Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 1A in Dakar

Date & Time: Jun 25, 1953 at 0600 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-BGSC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Paris – Marseille – Dakar – Abidjan
MSN:
6019
YOM:
1953
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight and approach, the pilot-in-command landed properly and started the braking procedure when one of the main landing gear struck a hole in the runway surface. The gear's leg broke off and the airplane came on its belly, slid for dozen yards and overran before coming to rest about 40 meters past the runway end. There were no casualties but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair. Brand new, it was delivered few weeks ago.
Probable cause:
Undercarriage collapsed while contacting a hole in the runway surface.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 1 near Calcutta: 43 killed

Date & Time: May 2, 1953 at 1635 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ALYV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Singapore – Calcutta – New Delhi – London
MSN:
6008
YOM:
1952
Flight number:
BA783
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
43
Captain / Total flying hours:
8710
Captain / Total hours on type:
589.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4391
Copilot / Total hours on type:
261
Aircraft flight hours:
1649
Circumstances:
On its scheduled return flight from Singapore to London the aircraft took off from Calcutta-Dum Dum Airport at 1629LT bound for New Delhi-Palam Airport. Six minutes later, while climbing, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with the presence of a thunder-squall. The airplane went out of control, nosed down and crashed near the village of Jagalgori, about 24 miles from Dum Dum Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 43 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by structural failure of the airframe during flight through a thunder-squall. In the opinion of the Court the structural failure was due to overstressing which resulted either:
- severe gusts encountered in the thunder-squall, or
- overcontrolling or loss of control by the pilot when flying through the thunderstorm.
The following findings were pointed out:
- before departure the Captain was in possession of all the relevant meteorological and air traffic control information required for the flight. This included the warning of a thunder-squall,
- the aircraft encountered a norwester squall with thunderstorm shortly after take-off when climbing to its cruising altitude, and suffered structural failure in the air which caused fire,
- an examination of the wreckage on the site did not reveal any sign of sabotage, lightning damage, faulty workmanship, defective material or power plant failure.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 1A in Mauripur: 11 killed

Date & Time: Mar 3, 1953 at 0335 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CF-CUN
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
London – Rome – Beirut – Karachi – Yangon – Jakarta – Darwin – Sydney
MSN:
6014
YOM:
1952
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Aircraft flight hours:
51
Circumstances:
The crew (five flying crew and six De Havilland engineers) were conducting a demo flight from London to Sydney to show this new jetliner to potential clients in Southeast Asia and Oceania. While taking off from runway 25 (2,500 meters long) at Mauripur Airbase, the airplane failed to get airborne, overran, hit several obstacles, went through a perimeter fence and eventually crashed in flames in a small river. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all 11 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the fact that the nose of the aircraft was lifted too high during the takeoff run, resulting in a partially stalled condition and excessive drag. This did not permit normal acceleration and prevented the aircraft from becoming airborne within the prescribed distance. The pilot appears to have realised that the nose was excessively high and took corrective action, but this was done too late to prevent the aircraft striking an obstruction immediately beyond the perimeter fence before it became airborne. The following factor was considered as contributory: the pilot, who had only limited experience in the Comet aircraft, elected to takeoff at night at the maximum permissible takeoff for the prevailing conditions. The circumstances required strict adherence to the prescribed takeoff technique, which was not complied with.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 1A in Rome

Date & Time: Oct 26, 1952 at 1756 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ALYZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
London – Rome – Cairo – Johannesburg
MSN:
6012
YOM:
1952
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
35
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger service from London to Johannesburg. The flight from London Airport to Rome was without incident. During the take-off from Rome on the second stage, the aircraft's normal speed failed to build up and after becoming airborne for a few seconds, the Captain's immediate reaction was that there was a lack of engine thrust. He throttled back the engines at the same time as the aircraft came to rest near the airport boundary, and the aircraft sustained considerable damage and two passengers were slightly injured. For take-off the aircraft was taxied to Runway 16 and lined up on the centre line; all pre-take-off checks were made and the elevator, aileron and rudder trim were set at the neutral position. The Captain's estimation of runway visibility was 5 miles but with no horizon. The flaps were lowered to 15" and the windscreen wipers were both operating. The engines were opened up to full power and the isolation switches were set to "Isolate'. The RPM were checked at 10 250 on all engines; fuel flows, engine temperatures and pressures were reported to be correct. The brakes were released and the aircraft made a normal acceleration. At an IAS of 75-80 knots, the nose wheel was lifted from the runway and a slight tendency to swing to starboard was corrected. At an IAS of 112 knots, the Captain lifted the aircraft from the ground by a positive backward movement of the control column and when he considered that the aircraft had reached a safe height he called for "undercarriage up". At about the same instant the port wing dropped rather violently and the aircraft swung to port; the controls gave normal response and lateral level was regained. At this point the Captain realized that the aircraft's speed was not building up, although he made no reference to the ASI. A pronounced buffeting was felt which he associated with the onset of a stall and in spite of two corrective movements of the control column the buffeting continued. Before the First Officer had time to select undercarriage up, the aircraft came down on its main landing wheels and bounced. It was now plainly evident to the Captain that the aircraft's speed was not increasing and he was convinced that there was a considerable loss of engine thrust. He was also aware that the aircraft was rapidly approaching the end of the runway and a decision to abandon the take-off was made. The undercarriage struck a mound of earth as he was closing the throttles and the aircraft slid for some 270 yards over rough ground. The main undercarriages were wrenched off and considerable damage resulted; a large spillage of fuel occurred but fire did not break out. One passenger suffered slight shock and another sustained a cut finger.
Probable cause:
The accident was due to an error of judgment by the Captain in not appreciating the excessive nose-up attitude of the aircraft during the take-off.
Final Report: