Crash of a Convair CV-340-32 in Chicago: 22 killed

Date & Time: Jul 17, 1955 at 0624 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N3422
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dallas – Oklahoma City – Wichita – Kansas City – Chicago
MSN:
71
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
BN560
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
38
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Captain / Total flying hours:
15121
Captain / Total hours on type:
1281.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9040
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1989
Aircraft flight hours:
4956
Circumstances:
Flight 560 is a Braniff daily scheduled flight between Dallas, Texas, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Wichita, Kansas; and Kansas City, Missouri. On July 17 the flight crew, assigned at Dallas for the entire trip, consisted of Captain Allen R. Tobin. First Officer Orbin W. Hanks, and Hostess Mary E. Teel. Captain Tobin and First Officer Hanks arrived at the airport more than an hour before the scheduled departure. During this time preflight preparations were made in a normal and routine manner. The pilots were briefed and furnished the latest weather forecasts and reports over the route and for the scheduled stops. No weather conditions of consequence were indicated except that fog was forecast for the Chicago area, and the visibility was expected to be restricted to possibly one-half mile, on arrival. Flight 560 departed Dallas on schedule at 0100. The flight segments between Dallas and Wichita were uneventful; however, while starting the No. 1 (left) engine at Wichita prior to departure a small carburetor intake manifold fire occurred which was immediately extinguished. There was no damage incurred and the engine started easily on the second attempt. The flight proceeded to Kansas City where it landed at 0416. As the aircraft taxied to the terminal several persons noted that the No. 1 propeller was feathered and stopped. Captain Tobin told Braniff personnel that it feathered while being returned to positive pitch after reverse thrust had been used during the landing roll deceleration. The captain unfeathered the propeller before deplaning and maintenance personnel checked it for malfunction; none was indicated. No other mechanical service was requested or performed. The aircraft was serviced to 1,000 gallons of fuel while Captain Tobin and First Officer Hanks received supplemental weather information and completed other preparations for the last segment of the route to Chicago. Flight 560 departed Kansas City at 0435 in accordance with a VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight plan. The aircraft, according to company records, was loaded to a gross weight of 45,622 pounds. This amount was less than the maximum allowable of 47,000 pounds and the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limitations. The flight climbed to 15,000 feet m. s. l. (mean sea level. At 0519 it requested and received an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan for the remainder of the trip; accordingly, routine en route reports were made. This segment, as well as the previous, was described as very pleasant, smooth, and conducted primarily above or clear of the clouds. At 0547 ARTC cleared the flight as follows: “ATC clears Braniff 560 to the Naperville Omni via Peoria, Victor 116 over Joliet, maintain at least l,000 on top, tops reported 2,000 m. s. l., contact Chicago Center on 118.9 mc. passing Peoria.” This clearance was acknowledged and the flight reported accordingly. At 0556 Chicago ARTC broadcast a Chicago special weather observation which was: “Thin obscuration, visibility one-half mile.” At approximately 0609 the flight was asked by ARTC if it could land with one-half mile visibility and 1,000 feet thin obscuration. Braniff 560 replied that it could. At 0611 the flight reported over Joliet, 1,000 on top, whereupon ARTC advised it to contact the Chicago Midway Approach Control. Immediate contact was made and the flight was given the same weather and the latest altimeter information. The crew reported at 0618 over Naperville and was radar vectored by Approach Control to the outer marker for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 13R for landing. At 0624 the aircraft hit the sign and crashed through the airport boundary fence onto the airport. Another flight, holding off the runway before takeoff saw the wreckage stop and immediately notified the tower; crash emergency procedures were promptly initiated. The weather conditions reported at the time of the accident were: Partial obscuration; visibility one-half mile, fog, and smoke; sea level pressure 1014.2; temperature 71, dewpoint 68; wind south 6; altimeter 29.94; remarks, fog 8.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was momentary disorientation caused by the lose of visual reference during the final visual phase of the approach resulting in an increased rate of descent at an altitude too low to effect recovery. The following findings were reported:
- The reported weather conditions at Chicago permitted the flight to land and were accurately reported from the observer's position,
- The navigational aids, the ILS components, and ground lighting facilities were functioning normally,
- An ILS approach was made to runway 13R and was executed precisely and accurately until one-half mile from touchdown,
- Radar advisories were furnished in a normal manner supplementing the ILS approach,
- After approximately one-half mile from touchdown the aircraft descended at a high rate,
- The aircraft struck an advertising sign and its supporting steel post located 1,000 feet short of the runway threshold,
- Fog, with near zero flight visibility, enveloped the crash site over an indeterminable area,
- Examination of the aircraft wreckage and its components revealed no evidence indicating malfunction or failure and there was no evidence of an emergency aboard the flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-340-13 near Dexter

Date & Time: Jan 19, 1955 at 1625 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N73154
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Newark – Allentown – Youngstown – Akron – Cleveland – Chicago – Moline – Iowa City – Des Moines – Omaha – Lincoln
MSN:
180
YOM:
1954
Flight number:
UA329
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7578
Captain / Total hours on type:
750.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2123
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1147
Aircraft flight hours:
1502
Circumstances:
Flight 329 departed Des Moines on a VFR (Visual Flight Reed) night plan at 1608 for Omaha, Nebraska. The gross weight of the aircraft was 45,215 pounds 1,685 pounds less than the allowable 46,900 pounds. According to company records, the load was properly distributed with respect to the canter of gravity of the aircraft. The climb to 5,000 feet was uneventful but at that altitude the crew noticed vibration and a slight fore-and-aft movement of the control column. The climb was continued to 6,000 feet, where the aircraft was leveled off and power was reduced. As the vibration was still present at this time, the captain attempted to dampen it by engaging the autopilot; however, this was unsuccessful and it was immediately disengaged. The first officer next lowered the flaps, first to 5 degrees and then to 15 degrees, without any noticeable effect. The “Fasten Seat Belt" sign was turned on and the captain told the first officer to advise the company of their difficulty via radio. About this time a sudden failure in the control system was felt and it was with extreme difficulty that any semblance of elevator control was maintained. The first officer again tried lowering the flaps, this time to the 24-degree position, but as this did not help to maintain control he returned them to the 15-degree position, where it was found the most favorable results were attained. Accordingly, the first officer transmitted "Mayday” (distress call) on the radio and said that they were attempting to return to Des Moines but were experiencing control trouble. The buffeting became so severe it was then necessary for the copilot to help the can hold the control column. However, the buffeting lessened and the captain advised the first officer to depressurize the aircraft and tell the stewardess to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. This was done. By that time the aircraft had descended below 3,000 feet. Both throttles were retarded in turn to see if the trouble could possibly be caused by one of the engines. This also proved to no avail. The vibration built up to high level and suddenly another failure in the control system was felt and the air-plane went into a steep climb. As it seemed that a stall was imminent, the captain quickly moved the propellers to a high r. p. m. and pushed the throttles forward until about 50 inches of manifold pressure was seen on the gauges. The airplane then nosed over and began to dive at a very steep angle. During this rapid descent the captain reduced power and headed toward open country to his right. When the aircraft reached 500 feet above the ground the captain was successful in flaring the aircraft and it struck the ground in a flat attitude. All occupants were quickly deplaned as soon as the aircraft stopped.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a series of omissions made by maintenance personnel during a scheduled inspection which resulted in the release of the aircraft in an unairworthy condition and an almost complete loss of elevator control during flight. The following findings were reported:
- During a routine maintenance inspection of the aircraft an explanation was not written on the non-routine job card that the bolt had been removed and replaced finger-tight pending the arrival of a new bolt,
- Final inspection of the servo tab system failed to disclose its unairworthy condition and the aircraft was released for service,
- Vibration backed off an unsafetied not in the servo tab system resulting in a sequence of structural failures that ended in almost complete loss of control of the aircraft elevators.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-340-35 in Midland

Date & Time: Mar 16, 1954 at 0838 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90853
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
El Paso – Midland – Kansas City
MSN:
44
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
CO046
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11038
Captain / Total hours on type:
620.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2742
Copilot / Total hours on type:
659
Aircraft flight hours:
3099
Circumstances:
At 0833 Trip 46 was cleared to Runway 10 for takeoff. At this time the aircraft carried 585 gallons of fuel and was loaded to a gross takeoff weight of 36,345 pounds which was 10,655 pounds less than the maximum allowable. The load was properly distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the approved limits. A pre-takeoff check was conducted adjacent to Runway 10 at which time the propellers, engines and instruments gave normal Indications. A part of this check included moving the control column fore and aft and turning the wheel left and right in order to check the control system for freedom of movement and full travel. At 0838 the flight was cleared for takeoff which was made using normal takeoff power. Immediately after becoming airborne the crew noted a slight vibration which was attributed to an unbalanced condition of the spinning main landing gear wheels. Captain Persing applied brakes during the landing gear retraction to eliminate this vibration; however, it not only continued but rapidly increased in severity. The aircraft reached an altitude of approximately 75 feet, the highest attained, and was near the airport boundary when the vibration stopped with a sudden jolt and the aircraft assumed a nose-down attitude. The first officer immediately sensing the situation joined the captain and both exerted their entire strength applying back pressure to their respective control columns to keep the aircraft from plunging into the ground. The captain quickly reduced power; however, the nose-down pressure could not be completely overcome. The first officer used nose-up trim control in an effort to relieve the nose-down pressure; this action had no appreciable effect and during the last attempt the trim tab control wheel appeared to be stuck. The captain established a shallow left turn with the thought of returning to the airport and continued the turn about 45 degrees from the takeoff heading. As air speed decreased power was momentarily increased whereupon it became evident to the crew that using power sufficient to maintain flight resulted in an insurmountable nose-down pressure. The captain therefore decided to make a wheels-up landing straight ahead. Close to the ground the first officer closed the throttles and the captain pulled the electrical crash bar. Contact with the ground followed with the aircraft in a near-level attitude and at approximately 100 m.p.h. Although the passengers and crew received injuries of varying degrees, they were able to get out of the aircraft unassisted in an orderly manner. The evacuation was mainly through the rear service door (emergency exit) and was accomplished in about 30 seconds. There was no fire.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was loss of control due to a failure of the right elevator trim tab push-pull rod caused by a reversed installation of the right elevator trim tab idler as a result of the carrier’s reliance on the Manufacturers Illustrated Parts Catalog as a maintenance reference. The following findings were reported:
- Immediately following a normal takeoff the right elevator trim tab push-pull rod failed and the stub end became wedged, holding the trim tab in a full-up or aircraft nose-down position,
- The trim tab position resulted in the crew being unable to control the aircraft and a wheels-up landing resulted,
- The push-pull rod failed as a result of excessive stresses caused by interference resulting from a reversed idler installation,
- The right elevator trim tab assembly as removed, reinstalled, inspected and functionally checked by company maintenance personnel 14:40 flight hours prior to the accident,
- Correct positioning of the right idler component could not be determined from the Maintenance Manual figure, 7.4.101, which the carrier considered appropriate for the installation,
- The Manufacturers Illustrated Parts Catalog was used in accordance with company policy as an installation reference to determine the idler position,
- Under conventional interpretation of the appropriate exploded diagram of the Parts Catalog, the idler was installed in reverse,
- The Illustrated Parts Catalog was not intended and should not have been used as a maintenance reference.
Final Report: