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The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 2321LT on May 18 on an international schedule flight to Cairo. carrying 56 passengers and 10 crew members. The crew maintained radio contacts with the Greek ATC and was transferred to the Egyptian ATC but failed to respond. Two minutes after the airplane left the Greek Airspace, the aircraft descended from FL370 to FL220 in few seconds, apparently making a first turn to the left and then a 360 turn to the right before disappearing from the radar screen at 0229LT while at an altitude of 10'000 feet. It is believed that the aircraft crashed in the Mediterranean sea about 200 km north of Egyptian coast. The crew did not send any mayday message, thereby all assumptions remains open. It appears that some various debris such as luggage were found on May 20 about 290-300 km north of Alexandria. Two days after the accident, it is confirmed that ACARS messages reported smoke on board, apparently in the lavatory and also in a technical compartment located under the cockpit area. Above that, several technical issues were reported by the ACARS system. The CVR has been recovered on June 16, 2016, and the DFDR a day later. As both recorder systems are badly damaged, they will need to be repaired before analyzing any datas. On December 15, 2016, investigators reported that traces of explosives were found on several victims. Egyptian Authorities determined that there had been a malicious act. The formal investigation per ICAO Annex 13 was stopped and further investigation fell within the sole jurisdiction of the judicial authorities. Contradicting the Egyptian finding, the French BEA considered that the most likely hypothesis was that a fire broke out in the cockpit while the aircraft was flying at its cruise altitude and that the fire spread rapidly resulting in the loss of control of the aircraft.

The airplane departed Ouagadougou Airport at the end of the afternoon on an ambulance flight to Dakar-Léopold Sédar Senghor Airport with one patient, one doctor, two nurses and three crew members on board. After entering in contact with Dakar Control, the crew was cleared to FL340, an altitude that was confirmed by the crew at 1801LT. But the airplane continued and climbed to FL350. At 1812LT, the aircraft collided with a Boeing 737-8FB operated by Ceiba Intercontinental. Registered 3C-LLY, the B737 was operating the flight CEL071 Dakar - Cotonou - Malabo with 104 passengers and 8 crew members on board. Immediately after the collision, the BAe 125 entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the Atlantic Ocean about 111 km off Dakar. The pilot of the Boeing 737 informed ATC about a possible collision and continued to Malabo without further problem. Nevertheless, the top of the right winglet of the Boeing 737 was missing. SAR operations were suspended after a week and no trace of the BAe 125 nor the 7 occupants was ever found.

The crew was performing a delivery flight from Stauning (Denmark) to Klaipėda with an intermediate stop in Kattleberg, Sweden. Recently acquired by the company for agricultural purposes, the single engine aircraft departed Kattleberg Airfield at 1312LT with an ETA in Klaipėda at 1720LT. En route, the crew informed ATC about their position at 1508LT. Less than half an hour later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in unknown circumstances in the Baltic Sea, some 111 km off Klaipėda. The crew of a Lithuanian Marine vessel located the wreckage three days later at a depth of 124 meters. A dead body was found on May 21. The second pilot was not found.

The Boeing 777-2H6ER took off from Kuala Lumpur Airport runway 32R at 0041LT bound for Beijing. Some 40 minutes later, while reaching FL350 over the Gulf of Thailand, radar contact was lost. At this time, the position of the aircraft was estimated 90 NM northeast of Kota Bharu, some 2 km from the IGARI waypoint. More than 4 days after the 'accident', no trace of the aircraft has been found. On the fifth day of operation, several countries were involved in the SAR operations, in the Gulf of Thailand, west of China Sea and on the Malacca Strait as well. All operations are performed in coordination with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. No distress call or any kind of message was sent by the crew. The last ACARS message was received at 0107LT and did not contain any error, failure or technical problems. At 0119LT was recorded the last radio transmission with the crew saying "All right, good night". At 0121LT, the transponder was switched off and the last radar contact was recorded at 0130LT. Several hypothesis are open and no trace of the aircraft nor the occupant have been found up to March 18, 2014. It is now understood the aircraft may flew several hours after it disappeared from radar screens, flying on an opposite direction from the prescribed flight plan, most probably to the south over the Indian Ocean. No such situation was ever noted by the B3A, so it is now capital to find both CVR & DFDR to explain the exact circumstances of this tragic event. Considering the actual situation, all scenarios are possible and all hypothesis are still open. On Mar 24, 2014, the Malaysian Prime Minister announced that according to new computations by the British AAIB based on new satellite data, there is no reasonable doubt that flight MH370 ended in the South Indian Ocean some 2,600 km west of Perth. Given the situation, the Malaysian Authorities believe that there is no chance to find any survivors among the 239 occupants.

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According to the testimony of 6 Swiss Citizens making a cruise between Perth and Singapore via Jakarta, the following evidences were spotted on March 12 while approaching the Sunda Strait:
1430LT - latitude 6° S, longitude 105° E, speed 17,7 knots:
life jacket, food trays, papers, pieces of polystyrene, wallets,
1500LT:
a huge white piece of 6 meters long to 2,5 meters wide with other debris,
1530LT:
two masts one meter long with small flags on top, red and blue,
2030LT - latitude 5° S, longitude 107° E, speed 20,2 knots.

This testimony was submitted by these 6 Swiss Citizens to the Chinese and Australian Authorities.

On April 21, 2016, it was confirmed that this testimony was recorded by the Swiss Police and transmitted to the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), the State authority of the Swiss Confederation which has a mandate to investigate accidents and dangerous incidents involving trains, aircraft, inland navigation ships, and seagoing vessels. The link to the STSB is http://www.sust.admin.ch/en/index.html.

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On July 29, 2015, a flaperon was found on a beach of the French Island of La Réunion, in the Indian Ocean. It was quickly confirmed by the French Authorities (BEA) that the debris was part of the Malaysian B777. Other debris have been found since, in Mozambique and South Africa.

On May 12, 2016, Australia's TSB reported that the part has been identified to be a "the decorative laminate as an interior panel from the main cabin. The location of a piano hinge on the part surface was consistent with a work-table support leg, utilised on the exterior of the MAB Door R1 (forward, right hand) closet panel". The ATSB reported that they were not able to identify any feature on the debris unique to MH-370, however, there is no record that such a laminate is being used by any other Boeing 777 customer.

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On September 15, 2016, the experts from the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) have completed their examination of the large piece of debris discovered on the island of Pemba, off the coast of Tanzania, on June 20, 2016. Based on thorough examination and analysis, ATSB with the concurrence of the MH370 Safety Investigation Team have identified the following:
- Several part numbers, along with physical appearance, dimensions, and construction confirmed the piece to be an inboard section of a Boeing 777 outboard flap.
- A date stamp associated with one of the part numbers indicated manufacture on January 23, 2002, which was consistent with the May 31, 2002 delivery date for MH370,
- In addition to the Boeing part number, all identification stamps had a second 'OL' number that were unique identifiers relating to part construction,
- The Italian part manufacturer has confirmed that all numbers located on the said part relates to the same serial number outboard flap that was shipped to Boeing as line number 404,
- The manufacturer also confirmed that aircraft line number 404 was delivered to Malaysian Airlines and registered as 9M-MRO (MH370)

As such, the experts have concluded that the debris, an outboard flap originated from the aircraft 9M-MRO, also known as flight MH370. Further examination of the debris will continue, in hopes that further evidence may be uncovered which may provide new insight into the circumstances surrounding flight MH370.

According to a statement provided by the Jacksonville Center air traffic control (ATC) facility, the pilot contacted ATC while at flight level 270. About 25 minutes later, the airplane began to deviate from the ATC-assigned altitude and route. The controller’s attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful. The North American Aerospace Defense Command launched military fighter aircraft to intercept the airplane. The military pilots reported that the airplane was circling in a left turn at a high altitude and low airspeed and that its windows were partially frosted over. They also reported that the pilot was slumped over in the cockpit and not moving. They fired flares, and the pilot continued to be unresponsive. The airplane circled for about 3 hours before it descended into the Gulf of Mexico and sank. The pilot and airplane were not recovered. Review of the pilot’s Federal Aviation Administration medical records did not reveal any recent medical conditions that would have deemed him unfit to fly.

While delivering the single-engine, turbine-powered airplane to Brazil during a multiple leg trip, the pilot decided to fly direct from his departure airport in Puerto Rico to his destination airport in Grenada instead of following the island chain and staying within power-off gliding distance of the shore. During the cruise portion of the flight, a total loss of engine power occurred over open water in visual meteorological conditions at 27,000 feet, about 119 miles west of a suitable landing area. During the loss of power, the engine torque indication dropped from the cruise power setting to 0 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) of torque, the engine then began to vibrate, and smoke began emanating from the engine. The pilot ditched the airplane, it sank, and it was not recovered. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were rescued by a French Navy helicopter. The pilot said that he had decided to take a direct route instead of staying closer to the island chain between the two airports because he had ferried 3 airplanes down to Brazil in the last year and that it was a judgment call and a calculated risk because the engine was reliable. At the airplane’s planned operating altitude of 27,000 feet, the airplane could have glided about 54 miles; if the route had been planned to take advantage of this glide distance, the pilot could have remained off shore island chain and taken a shorter, although not direct, route. Review of fueling documentation, the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and statements made by the pilot and pilot-rated passenger also revealed that on the accident flight, good operating practices were disregarded. For instance, during fueling, the airplane which was not equipped with fuel heaters, had been topped off with fuel, but no fuel icing additive had been added, even though the pilot was planning to operate the airplane at 27,000 feet. The airplane was also operated in excess of the manufacturer's published weight limitations, and no power setting or performance information was available for climb and cruise operations in excess of these limitations. Furthermore, according to the pilot, before the loss of engine power, the torque was about 937 ft-lbs. According to the pilot-rated passenger, before the failure, the torque gauge was indicating about 980 ft-lbs. Review of the maximum cruise performance chart in the POH and Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) revealed that both of the stated torque settings exceeded the maximum torque setting listed on the chart. Operating the engine beyond the recommended power settings specified in the POH/AFM for a prolonged period will result in accelerated deterioration due to hot section component distress and will affect engine reliability and durability.

On 28 July 2011, about 04:11 Korean Standard Time), Asiana Airlines flight 991, a B747-400F airplane, HL7604 (hereafter referred to as AAR991), a scheduled cargo flight from Incheon, Republic of Korea, to Shanghai, China, crashed into the international waters about 130 km west of Jeju International Airport (hereafter referred to as Jeju Airport after the flight crew reported a cargo fire to SHI ACC near a reporting point SADLI on airway A593 about 03:54 and attempted to divert to Jeju Airport. Due to the crash impact and fire, the captain and the first officer (FO) were fatally injured, the aircraft was destroyed, and the cargo shipments were damaged, incapable of being recovered, or washed away. AAR991 was a scheduled international cargo flight operated at night under the instrument flight rule in accordance with the Aviation Act of the Republic of Korea and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The captain and the FO showed up at the flight crew ready room of Asiana Airlines in Incheon International Airport (hereafter referred to as Incheon Airport) an hour before the scheduled time of departure) and signed the "show-up log," respectively. The line mechanic stated that on 28 July, about 02:00, the flight crew arrived at the airplane and that the captain performed the ramp inspection. The loadmaster stated that about 02:15, under the guidance with him, the captain inspected the loaded status of dangerous goods and other shipments in the main deck cargo compartment. The transcript) of ATC radio communications shows that at 03:04:28, AAR991 took off from runway 15L in Incheon Airport. From this moment, the captain) took control of radio communications. At 03:05:48, AAR991 made initial contact with Seoul Area Control Center (SEL ACC) after takeoff and was instructed to climb to 34,000 ft and fly direct to MALPA. At 03:12:19, the flight crew were advised to contact Incheon Area Control Center (ICN ACC). At 03:12:35, AAR991 was climbing to 34,000 ft on a permitted route when it made initial contact with ICN ACC, and at 03:13:05, was allowed to fly direct to NIRAT. At 03:26:05, ICN ACC instructed AAR991 to change its radio frequency to 124.52 MHz. From this moment, the FO mainly assumed control of radio communications, but the captain also occasionally made communication. At 03:26:21, the crew were instructed to fly direct to SADLI, and at 03:50:46, ICN ACC advised AAR991 to contact SHI ACC on frequency 134.0 MHz. At 03:51:15, AAR991 stated that it was maintaining at 34,000 ft and flying direct to SADLI when it made initial contact with SHI ACC. At 03:52:39, SHI ACC instructed AAR991, "AAR991 radar contact, off-set 5 miles right of track," and the flight crew carried out this instruction at 03:52:51. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) messages) received by the ground station were as follows: about 03:53, "EQUIPMENT SMOKE," "EQUIP COOLING," and "CGO DET 11 MN DK"; and about 03:54, "CGO DET 6 MN DK" and "CGO DET 10 MN DK." At 03:54:23, the FO stated, "Shanghai control, Shanghai control, AAR991 request emergency descent, emergency, declare emergency due to fire main deck. Request descent, and descent to one-zero thousand." At 03:54:37, SHI ACC gave AAR991 a descent clearance and instructed it to turn at its discretion, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that AAR991 started descending at 03:54:59. At 03:55:08, the FO requested a diversion to Jeju Airport, stating "We have fire main deck, AAR991, return to Jeju AAR991," and SHI ACC approved the request. At 03:58:03, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to maintain 10,000 ft, however, followed by no response from AAR991. At 03:58:25, SHI ACC requested KAL886 flying near AAR991 to relay any information from AAR991 to SHI ACC. KAL886 stated that AAR991 was descending to 10,000 ft and flying direct to Jeju. According to the radar data of ICN ACC, AAR991 was flying at 16,000 ft at a ground speed of 452 kt on a heading of 345°. At 03:59:13, AAR991 requested a radar vector to Jeju. At 03:59:50, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to fly heading 045, and AAR991 acknowledged this instruction. At 03:59:26, according to the ATC transcript, the sound of the FO's breathing through an oxygen mask was recorded four times when he communicated with SHI ACC. The last ACARS messages received by the ground station about 04:00 are as follows: "YAW DAMPER UPR," "RUD RATIO DUAL," and "FLAPS CONTROL." At 04:00:23, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz for a radar vector to Jeju, however, AAR991 stated that it was unable to contact on this frequency. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed the crew to monitor frequency 134.0 MHz. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that at 04:01:43, AAR991 was flying at 8,200 ft at a ground speed of 404 kt on a heading of 033°, and after this, AAR991's altitude, ground speed, and heading changed inconsistently. At 04:02:00, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact Fukuoka Area Control Center (FUK ACC) on 133.6 MHz. At 04:02:10, the FO stated, "AAR991" and 12 seconds later, added, "Fukuoka AAR991 mayday mayday mayday, we have cargo fire, request direct to Jeju please," followed by no response from FUK ACC. At 04:03:01, the FO called SHI ACC and stated that it was unable to contact FUK ACC. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to pass information to KAL886 and let KAL886 relay the information to FUK ACC and ICN ACC. At 04:03:01, the flight track data of the Incheon radar shows that AAR991's transponder code in Mode 3/A was set to 7700 from 6353 when the aircraft was flying at 8,500 ft at a ground speed of 410 kt on a heading of 027°. At 04:03:24, KAL886 advised AAR991 that it would relay its message to ICN ACC, and the FO stated, "Yes, now direct Jeju heading 030." KAL886 informed AAR991 that SHI ACC gave it heading 045, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. At 04:04:14, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to use another transmitter to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, to request heading to Jeju from its present position, and to report back to SHI ACC. Regarding this, KAL886 gave an affirmative response. At 04:05:30, the captain called KAL886, and KAL886 responded, "Relay from Incheon Control, from Incheon Control, maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and you may descend to 7,000 ft." At 04:05:52, KAL886 again relayed the message, "Maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and descend to 7,000 ft," followed by the captain's response, "Descend 7,000 ft." Beginning 04:06:25, the captain called "Korean Air" twice. At 04:06:30, KAL886 responded, "Stand by, stand by," followed by the captain's statement at 04:06:32, "Ah… we are now that rudder control is not working and seems to be fired… (jamming)." At 04:06:41, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, and at 04:07:16, instructed AAR991 to try contacting KAL886 on 124.52 MHz, followed by the captain's acknowledgement. At 04:07:34, the captain stated, "We have to open the hatch, hatch." Subsequently, KAL886 instructed AAR991 to change its frequency to ICN ACC frequency 124.52 MHz. At 04:08:52, ICN ACC instructed KAL886 to relay the message to AAR991 that JEJ APP established radar contact with AAR991 and that AAR991 should contact JEJ APP on 121.2 MHz. At 04:09:08, KAL886 relayed this message to AAR991. At 04:09:47, the captain said to JEJ ACC, "Rudder control… flight control, all are not working." The FO said to JEJ ACC, "Did you contact? Uh… do you contact us?" and JEJ ACC responded, "AAR991… yes, I can hear you." At 04:10:06, the FO stated, "We have heavy vibration on the airplane, may need to make an emergency landing, emergency ditching," and JEJ ACC responded, "Yes, say again, please." He stated, "Altitude control is not available due to heavy vibration, going to ditch… ah." At 04:10:26, JEJ ACC asked AAR991, "Can you make approach to Jeju?" and subsequently, tried to contact AAR991 three times, however, followed by no response from AAR991. The aircraft crashed in the East China Sea and both pilots were killed. Debris were found about 130 km west of Jeju.

About 2 hours into a cross-country flight over water, the pilot heard a noticeable change in engine noise and observed erratic engine torque readings. Moments later the airplane experienced a complete loss of engine power. After declaring an emergency, the pilot attempted to diagnose the problem and restart the engine to no avail. The airplane ditched 175 miles from land, in water over 5,000 feet deep. The airplane was not recovered and the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

The aircraft was engaged in a maritime patrol flight from USS Eisenhower cruising in the Oman Sea. While returning to the ship, the crew encountered technical problems and abandoned the aircraft that crashed in the sea. Three crew members were rescued while the fourth was not recovered.

The Hawkeye was based on the USS Harry S. Truman cruising in the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly after take off, the aircraft crashed into the sea, some 240 km off the Virginia coast. All three crew members were killed. The accident occurred under unknown circumstances by night.