Cessna 208B Grand Caravan

The Cessna 208B aircraft took off from Runway 27 at Clonbullogue Airfield (EICL), Co. Offaly at approximately 13.14 hrs. On board were the Pilot and a Passenger (a child), who were seated in the cockpit, and 16 skydivers, who occupied the main cabin. The skydivers jumped from the aircraft, as planned, when the aircraft was overhead EICL at an altitude of approximately 13,000 feet. When the aircraft was returning to the airfield, the Pilot advised by radio that he was on ‘left base’ (the flight leg which precedes the approach leg and which is normally approximately perpendicular to the extended centreline of the runway). No further radio transmissions were received. A short while later, it was established that the aircraft had impacted nose-down into a forested peat bog at Ballaghassan, Co. Offaly, approximately 2.5 nautical miles (4.6 kilometres) to the north-west of EICL. The aircraft was destroyed. There was no fire. The Pilot and Passenger were fatally injured.

The pilot was on a visual flight rules flight transporting mail to a remote village. He reported that when he was about 15 minutes from the destination, he checked the automated weather observing system (AWOS) for updated weather information for the destination and recalled that the visibility was reported as 7 miles. However, the information he recalled was not consistent with what was actually reported by the AWOS; 18 minutes before the accident, the AWOS reported no more than 1 3/4 miles visibility. As he descended the airplane from 2,500 ft to 1,500 ft in the terminal area, he observed reduced visibility conditions that would require an instrument approach procedure. According to the pilot, while maneuvering toward the initial approach fix, he heard the autopilot disconnect, and the airplane began an uncommanded descent. He said that he remembered pulling on the control wheel and thought he had leveled off, but then the airplane impacted terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and rudder. He could not recall if he had heard terrain warnings or alerts before the impact. An airplane performance study indicated that the airplane was in a continuous descent from 2,500 ft until the final data point about 12 ft above the surface; the airplane was not leveled off at any time during the descent. In the final 15 seconds of recorded data, the rate of descent increased from about 500 fpm to about 2,300 fpm before decreasing to 1,460 fpm at the last recorded data point. Postaccident examinations of the airframe, engine, flight control, and autopilot components revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation or affected flight controllability. It is likely that the unexpected instrument approach procedure increased the pilot's workload as he maneuvered to set up for the approach. Further, when the autopilot disconnected, the airplane continued to descend; although the pilot reported that he heard the autopilot disconnect, he did not arrest the airplane's descent rate. Given the low visibility conditions, it is likely that the pilot did not detect the airplane's descent, and the airplane descended into the terrain.

In unclear circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed while taking off from Akobo Airstrip. It struck a house and several cows before coming to rest, bursting into flames. One person on the ground was killed while all 11 occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The two pilots were conducting a commercial charter flight to take 10 passengers to an international airport for connecting flights. The flight departed a nontower-controlled airport that was in a valley surrounded on all sides by rising terrain, with the exception of the area beyond the departure end of runway 21, which led directly toward the Pacific Ocean. The accident airplane was the second of a flight of two; the first airplane departed runway 3 about 15 minutes before the accident airplane and made an immediate right turn to the east/southeast after takeoff, following a pass in the hills over lower terrain that provided time for the airplane to climb over the mountains. Both a witness and surveillance video footage from the airport indicated that, 15 minutes later, the accident airplane also departed from runway 3 but instead continued on runway heading, then entered a left turn and descended into terrain. Analysis of the video determined that the airplane reached a maximum bank angle of about 75° and an airspeed below the airplane's published aerodynamic stall speed before impact. Examination of the airplane was limited due to impact and postcrash fire damage; however, no defects consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction were observed, and the engine exhibited signatures consistent with production of power during impact. The captain was appropriately rated and had extensive experience in the accident airplane make and model. He had been employed by the accident operator for about a year in 2006 and had recently been re-hired by the operator; however, records provided by the operator did not indicate that he had completed all of the training and check flights required by the operator's General Operations Manual (GOM). The first officer was appropriately rated but had little experience in the accident airplane. The GOM also stated that pilots would receive additional, airport-specific training before operating to or from airports with special characteristics; however, the operator provided no listing of such airports, including the airport from which the accident flight departed. The pilots' experience at the departure airport could not be determined. It is possible the psychiatric diagnoses in 2011 were correct and the pilot suffered from a number of conditions which can cause a variety of symptoms. However, given the extremely limited information, what his symptoms were around the time of the accident, whether they were being addressed or effectively treated, and what his mental state was at the time could not be determined from the available information. Therefore, whether or not the pilot's medical or psychological conditions or their treatment played a role in the accident circumstances could not be determined by this investigation. There were no weather reporting facilities in the vicinity of the airport. Although the airport was equipped with two frames for windsocks, no windsocks were installed at the time of the accident to aid pilots in determining wind direction and intensity. Although a takeoff from runway 21 afforded the most favorable terrain since the airplane would fly over lower terrain to the ocean, it is possible that a significant enough tailwind existed for runway 21 that the pilots believed the airplane's maximum tailwind takeoff limitation may be exceeded and chose to depart from runway 3 in the absence of any information regarding the wind velocity. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have been able to take off with up to a 10-kt tailwind, which was the manufacturer limitation for tailwind takeoffs. The witness who saw the accident reported that he spoke with the pilots of both airplanes before the flights departed and that the pilots acknowledged the need to use the eastern pass in order to clear terrain when departing from runway 3. The reason that the flight crew of the accident airplane failed to use this path after takeoff could not be determined. It is likely that, after entering the valley ahead of the runway, with rising terrain and peaks that likely exceeded the climb capability of the airplane, they attempted to execute a left turn to exit the valley toward lower terrain. During the steep turn, the pilots failed to maintain adequate airspeed and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Performance calculations using weights that would allow the airplane to operate within manufacturer weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident indicated that it was unlikely that the airplane would have had sufficient climb performance to clear the terrain north of the airport. However, the airplane would likely have had sufficient climb performance to clear terrain east of the airport had the crew performed a right turn immediately after takeoff like the previous airplane.

On 17 November, 2017, a Tropic Air Cessna 208B Grand Caravan with registration V3-HGX, departed from the Sir Barry Bowen Municipal Airport at approximately 7:15 a.m. local time with one aircraft captain, 11 passengers and 1 crew on board. The flight was a regular operated commercial passenger flight with scheduled stops in Dangriga, Placencia and with the final destination being Punta Gorda. The pilot reported that the portion of the flight from Belize City to Dangriga was uneventful and normal and so was the landing at Placencia. At approximately 8:40 a.m. local time the airplane taxied from the Tropic Air ramp and taxied towards the west on runway 25. The pilot did a turnaround using all the available runway at normal speed and started his takeoff run to the east on runway 07. The pilot proceeded down the runway in a normal takeoff roll with normal takeoff speed and prior to reaching the end of the runway, he rotated the aircraft and lifted the nose wheel to get airborne. At exactly 28 feet past the end of runway 07 and during the initial climb phase, a part of the aircraft landing gear made contact with the upper part of the front righthand passenger door frame of a vehicle that had breached the area in front of the runway which is normally protected by traffic barriers. The impact caused the aircraft to deviate from its initial climb profile, and the pilot reported that the engine was working for a couple seconds and it abruptly shut down shortly after. The pilot realized that he was unable to return to the airport. The pilot carried out emergency drills for engine loss after take-off over water and decided to ditch the aircraft in the sea, which was approximately 200-300 feet from the main shoreline in front of the Placencia airport. The flight crew and all passengers were safely evacuated from the fuselage with the assistance of witnesses and passing boats which provided an impromptu rescue for the passengers. All passengers received only minor injuries.

The single engine airplane departed Arusha Airport on a charter flight to the Serengeti National Park, carrying 10 tourists and one pilot. While flying in marginal weather conditions, the aircraft impacted hilly terrain near Empakaai Camp and was destroyed upon impact. All 11 occupants were killed.

After touchdown at Lobo Airstrip deserving the Lobo Wildlife Lodge located in the Serengeti National park, the single engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the left and came to rest against a tree. The pilot and two passengers were injured while eight other occupants were unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. There was no fire.