Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise

On final approach to Macapá Airport, the left engine exploded and caught fire. The aircraft lost height, descended below the glide and eventually crash landed in a grassy area to the right of the runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot departed on a night cross-country flight without obtaining a weather briefing or flight plan. Arriving in the area of the destination airport, the weather was reported as, 2 statute miles of visibility and mist; overcast cloud layer at 100 feet. The pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance from the approach controller, and was vectored and cleared for the ILS 24 approach. The clearance included an altitude restriction of 1,500 feet msl, until the airplane was established on the localizer. As the pilot contacted the control tower, the tower controller issued a low altitude alert to the pilot. The pilot replied that he was climbing and the tower controller cleared the pilot to land, which the pilot acknowledged. No further pertinent radio transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 3/4-mile from the runway threshold, and about 50 feet right of the extended centerline. Review of the approach plate for the ILS 24 approach revealed that the minimum glide slope intercept altitude at the beginning of the final approach segment on the precision approach was 1,500 feet. The glide slope altitude at the final approach fix for the non-precision approach, which was located about 4 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 1,407 feet. The glide slope altitude at the middle marker, which was located about 0.6 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 299 feet. Review of radar data revealed that the airplane was observed at 700 feet, about 4 miles from the airport, and at 300 feet, about 1.5 miles from the airport. The pilot had accumulated about 1,946 hours of total flight experience, with about 252 hours in make and model. The pilot had attended initial and recurrent training for the make and model airplane; however, did not complete the training. The pilot, aged 61, was Charles B. Yates, member of the New Jersey Senate, who was flying to Martha's Vineyard with his wife and two of his three children.

The aircraft departed Den Helder-De Kooy Airport on a radar tracking flight over the North Sea. Following an uneventful mission, the crew was returning to De Kooy Airport. After touchdown on runway 03, the crew activated the thrust reverser systems when the aircraft lost controllability. The pilot attempted to maintain control and selected the left throttle from 'reverse' again to turn to the right. Eventually, he feathered the right propeller and cut off the fuel supply, causing the right engine to stop. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a ditch. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane impacted a ridgeline about 1.5 miles from the runway and approximately 7 to 14 seconds after the pilot reported a dual engine flameout. The airplane's altitude was about 400 feet agl when the pilot reported the flameout. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies. Icing conditions were forecast and PIREPS indicated that light to moderate rime/mixed icing conditions existed along the route of flight. The Continuous Ignition switches were found in the OFF position. The Approach procedures listed in the Airplane's Flight Manual stated, 'CONTINUOUS IGNITION SHALL BE SELECTED TO ON DURING APPROACH AND LANDING WHILE IN OR SHORTLY FOLLOWING FLIGHT IN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ICING CONDITIONS.' The aircraft manufacturer had issued a Service Bulletin in 1995 for the installation of an auto-ignition system to '... reduce the possibility of engine flame-out when icing conditions are encountered and the continuous ignition is not selected.' The operator had not installed the non-mandatory service bulletin. On May 5, 2000, the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive that required the installation of an auto-ignition system. The toxicology test detected extremely high levels of dihydrocodeine in the pilot's blood. The pilot received a special issuance second-class medical certificate on August 22, 1995, after receiving treatment for a self disclosed history of drug abuse. The drug testing that this pilot underwent as a consequence of his previous self disclosed history of drug abuse would not have detected these substances.

Witnesses reported that during the airplane's takeoff roll they heard a heard a series of repeated sounds, which they described as similar to a "backfire" or "compressor stall." Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane's right propeller "stopped." One witness reported that as the airplane lifted off the ground, he heard "a loud cracking sound followed by an immediate prop wind down into feather." He continued to watch the airplane, as the gear was retracted and the airplane entered a climb and right turn. Subsequently, the airplane pitched up, entered a "Vmc roll-over," followed by a 360-degree turn, and then impacted the ground. Radar data indicated the airplane took off and climbed on runway heading to a maximum altitude of about 200 feet agl. The airplane than entered a right turn and began to lose altitude. A radar study revealed that the airplane's calibrated airspeed was 97 knots when the last radar return was recorded. According to the flight manual, minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc) was 93 knots. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. A post-crash fire erupted, which destroyed all cockpit instruments and switches. Examination of the propellers revealed that neither of the
propellers were in the feathered position at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine revealed signatures consistent with operation at the time of impact. Examination of the right engine revealed that the second stage impeller shroud exhibited static witness marks indicating that the engine was not operating at the time of impact. However, rotational scoring was also observed through the entire circumference of the impeller shroud. The static witness marks were on top of the rotational marks. Examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 950 hours of which 16.9 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 4.5 hours were in the accident airplane. Although he had started an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course, he did not complete the course. The right seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 2,000 hours of which 20.0 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 20.6 hours were in the accident airplane. He had successfully completed an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course one month prior to the accident.

With one pilot and one passenger, the Mitsubishi MU-2B-40 Solitaire aircraft, serial number 410 S.A., departed on a night instrument flight rules flight from Parry Sound / Georgian Bay Airport, Ontario, destined for Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport. Prior to departure, the pilot received his instrument flight rules clearance via telephone from the Sault Ste. Marie flight service station with a clearance valid time of 2118 eastern daylight time from Toronto Area Control Centre and a clearance cancel time of 2135. When the pilot did not establish communications with Toronto Area Control Centre within the clearance valid time, the Area Control Centre supervisor commenced a communication search. At 2151, he confirmed with Parry Sound / Georgian Bay Airport personnel that the aircraft had departed 10 to 15 minutes earlier. The aircraft was assumed missing and the Rescue Coordination Centre in Trenton, Ontario, was notified. Search and rescue was dispatched and three days later the aircraft wreckage was located one nautical mile west of the airport. Both of the aircraft occupants were fatally injured. The aircraft disintegrated as it cut a 306-foot swath through the poplar forest. The accident occurred at night in instrument meteorological conditions.

On January 11 1999, during a local check flight for the new owner-pilot, as the aircraft was descending through about 150 feet during the final stage of a visual approach to Runway 27 at Frankfurt Egelsbach Airport, Egelsbach, the pilot 'pulled the throttles back to ground idle.' The check pilot immediately moved the throttles forward again but meanwhile the aircraft had developed a high rate of descent and it touched down very hard on the threshold of Runway 27 wherein the nose gear and left main landing gear broke off.

The airplane's left engine had been overhauled and required an in-flight Negative Torque Sensing (NTS) check. The procedures required that the left engine be shut down during the test flight. The test flight was conducted at night. The pilots were briefed that there was icing and moderate rime icing mixed below 15,000 feet in clouds and precipitation. The cloud bases were between 2,500 to 2,900 feet agl. After departure, the pilot reported to ATC that they were clear and on top of the clouds at about 6,500 feet msl. N5LN was assigned a 180 degree heading at an assigned altitude of 8,000 feet. Without notification to ATC, N5LN turned to a southeast heading, descended from 7,700 feet to about 5,500 feet, and decelerated from about 182 kts to about 138 kts. ATC assigned N5LN a block altitude of 6,000 to 8,000 feet and a VFR-On-Top clearance. ATC instructed N5LN to turn right to stay in the assigned airspace. N5LN turned right but continued to descend from about 5,500 feet to the last radar indication of 4,500 feet. The airplane impacted the ground in a steep attitude. The inspection of the wreckage indicated the landing gear was down, and with full right rudder trim and about six degrees nose up trim. The examination of the engines indicated both engines were rotating and operating at the time of impact. The examination of the airframe and propellers found no pre-existing anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.