Anchorage-Ted Stevens Intl

A Piper PA-31, N35206, (South Central Air flight 59) was cleared to taxi to runway 06L. The weather at that time was foggy with about 1/8 mile visibility, but the RVR was improving and the airport was expected soon to be acceptable for takeoffs. The PA-31 crew taxied and waited in the holding area for the visibility to improve. A Douglas DC-10, HL7339, Korean Air Lines flight 084, was cleared to runway 32; however, while taxiing in the fog, the DC-10 crew inadvertently taxied to runway 06L/24R. Tower personnel were unable to see the aircraft in the fog and were unaware of the DC-10's position. The DC-10 was cleared to take-off on runway 32 and the PA-31 was cleared to hold on runway 06L. The DC-10 crew taxied on runway 24R and began taking off toward the PA-31 with 2,400 feet of runway remaining. Its estimated takeoff distance was 8,150 feet. Subsequently, the DC-10 collided with the PA-31, continued off the runway and hit stanchion lights, small trees and rough terrain. An investigation revealed the DC-10 pilot did not confirm his position by using his compass and that there was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs.

While taxiing out in fog, the KAL crew became disoriented and ended up on the wrong runway. During the takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with South Central Air Flight 59, a Piper PA-31 which was taking off from runway 06L-24R for a flight to Kenai. The 9 occupants of N35206 were injured. The DC-10 overran the runway by 1434 feet and came to rest 40 feet right of the extended centreline.

On 31 August 1983, a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747, designated KE 007, departed John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, United States, on a one-stop scheduled flight for Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The en-route stop occurred at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska, United States. At Anchorage, the aircraft was refuelled and serviced for the remainder of the flight to Seoul and, in accordance with company practice, the flight and cabin crews were changed. The flight departed at the planned time of departure which, in keeping with Korean Air Lines' procedure, was calculated for each KE 007 flight. The departure from Anchorage was flexible to ensure arrival in Seoul at the scheduled arrival time of 21:00 hours* (06:00 hours local time). The actual departure time of 13:00 hours on 31 August would have resulted in an on-time arrival of KE 007 in Seoul, had the flight been completed in accordance with its flight plan. On departing Anchorage, the flight had 269 persons on board consisting of 240 passengers, 3 flight crew members, 20 cabin attendants, and 6 crew members of KAL being repositioned to Seoul. Soon after departure from Anchorage, KE 007 deviated to the right (north) of its direct track to Bethel. This deviation resulted in a progressively greater lateral displacement to the right of its planned route which, ultimately, resulted in its penetration of adjacent high seas airspace in flight information regions (FIR_s) operated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as of sovereign USSR airspace overlying Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island and their surrounding territorial waters. No evidence was found during the investigation to indicate that the flight crew of KE 007 was, at any time, aware of the flight's deviation from its planned route in spite of the fact that it continued for over five hours. According to representatives of the United States, military radar installations in Alaska were not aware in real time that the aircraft was proceeding west with an increasing northerly deviation from the recognized airways system. The military radar installations of the Japanese Defence Agency were aware that an aircraft was tracking in USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island. According to representatives of Japan, they were not a\vare that it was a civil aircraft off its intended track. Approximately between 16:40 and 17:08 hours military aircraft operated by the USSR attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula. The interception attempts were unsuccessful. From about 18:00 hours when KE 007 was approaching Sakhalin Island, USSR, the flight was intercepted by USSR military aircraft. At 18:26:02 hours the aircraft was hit by at least one of t\\'o air-to-air missiles fired by the pilot of one of the USSR interceptor aircraft who had been directed, by his ground command and control units, to shoot down an aircraft which they assumed to be a United States RC-135. As a result of the attack, KE 007 collided with the sea and sank off the southwest coast of Sakhalin Island. There were no survivors. The flight recorders, fragmentary pieces of the aircraft and a small number of items of personal property were salvaged by divers from the USSR during a two month period following the accident. In addition, some flotsam from the aircraft was dispersed by tidal currents and recovered later. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) tapes were recovered by the USSR in 1983 and were handed over to ICAO in January 1993 by the representatives of the Russian Federation. They also made available recordings and transcripts of the communications between the pilots of the intercepting fighter aircraft and their ground controllers as well as the communications between the command centres. The representatives of the United States made available certified copies and transcripts of the Anchorage ATC tapes, and the representatives of Japan made available the Tokyo ATC tape. In the course of the investigation, all practical steps were taken to confirm the authenticity of the communications tapes. A comprehensive assessment of the physical characteristics of the CVR and the DFDR tapes and the information recorded thereon was made to ensure that they contained authentic records. The material on the communications tapes and the CVR and DFDR tapes showed no evidence of contradiction with known information and correlated well with other sources of data. There was no evidence to suggest that the crew of flight KE 007 was aware that their aircraft was flying to the north of its planned route or that they knew of the presence of the intercepting fighter aircraft. The DFDR record established that flight KE 007 maintained a constant magnetic heading from soon after departure from Anchorage until the attack by the fighter aircraft. The maintenance of the constant magnetic heading was so accurate it could only have resulted from the autopilot controlling the aircraft. The CVR and the DFDR records also established that the aircraft did not sustain an extensive avionics or navigation systems failure or malfunction prior to the attack by the USSR fighter aircraft. The evidence obtained supported the first hypothesis of those listed in the 1983 ICAO report, Le. that the crew inadvertently flew virtually the entire flight on a constant magnetic heading. The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading and the resulting track deviation was due to the KE 007 crew's failure to note that the autopilot had either been left in heading mode or had been switched to INS when the aircraft was beyond the range (7.5 NM) for the INS to capture the desired track.
Concerning the interception and associated identification, signalling and communications the investigation found the following:

1) Interceptions of KE 007 were attempted by USSR military aircraft over Kamchatka Peninsula and made in the vicinity of Sakhalin Island.

2) The USSR command centre personnel assumed that KE 007 was a United States RC-135 aircraft. KE 007's climb from FL 330 to FL350 during the time of the interception over Sakhalin Island was interpreted as being an evasive action, thus further contributing to the USSR presumption that it was an RC-135 aircraft.

3) No attempt was made by the USSR to contact the crew of KE 007 by radio on the distress frequency 121.5 MHz or on any other VHF or HF frequency. However, the interceptor pilot was instructed by his ground control to attempt to attract the attention of the crew of the intruding aircraft by firing his aircraft's cannon and flashing its navigation lights. It was not possible to assess the distance of the interceptor aircraft from the intruder nor their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired.

4) The USSR command centre personnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with the position of the intruder aircraft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity. The time factor became paramount as the intruder aircraft was .about to coast out from Sakhalin Island. Therefore, exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its identity. .5) It was not possible to determine the position of KE 007 at the time of the missile attack in relation to USSR sovereign airspace.

Following an uneventful flight from Los Angeles via Anchorage, the crew started the approach to Seoul-Gimpo Airport in the early morning, just after sunset. On final to runway 14, with a limited visibility of 1,000 meters due to patches of fog, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane landed 90 meters short of runway threshold. Then the aircraft struck a concrete wall, causing all main gears to be torn off or to pushed back in their respective wheel well, except the nose gear which remained intact. The airplane slid on its belly for about 1,200 metres before coming to rest in flames on the left side of the runway. 14 occupants escaped uninjured while 198 others were injured. Unfortunately, eight passengers and six crew members, among them both pilots, were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by a fire that probably ignited in a cargo compartment.

During the takeoff roll at Dutch Harbor Airport, the airplane swerved then collided with rocks and the right side of the runway. The crew aborted the takeoff procedure but the airplane went out of control and crashed in flames. All six occupants were injured, three of them seriously. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Following an uneventful flight from Juneau, the crew completed the final approach and was attempting to land on runway 06R when the airplane rolled sharply and struck the ground. out of control, it crashed inverted in a snow covered area near the runway. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

Flight KE902 departed Paris-Orly Airport at 1339LT on a flight to Seoul with an intermediate stop in Anchorage. After passing the North Magnetic Pole, while approaching Ellesmere Island, Canada, the airplane initiated a turn to the right by 150° instead continuing straight-in to North Canada and Alaska. This caused the airplane to fly to the southeast, over the Barents Sea and then into Soviet airspace, reaching the Soviet coast approximately three hours and 2,400 km after its right turn. The aircraft was intercepted by a Soviet Air Force Sukhoi SU-15TM and was forced to land. For reasons undetermined, the Korean crew did not respond to multiple requests and initiated a turn when the Soviet pilot was instructed to shoot down the Boeing 707. One of the air/air missile struck the left wing and four meters were torn off. The missile also punctured the fuselage, causing rapid decompression and jamming one of the plane's four turbines. From an altitude of 30,000 feet, the crew initiated a rapid descent and eventually completed an emergency landing on the frozen Korpijärvi Lake located in the region of Kem, Republic of Karelia. Two passengers were killed during the attack while all other occupants were evacuated, 13 were injured. Both pilots and the navigator were arrested but released on April 29.

Shortly after takeoff from Yakutat Airport, while climbing to a height of 50 feet, one of the engine caught fire. The captain elected to return for an emergency landing when he lost control of the airplane that crashed in flames in a wooded area located 2,5 miles from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all four crew members were killed.

Flight 302 departed Iliamna at 1419LT with 11 passengers and 2 crew members on board. It was cleared to Anchorage on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan via the low frequency airways--Red Airway 99 (Red 99) to the Kakon Intersection, and then Green Airway 8 (Green 8) to Anchorage. The flight was to maintain 7,000 ft. At 1425:20, the flight crew of Flight 302 established radio contact with Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center's (Anchorage Center) D2 nonradar sector controller. They reported that the flight was level at 7,000 ft and that they estimated arrival at Kakon Intersection at 1434. At 1428:35, Anchorage Center requested the flight's estimate for its arrival at Homer, Alaska. The flight crew responded that they estimated to be over Homer at 1515. The flight crew of Flight 302 did not make radio contact when they were over Kakon Intersection; however, at 1439:40 they requested of Anchorage Center, "302, we would like to file Green 8 and intercept the 192° bearing from Wildwood." Fifteen seconds later, Anchorage Center cleared the flight to proceed along the new route of flight and to remain at 7,000 ft. At 1440:50, the flight crew of Flight 302 advised, "302, we--we'll estimate Clams at 15 past the hour." Anchorage Center acknowledged the advisory. This was the last known radio transmission from Flight 302. At 1452:08, three abrupt, audible sounds were recorded on the Anchorage Center tape of incoming air-to-ground communications with Flight 302. These sounds were similar to those produced by a carrier frequency that was heard during the activation of Flight 302's radio transmitter during earlier radio communications with the Center. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact Flight 302 by several air traffic, control facilities between Iliamna and Anchorage and after the flight could not be detected on radar in the areas where radar coverage was available, Anchorage Center initiated the required actions to alert and notify appropriate authorities of a possible aircraft accident. U.S. Air Force search and rescue aircraft located the wreckage site at 1643 on September 7, 1977. The aircraft had struck a glacier face on the southwest side of Mt Iliamna at the 7,000 ft elevation. There were no survivors. Because of the rapidly changing environmental conditions on the glacier face of Mt Iliamna, recovery of bodies and wreckage was not possible.

Shortly after takeoff from Anchorage-Intl Airport, while climbing, the airplane stalled and crashed. A crew member was killed while two others were seriously injured.