For undetermined reason, the crew was unable to feather the propeller. Following a normal approach, the airplane landed and was stopped in flames after a course of several hundred yards. All 42 occupants were quickly evacuated and there were no casualties. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to East Midlands Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions (snow falls) and the captain decided to go-around. During a second attempt to land on runway 10, the pilot-in-command failed to realize his exact position when the airplane struck the ground 1,000 feet prior to the touchdown zone. Upon impact, the nose gear was torn off and the aircraft came to rest in a snow covered field, broken in two. All 53 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.