Victoria

During the morning of August 9, 1979, the aircraft was refuelled to capacity and three drums, each with a capacity of 20 litres, were also filled with fuel and placed in the baggage compartment. The aircraft, loaded with freight, subsequently departed Essendon at 1335 hours and proceeded to Cambridge where it arrived at 1536 hours. The freight was unloaded and, at 1621 hours, the aircraft departed for Launceston where it arrived at 1653 hours. It was again loaded with freight and departed Launceston at 1720 hours bound for Flinders Island. The aircraft landed at Flinders Island several minutes after the end of daylight, which was at 1745 hours, and the freight was unloaded. On the following day, the aircraft was again loaded with freight and the pilot subsequently reported departure from Flinders Island at 1329 hours, bound for Essendon. The take-off run was observed to be longer than usual for this type of aircraft and its rate of climb appeared to be less than normal. The IFR flight plan notified by the pilot before departure indicated his intention to cruise at an altitude of 4500 feet but, at 1410 hours, he reported to Melbourne Flight Service Unit "request traffic for a descent to proceed VFE we're getting 50 knot head wind here". On being advised that there was no traffic information, the pilot reported leaving 4500 feet. At 1502 hours, the pilot established communication with Essendon Tower, reported approaching Channel 0 at 1500 feet, and "request expedite clearance". He was issued with a clearance to enter controlled airspace at 1500 feet tracking from Channel 0 to Essendon via Clifton Hill. At 1506 hours he reported at Clifton Hill and, at 1507:38 hours, he advised "I'm sorry have a Mayday appear to have a fuel problem we'll have to land on a golf course". On being asked "which golf course?, the pilot replied "oh right where we are now". No further communications were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was observed by witnesses in the Northcote area initially on a north-westerly heading towards Essendon. E was seen to be descending and the sound of the engines was not normal. After flying over the northern section of the Northcote Municipal Golf Course, the aircraft commenced a descending left turn and [passed over a power transmission line which ran in a north-south direction near the western boundary of the golf course. As the turn continued towards an easterly heading, the aircraft again passed over the power line, at a very low height, and in strong tail wind conditions struck trees bordering a fairway while in a slightly left wing down, nose down, attitude. It struck the ground heavily just beyond the trees and the main wreckage travelled a further 73 metres before it came to rest on the edge of a green in the south-eastern corner of the golf course. Detailed examination of the wreckage of the aircraft revealed no evidence of any defect or malfunction which may have contributed to the accident. There was no significant fuel in the fuel systems of the two engines and there was negligible fuel in those cells of the fuel storage system which were undamaged. There was no fire. The pilot was in full time employment as an airline captain with a major operator. He was also involved financially and managerially in Norfish Pty. Ltd. and both he and the Company had financial difficulties at that time. The flight plan submitted by the pilot before departure from Essendon on August 9 contained false names in respect of both the pilot and the operator. Neither the pilot nor Norfish Pty Ltd held a Charter or Aerial Work Licence. The maximum specified take-off weight for the aircraft was 3357 kg. for VFR operations and 3243 kg. for IFR operations. It has been calculated that the gross weight of the aircraft was 3775 kg. when it departed Essendon for Cambridge on 9.8.79 and 3746 kg. when it departed Launceston for Flinders Island on the same day. The calculated gross weight was 4061 kg. when it departed Flinders Island on the day of the accident. Although fuel was available at Cambridge and Launceston, the aircraft was not refuelled after it 'departed from Essendon. The three 20 litre drums were located in the aircraft wreckage and, although all were damaged, detailed examination indicated that they ruptured under the action of hydraulic shock and that they wert filled at the time of the accident. The total operating time of the aircraft from departure Essendon until the time of the accident was consistent with a fuel endurance which could be expected in the circumstances leading to this accident.

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a local training flight at MelBourne-Essendon Airport, carrying one instructor, a pilot under supervision and a pilot's friend as passenger. Shortly after takeoff from runway 26, while climbing to a height of 200-250 feet, the pilot-under-supervision selected the wing flaps up and, at about this time, the pilot-in-command simulated an engine failure of one engine by closing a mixture control-believed to have been the starboard engine. The pilot-under-supervision identified the 'failed' engine, exercised the appropriate engine throttle to signify this identification and indicated the essential actions which would be taken in the event of an actual engine failure. The relevant controls were not operated. Following the completion of these actions full engine power was restored by the pilot-in-command. During the course of the simulated engine failure the aircraft assumed a nose down attitude. It then descended straight ahead with full engine power, passed through electric power cables outside the airport boundary at a height of 4.15 metres above terrain, and crashed into houses 286 metres beyond the western end of the runway. All three occupants were seriously injured while six people on the ground were killed, a seventh was injured as well.

On the morning of 2.7.78 the pilot obtained the relevant meteorological forecasts and submitted a flight plan to the Moorabbin Briefing Office for a flight from Moorabbin to Flinders Island and return. He did not hold an instrument rating and was therefore restricted to flight in accordance with the Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The forecasts indicated patches of fog over the route initially, with areas of rain developing later in the day. Broken layers of stratus and strato-cumulus cloud were forecast but there was nothing to suggest that VFR flight would not be possible. The VFR flight plan submitted indicated an estimated flight time of 89 minutes to Flinders Island and 72 minutes for the return flight. The fuel endurance was stated as 300 minutes. After being refuelled to capacity, the aircraft departed from Moorabbin at 1007 hours and the pilot subsequently reported in the Flinders Island circuit area at 1143 hours. The aircraft landed at Flinders Island Aerodrome and the pilot and passenger proceeded by motor vehicle to a farming property some 40 kilometres distant. On returning to the aerodrome later in the day the pilot attempted to obtain up-to-date weather information for the return flight but the telephone was found to be unserviceable. By this time, the earlier forecasts covering the route had been amended and generally indicated some deterioration in conditions, particularly in relation to increased cloud at the lower levels. Nevertheless, the forecast conditions suggested that VFR flight could be possible over the route. The amended terminal forecast for Moorabbin also indicated increasing low cloud. The pilot and the passenger were seen to board the aircraft which then took off and circled the aerodrome before being obscured by cloud. At this time the weather to the south of Flinders Island Aerodrome was squally and the nearby mountain was partly covered by cloud. At 1543 hours the pilot established radio communication with Launceston Flight Service Unit (FSU) and reported his departure from Flinders Island at 1541 hours, his intention to cruise below 5000 feet and his estimated time over South East Point (southern end of Wilson's Promontory) as 1617 hours. He also asked for confirmation that Moorabbin Airport was open to VFR traffic. He was advised that Moorabbin was "not closed to VFR at the moment however they expect it to be". He was also given the current terminal forecast for Moorabbin and the sections of the relevant area forecasts relating to cloud. He was requested to call Melbourne FSU at 1550 hours. At 1551 hours the pilot established communication with Melbourne FSU and, at 1600 hours, he again asked for confirmation that Moorabbin Airport was open to VFR operations and was advised in the affirmative. He then reported that he was climbing to his planned altitude of 6500 feet and, at 1607 hours, reported that he was climbing to 8500 feet. At 1620 hours he reported an amended estimated time over South East Point as 1625 hours and again requested confirmation that Moorabbin was still open to VFR operations. He was again advised in the affirmative. At 1622 hours the pilot broadcast the call sign of the aircraft once very rapidly and the pitch of his voice was raised above normal. The flight service officer heard but did not understand the call and twice requested the calling aircraft to repeat its call. There was no reply and no further communications were received from the aircraft. Following failure of the aircraft to report position at South East Point, the Uncertainty Phase of search and rescue procedures was declared at 1640 hours. When widespread checks failed to establish the location of the aircraft, the Alert Phase was declared at 1713 hours and this was upgraded to the Distress Phase at 1745 hours. A search of the probability area was carried out by air, land and sea during the next three days and, on the morning of 3. 7. 78, two seats and a left main wheel assembly from a Partenavia P68B aircraft were found on the eastern shoreline of Wilson's Promontory. Additionally, three life jackets with the name "TIPPETT" stencilled on them were found in the same area. No trace of the main wreckage of the aircraft, or of the occupants, has been found. Damage to the recovered aircraft seats and wheel assembly was consistent with them having been attached to an aircraft which had struck the water at high speed in a nose down, left wing down attitude. Post analysis of the meteorological situation at the time of the accident indicated that a complex low pressure system was moving across Victoria. There was extensive cloud cover in the Wilson's Promontory area and the base of the lowest cloud was 1000/2000 feet. Visibility was reduced in areas of heavy rain showers. The interaction of differing air masses could have produced conditions conducive to severe airframe icing In respect of aircraft operating at altitudes between 5000 and 7000 feet.

The aircraft was based at Moorabbin Airport and, late in foe afternoon of 29.3.78, it was refuelled and a pre-flight inspection was carried out. The pilot ferried it to Melbourne Airport just after midnight. While he was preparing and submitting a flight plan for the flight to Canberra and return, the aircraft was loaded with newspapers and a small quantity of other freight. On returning to the aircraft, the pilot checked the loading documents and the freight and made a walk around inspection of the exterior of the aircraft. The pilot started the aircraft engines and established radio communication with air traffic control at 0139 hours. He was given a taxi clearance and an airways clearance for departure from runway 34. Upon request, he was granted approval to commence take-off from the taxiway "J" intersection, some 800 metres from the southern end of the runway. He reported "ready" at 0143 hours and was immediately given a clearance for take-off. The aircraft commenced to take-off, became airborne and, when it was at a height of 100 to 200 feet above the intersection of the two runways, the pilot advised "got a fire - fire in the ah starboard engine and ah doing a low circuit request two seven". Air traffic control immediately replied "make visual approach runway two seven clear to land". Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last communication received from the aircraft. As the aircraft passed over the northern end of runway 34 it commenced a turn to the right and gradually descended. It struck the ground in a right wing down attitude on a track of 070° magnetic and an intense fire broke out. The accident site was 1.8 kilometres to the north-east, and 88 feet above the elevation, of the northern end of runway 34. At the time of the accident the surface wind was 330°/9 knots, the visibility was 25 km in passing showers, there was 3 oktas stratus cloud base 1800 feet and 6 oktas cumulus cloud base 3500 feet. It is probable that below 1000 feet there was some wind shear, downdrafts from passing showers and intermittent moderate turbulence. It has been calculated that the gross weight of the aircraft was some 65 kilograms in excess of the maximum take-off weight and the centre of gravity was within limits. A detailed examination of the wreckage of the aircraft revealed that the landing gear and flaps were fully retracted, the cowl flaps of both engines were midway between the open and closed positions a considerable degree of nose left rudder trim was selected, the right engine was closed down and the propeller feathered. It was established that, as a result of excessively lean mixture operation, there was a hole burned through the piston rings and into the side of the No. 2 piston of the right engine. There was no evidence of fire within the engine but it was apparent that the hole in the piston had resulted in pressurisation of the crankcase cavity, ejection of the oil dipstick and the consequent venting of oil from the dipstick orifice and the engine breather pipe on to the exterior of the exhaust pipes. The engine had the capacity to continue to produce a substantial amount of power for a limited period. The turbo-charger density controller of the left engine was found to be incorrectly adjusted to the extent that the engine could develop only about 330 BHP instead of 350 BHP of which it was normally capable.

At approximately 1103 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 6 August 1976 the pilot of Nomad N24 aircraft Serial Number 10 encountered control difficulty at a height of about 950 feet immediately after taking off at Avalon Aerodrome. The aircraft entered a descending turn to the left through about 175 degrees and struck the ground. The pilot was killed; the occupant of the other pilot seat, an observer, sustained injuries which resulted in his death two days later; and the third occupant, the flight test engineer, was seriously injured.

The flight departed from Essendon Airport at 0050LT. At 0122 hours the flight reported to the Melbourne Flight Service Unit (FSU) that it was then at the Westgate reporting point cruising at 3,500 feet, and its estimated time of arrival at the West Bass reporting point was 0159 hours. At 0145:44 hours VH-SJQ advised the Melbourne FSU 'we have an engine failure on the port side, we have it feathered and are returning to Melbourne'. In response to a request from the FSU the flight advised it was able to maintain height 'at the moment'. At 0148:54 VH-SJQ confirmed that 'the port engine has failed and is feathered' and shortly thereafter advised an estimated time of arrival at the Primegate reporting point en route to Essendon Airport. The Uncertainty Phase of the search and rescue procedures was declared by the Melbourne Air Traffic Control Unit (ATC). At 0151:58 hours the flight advised the Melbourne FSU 'we are making a slow descent to one five zero zero' and, in answer to a query, reported 'we're unable to maintain our height with our rated power'. The Alert Phase of the search and rescue procedures was declared by Melbourne ATC, and a Bristol 170 Mark 31 aircraft en route from Launceston to Essendon Airport was diverted to intercept VH-SJQ and act as an escort. At 0157:46 hours VH-SJQ reported 'four eight DME Wonthaggi', and shortly thereafter, reported 'tracking one eight three on the Wonthaggi VOR'. At 0203:00 hours VH-SJQ transmitted a distress call and reported 'we're passed fifteen hundred feet and still going down'. The position of the aircraft at 0203:57 hours was reported as 'on the one eight six radial Wonthaggi and we are three seven DME'. The Distress phase of the search and rescue procedures was declared by Melbourne ATC and a second northbound aircraft was diverted to intercept VH-SJQ. At 0204:32 hours VH-SJQ reported 'we're down to nine hundred feet at the moment'; at 0207:42 hours, 'at six hundred feet at the moment; at 0212:55 hours, 'two two DME'; at 0213:22 hours, altitude was 200 feet; 0214:31 hours, 'we're down to one hundred feet'; and, at 0215:23 hours, 'this is a final MAYDAY call, we are approximately one eight DME and our altimeters registering zero feet'. Melbourne FSU then transmitted a ditching report of moderate seas with a moderate south-westerly swell; this was acknowledged by VH-SJQ. The escort aircraft then heard further transmissions from VH-SJQ which indicated that both altimeters were reading zero; the crew could see the tops of waves; and DME distances of 16, 15 and 14 were transmitted, the latter being the last transmission heard from the aircraft the time being about 0218 hours. Neither of the escort aircraft sighted VH-SJQ. Post analysis of the meteorological information indicates that the weather in the area of the accident was: surface wind from 280 degrees (True) at 15 knots, scattered cumulus cloud base 2,500 feet, scattered stratus cloud base 1,200 feet, patches of sea fog, visibility 40 kilometres reducing to 4,000 metres in rain showers, temperature 12° Celsius. It is probable that the temperatures at 1,500 feet, 2,500 feet, and 3,500 feet were 9.5°, 7° and 5° Celsius respectively. The conditions were not conducive to the formation of airframe or carburettor icing, and search aircraft in the area did not encounter any such icing.

At approximately 1935 hours EST on 6 May, 1969 an Aero Commander 500S aircraft, registered VH-EXT, struck the ground and crashed 2 miles west of Warracknabeal Aerodrome, Victoria, while making an approach to land at that aerodrome. The aircraft was owned and operated by Executive Air Services Pty. Ltd. of Melbourne and at the time of the accident it was engaged on a scheduled passenger commuter service between Essendon and Warracknabeal. The pilot, Allan James WALKER, and one passenger received minor injuries. A second passenger, the only other occupant, was seriously injured. The aircraft was virtually destroyed by impact forces. The pilot, aged 28 years, held a Current Commercial Pilot Licence, which was endorsed for the Aero Commander type of aircraft. He was the holder of a Class One Instrument Rating and this rating had been renewed after a flight test on 2 April, 1969. His total flying experience amounted to 5427 hours and of this, 966 hours had been flown on Aero Commander aircraft. He had recorded totals of 335 hours of instrument flying and 292 hours of night flying. The aircraft was operating under a current certificate of airworthiness and there is no evidence to indicate that the aircraft was other than in an airworthy condition. There is no evidence that the gross weight of the aircraft and the position of the centre of gravity were other than within the specified limits throughout the flight. The weather at Warracknabeal at the time of the accident was fine. There was no cloud and the wind was from the south east at 10 to 15 knots. The night visibility, that is, the distance at which prominent lighted objects could be seen and recognised, was reported to be 20 miles but it was a very dark night and there was virtually no visible horizon. The aircraft departed Essendon at 1836 hours using the procedures applicable to flight under the Instrument Flight Rules. The night to Warracknabeal at 6,500 feet was uneventful and the pilot commenced descent when the aircraft was approximately 40 miles from that destination. During the descent he observed the lights of the town of Warracknabeal and the lighting at the aerodrome. After entering the circuit the pilot commenced a downwind leg for a landing towards the east on runway 08. He made a left turn onto base leg and noted the indicated altitude as 1, 000 feet and at that altitude the clearance between the aircraft and the local terrain should have been slightly more than 600 feet. On the base leg of the circuit the pilot was unable to see the runway lights and being unsure of his position, he elected to conduct a go around. He did not retract the undercarriage, which had been extended earlier in preparation for landing, and the pilot continued the second circuit at 1, 000 feet indicated altitude rather than climbing to establish 1, 000 feet terrain clearance which would have been the normal procedure. He flew over the non-directional beacon, which is located approximately 300 yards north of the western end of the runway on which he intended to land arid he then positioned the aircraft for the downwind leg of the circuit.

The crew was performing a local training flight at Lovely Banks Aerodrome, northwest of Geelong, Victoria. During the last segment, the level off was completed to high and the airplane struck the ground with its right main gear. Both occupants were uninjured but the aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair due to serious structure damages on the right wing.

Flight No. 1 was a scheduled domestic flight from Hamilton to Melbourne via Warrnambool, Victoria, and the aircraft landed at Warrnambool at 2159 hours GMT after an uneventful flight. After a stay on the ground of 17 minutes, during which time there were load changes, the aircraft taxied for take-off on runway 31. The pre-take-off checks did not indicate any abnormality and the aircraft proceeded to take off. After becoming airborne, but prior to undercarriage retraction, a loss of engine power occurred and the pilot- in-command deduced that the port engine had failed. He feathered the port engine and then became aware that the starboard engine was delivering only partial power, which was insufficient to sustain the aircraft in flight. A suitable area was selected immediately and a landing with wheels and flaps retracted was made in grassy paddocks on level terrain, but the aircraft passed through three fences before coming to rest. All occupants survived while the aircraft was written off.

After landing at Melbourne-Moorabbin, the crew attempted to vacate the runway when the left main gear collapsed. The airplane sunk on its belly and came to rest. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.