Virginia

The pilot was conducting a post-maintenance test flight. An overhauled engine had been installed on the right side of the airplane, and both propeller assemblies had been subsequently re-rigged. Ground checks were satisfactory, although the right engine propeller idled 90-100 rpm higher than the left engine propeller. Test flight engine start and run-up were conducted per the checklist, with no anomalies noted. Takeoff ground roll and initial climb were normal; however, when the airplane reached about 100 feet, it stopped climbing and lost airspeed. The pilot could not identify the malfunction, and performed a forced landing to rough, hilly terrain. Upon landing, the landing gear collapsed and the engine nacelles were compromised. The airplane subsequently burned. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed that the propeller beta valves of both engines were improperly rigged, and that activation of the landing gear squat switch at takeoff resulted in both propellers going into feather. The maintenance personnel did not have rigging experience in airplane make and model. As a result of the investigation, the manufacturer clarified maintenance manual and pilot handbook procedures.

The pilot was descending the airplane from 23,000 feet for an instrument approach. All communications were normal until after he acknowledged an instruction to contact approach control, when radio contact was lost. Radar contact ceased at 11,300 feet due to radar signal reception difficulties. Contact was lost almost directly over the eventual impact site, which was on the eastern side of a small valley. Witnesses on the western side of the valley had seen the airplane flying near them, at treetop level, eastbound, and clear of clouds. About the same time, on the eastern side of the valley where the airplane would impact trees, then terrain, there was heavy rain. The commercial pilot had about 1,850 total flight hours, and had completed a 'Wings III' flight proficiency program and an instrument proficiency program about two months earlier. The airplane had been on a continuous maintenance program. At the accident site, all of the airplane's control surfaces were found, and the engines and propellers displayed signatures consistent with being under power at impact. There were insufficient remains to conduct an autopsy or toxicological testing. Previously, the pilot's father, two uncles, and a male cousin had suffered fatal heart attacks.

After takeoff, the airplane returned to the departure airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the runway threshold, about 500 feet above the ground, with it's left propeller feathered, when it entered a left bank which increased to about 90 degrees. The airplane then entered a spin, descended, and impacted the ground. Examination of wreckage revealed the camshaft of the left engine had failed as a result of a fatigue crack. No other abnormalities were observed of airframe or engine. The left engine had accumulated about 1,200 hours since overhaul. The pilot purchased the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 700 hours of flight experience in multi-engine airplanes, of which, 10 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane.

The Learjet was participating in water ingestion tests, which required multiple landing rolls through a diked pool on the runway. On one of the landing rolls, the airplane's left main landing gear and nose landing gear tracked through the pool, while the right main landing gear tracked outside the pool. The airplane veered to the left, departed the left side of the runway, and struck a pickup truck parked adjacent to the runway. The airplane came to rest inverted and on fire. Formal hazard identification and risk management procedures were not employed and no alignment cues were in place on the runway to facilitate pool entry alignment. Further, the accident truck, other vehicles, heavy equipment, and personnel were placed hundreds of feet inside the FAA recommended runway-safe and object-free areas during the test.

During arrival at night, the flight was being controlled by a developmental controller (DC), who was being supervised by an instructor (IC). The pilot (plt) was instructed to descend & cross the STILL Intersection (Int) at 3,000 ft. STILL Int was aligned with the localizer (loc) approach (apch) course, 10.1 mi from the apch end of runway 17 (rwy 17); the final apch fix (FAF) was 3.9 mi from the rwy. About 5 mi before reaching STILL Int, while on course & level at 3,000 ft, the plt was cleared for a Loc Rwy 17 Apch. Radar data showed the aircraft (acft) continued to STILL Int, then it turned onto the loc course toward the FAF. Shortly after departing STILL Int, while inbound on the loc course, the acft began a descent. Before the acft reached the FAF, the DC issued a frequency change to go to UNICOM. During this transmission, the IC noticed a low altitude alert on the radar display, then issued a verbal low altitude alert, saying, 'check altitude, you should be at 1,500 ft (should have said '1,800 ft' as that was the minimum crossing altitude at the FAF), altitude's indicating 1,200, low altitude alert.' There was no response from the plt. This occurred about 2 mi before the FAF. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the apch was 720 ft. The acft struck tree tops at 750 ft, about 1/2 mi before the FAF. The IC's remark 'you should be at 1,500 ft' was based on an expired apch plate with a lower FAF minimum crossing altitude; the current minimum crossing altitude at the FAF was 1,800 ft. Apch control management had not made the current plate available to the controllers. Investigation could not determine whether a current apch plate would have prompted an earlier warning by the controllers.

The airplane departed the airport and crashed shortly thereafter. Before departure, the airplane was fueled with 120 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. According to the refueler, the airplane had full fuel tanks. The refueler also indicated the pilot had stated he wanted to be airborne prior to the arrival of bad weather. After the accident, the engines and propellers were disassembled and examined. No engine or propeller discrepancies were noted, except (post impact) heat damage.

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

The pilot was taking off with 10 jumpers onboard. At the rotation speed of 100 knots, he used elevator trim to rotate the airplane, but it did not lift off the runway. He continued moving the trim wheel violently to pitch the nose up, and attempted to pull back on the yoke, but the airplane collided with rising terrain off the end of the runway. A witness did not see any of the flight controls move during the pilot preflight inspection, and during the takeoff roll, he did not observe a nose up rotation of the airplane. The pilot reported that he removed a single pin control lock from the yoke during preflight. The Beech control lock consisted of two pins, two chains, and a U-shaped engine control lock. The pilot walked away from the wreckage after the accident. No control locks were found in the wreckage. However, the control column shaft exhibited distress signatures on the periphery of the hole where the control lock is installed. No other evidence was found of any other form of mechanical jamming, interference, or discontinuity with the flight controls. Investigators were unable to identify any potential source of interference, other than a control lock, that could have simultaneously jammed both pitch and roll control. According to the airplane's manufacturer, about 3 to 6 degree of trim would have been normal for the airplane's takeoff conditions.

The airplane was loaded with 10 sport parachutists and one pilot. Later, investigators calculated that the maximum gross weight was exceeded by 149.6 pounds, and the center of gravity was 2.87 inches aft of the aft limit. The cabin door had been removed for parachuting operations; however, an altered Flight Manual Supplement had been used as authority for the door removal. The airplane was not on the FAA-approved eligible list for such removal. The airplane needed to be refueled before flight, but the quantity of fuel in the airport's underground storage tank was below the electric cutoff level. Fuel was pumped manually from the storage tank into plastic jugs, which were used to refuel the airplane. Before takeoff, samples of fuel were reported to have been drained from the airplane's fuel tanks (sumps). According to witnesses, they heard an engine misfiring during takeoff. They observed the airplane level off during the initial climb and start a shallow right turn. The bank angle gradually increased from shallow to steep as the nose dropped and the airplane descended. Other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep dive just before it crashed in the rear of a residence. One person in the residence was killed. A postaccident fire destroyed the accessory sections of both engines. Examination of the airplane disclosed evidence that the right engine had been shut down and the right propeller had been feathered; however, no preimpact mechanical failure was found. A sample of excess fuel was obtained from the tank that was used to refuel the airplane, but no observable quantity of water or contamination was found.

ATC data indicated the airplane was in cruise flight at about 17,000 feet MSL, when the pilot deviated from the intended flight path to avoid thunderstorms. At 2150 EDT, the pilot requested clearance to climb to 19,000 MSL. At 2152, he requested a right turn out of weather and advised ATC that he was 'getting icing.' Between 2153 and 2154, the pilot's transmissions were garbled, then at 2154:38, he stated '...trying to get out of this mess.' Radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost. An in-flight breakup of the airplane occurred, and wreckage was found scattered over a 3 mile area. Postaccident examination revealed the outboard portion of the right wing had failed and separated in an upward and aft direction. Scrape marks were found on the right side of the fuselage, and there was damage to the right horizontal stabilizer and rudder. Also, there was evidence that both engines had separated in flight; they were found about 1 mile from the main wreckage. No preexisting mechanical malfunction or fatigue of the airplane was found. The pilot had received a complete weather briefing, and was advised of severe weather along the intended route of flight.