New Jersey

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Nashville International Airport. After landing on runway 32 at Monmouth Airport, the crew started the braking procedure when the airplane deviated from the runway centerline to the left. It veered off runway to the left, crossed the parallel taxiway, lost its left main gain and nose gear and eventually came to rest perpendicular to the runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured. Referring to the photos, it appears that only the left reverser deployed.

The flight crew of the jet obtained weather information for the destination airport, which indicated quartering tailwind conditions for the runway in use at the time, with wind at 3 knots gusting to 16 knots. The crew determined the wind to be within limitations. The cockpit voice recorder transcript and airport surveillance video indicated that the landing approach was normal. The captain, who was the pilot flying, stated that, after touchdown, the thrust reversers were deployed and the airplane turned “sharply to the right.” He reported that remedial control inputs were ineffective in maintaining directional control. Airport surveillance video footage of the landing roll and accident sequence showed that, about 9 seconds into the landing roll, the airplane turned sharply to its right. The airplane departed the runway, its left wingtip struck the ground, the entire wing structure (left wing/right wing/wingbox) separated from the airplane as one assembly, and the fuselage continued a short distance before it came to rest upright. The thrust reversers on each engine were deployed and their extended positions were about equal. A windsock could be seen in the surveillance video footage nearly parallel to the ground, indicating nearly a direct crosswind to the landing runway that would have been towards the airplane’s right side. Recorded wind shortly after the accident was consistent with a 90° right crosswind for the landing runway at 6 knots with gusts to 14 knots. A detailed examination of the airplane and system components revealed that all flight control, steering, and braking systems and their actuator components operated as designed. Although the copilot's yaw force sensor did not meet manufacturer acceptance testing during post accident examination, this would not have affected the directional controllability of the airplane. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilot’s compensation for the crosswind conditions was inadequate, which resulted in a loss of directional control and runway excursion.

The pilot reported that he and the copilot were conducting an instrument approach to the runway in a business jet. He noted that the weather conditions included fog and mist. After touching down about 1,500 ft down the 7,300-ft-long runway, he engaged the thrust reversers and applied the brakes gradually because the runway was "slippery." As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he applied full braking, but the airplane departed the end of the runway and impacted a ditch, which resulted in the forward landing gear breaking and the airplane nosing down. The copilot corroborated the pilot's statement. The fuselage was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was conducting a GPS circling instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions to an airport with which he was familiar. During the final minute of the flight, the airplane descended to and leveled off near the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of about 600 ft mean sea level (msl). During this time, the airplane’s groundspeed slowed from about 90 knots to a low of 65 knots. In the few seconds after reaching 65 knots groundspeed, the flight track abruptly turned left off course and the airplane rapidly descended. The final radar point was recorded at 200 ft msl less than 1/10 mile from the accident site. Two home surveillance cameras captured the final few seconds of the flight. The first showed the airplane in a shallow left bank that rapidly increased until the airplane descended in a steep left bank out of camera view below a line of trees. The second video captured the final 4 seconds of the flight; the airplane entered the camera view already in a steep left bank near treetop level, and continued to roll to the left, descending out of view. Both videos showed the airplane flying below an overcast cloud ceiling, and engine noise was audible until the sound of impact. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propeller signatures, witness impact marks, audio recordings, and witness statements were all consistent with the engines producing power at the time of impact. The pilot likely encountered restricted visibility of about 2 statute miles with mist and ceilings about 700 ft msl. When the airplane deviated from the final approach course and descended below the MDA, the destination airport remained 3.5 statute miles to the northeast. Although the airplane was observed to be flying below the overcast cloud layer, given the restricted visibility, it is likely that the pilot was unable to visually identify the airport or runway environment at any point during the approach. According to airplane flight manual supplements, the stall speed likely varied from 76 to 67 knots indicated airspeed. The exact weight and balance and configuration of the airplane could not be determined. Based upon surveillance video, witness accounts, and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data, it is likely that, as the pilot leveled off the airplane near the MDA, the airspeed decayed below the aerodynamic stall speed, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and spin from which the pilot was unable to recover. Based on a readout of the pilot’s cardiac monitoring device and autopsy findings, while the pilot had a remote history of arrhythmia, sudden incapacitation was not a factor in this accident. Autopsy findings suggested that the pilot’s traumatic injuries were not immediately fatal; soot material in both the upper and lower airways provided evidence that the pilot inhaled smoke. This autopsy evidence supports that the pilot’s elevated carboxyhemoglobin level was from smoke inhalation during the postcrash fire. In addition, there were no distress calls received from the pilot and there was no evidence found that would indicate there was an in-flight fire. Thus, carbon monoxide exposure, as determined by the carboxyhemoglobin level, was not a contributing factor to the accident.