Takeoff (climb)

After departing runway 23 at Hermosillo-General Ignacio Pesqueira Garcia Airport, the twin engine aircraft entered a slight turn to the right but encountered difficulties to gain height. It struck power cables and crashed in a field located about 7 km west of the airport, bursting into flames. Three passengers were seriously injured while four other occupants including the pilot were killed. Few hours later, two of the three survivors died from their injuries. The undersecretary of Economic Development of Sonora Leonardo Ciscomani seems to be the only survivor.

According to the pilot, during the takeoff roll from the 5,000-ft-long runway, after reaching an airspeed of 90 knots, the airplane’s acceleration slowed. The airplane reached a maximum airspeed of about 92 knots, which was below the planned rotation speed of 100 knots. The pilot elected to abort the takeoff with about 1,500 ft of remaining runway. He reduced the power to idle and initiated maximum braking. The pilot stated that he did not sense the airplane slowing down but observed tire marks on the runway postaccident that were consistent with braking. The airplane continued off the end of the runway and collided with a fence before coming to a stop. All of the occupants exited the airplane safely, and a post-crash fire ensued. Examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks that began 1,200 ft from the runway end and continued into the grass leading to the airplane. An examination of the airplane revealed that the entire cockpit and cabin areas were destroyed by fire. The engines did not display evidence of a catastrophic failure but were otherwise unable to be examined in more detail due to the degree of fire damage. The parking brake control was found in the off position. All hydraulic brake lines were destroyed by fire, and the main landing gear sustained fire and impact damage. Although the tire marks on the runway indicated that some braking action took place, the extensive fire damage precluded a detailed examination of the braking system, and there was insufficient evidence to determine the reason for the runway excursion.

Coming from Juba, the twin engine airplane departed Pieri Airstrip on a short flight to Yuai (about 22 km southwest from Pieri) before returning to Juba, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces but there was no fire. All 10 occupants were killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Boralday Airport in the suburb of Almaty on an ambulance flight to Kegen with five people on board. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the engine suffered a loss of power. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft lost height and crashed in hilly terrain. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Operator reported as Asia Continental Airlines.

During the takeoff roll from runway 26 at Xalapa Airport, the aircraft was unable to rotate for unknown reasons. It struck a small berm located at the end of the concrete area, flew over trees and crashed in a field about 120 metres further, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.

The flight crew was conducting a flight with two passengers and one flight attendant onboard the multiengine jet airplane. The flight crew later stated that at rotation speed, the captain applied back pressure to the control yoke; however, the nose did not rotate to a takeoff attitude. The captain attempted to rotate the airplane once more by relaxing the yoke then pulling it back again, and, with no change in the airplane’s attitude, he made the decision to reject the takeoff by retarding the thrust levers and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway onto a gravel pad where the landing gear collapsed. Continuity was confirmed from the flight controls to the control surfaces. No mechanical anomalies with the engines or airplane systems were noted during the investigation that would have precluded normal operation. A review of performance data indicated that the flight crew attempted to takeoff with the airplane 2,975 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), a center of gravity (CG) close to the most forward limit, and an incorrect stabilizer trim setting. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data indicated that the captain attempted takeoff at a rotation speed 23 knots (kts) slower than the calculated rotation speed for the airplane at maximum weight. Takeoff performance showed the departure runway was 575 ft shorter than the distance required for takeoff at the airplane’s weight. The captain, who was the pilot flying, did not hold any valid pilot certificates at the time of the accident because they had been revoked 2 years prior due to his falsification of logbook entries and records. Additionally, he had never held a type rating for the accident airplane and had started, but not completed, training in the accident airplane model before the accident. The first officer had accumulated about 16 hours of flight experience in the make and model of the airplane and was not authorized to operate as pilot-in-command. The airplane’s flight management system (FMS) data were not recovered; therefore, it could not be determined what data the flight crew entered into the FMS that allowed the airspeed numbers to be generated. The investigation revealed that had the actual performance numbers been entered, a “FIELD LIMITED” amber message would have illuminated warning the crew that the MTOW was exceeded, and airspeed numbers would not have been generated. Therefore, it is likely that the crew entered incorrect data into the FMS either by manually entering a longer runway length and/or decreased the weight of the fuel, passengers, and/or cargo.

The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, about 1,000 ft above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane crashed into a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of the departure airport. First responders arrived immediately after the accident and found only a trace amount of fuel within the confines of the accident site or in the fuel tanks. The only postaccident fire was centered on a small, localized area near the right engine turbocharger. Both main fuel tanks were empty, and the auxiliary bladder tanks were ruptured by impact forces. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or anomaly. A surveillance video showed no evidence of smoke or mist training the airplane seconds prior to impact. The pilot reported that he departed the airport with 112 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot did not provide evidence of the latest refueling when requested by investigators. The available evidence is consistent with a total loss of engine power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion.

On 9 January 2021, a Boeing 737-500 aircraft, registration PK-CLC, was being operated by PT. Sriwijaya Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta to Supadio International Airport (WIOO), Pontianak . The flight number was SJY182. According to the flight plan filed, the fuel endurance was 3 hours 50 minutes. At 0736 UTC (1436 LT) in daylight conditions, Flight SJY182 departed from Runway 25R of Jakarta. There were two pilots, four flight attendants, and 56 passengers onboard the aircraft. At 14:36:46 LT, the SJY182 pilot contacted the Terminal East (TE) controller and was instructed “SJY182 identified on departure, via SID (Standard Instrument Departure) unrestricted climb level 290”. The instruction was read back by the pilot. At 14:36:51 LT, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data recorded that the Autopilot (AP) system engaged at altitude of 1,980 feet. At 14:38:42 LT, the FDR data recorded that as the aircraft climbed past 8,150 feet, the thrust lever of the left engine started reducing, while the thrust lever position of the right engine remained. The FDR data also recorded the left engine N1 was decreasing whereas the right engine N1 remained. At 14:38:51 LT, the SJY182 pilot requested to the TE controller for a heading change to 075° to avoid weather conditions and the TE controller approved the request. At 14:39:01 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 pilot to stop their climb at 11,000 feet to avoid conflict with another aircraft with the same destination that was departing from Runway 25L. The instruction was read back by the SJY182 pilot. At 14:39:47 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft’s altitude was about 10,600 feet with a heading of 046° and continuously decreasing (i.e., the aircraft was turning to the left). The thrust lever of the left engine continued decreasing. The thrust lever of the right engine remained. At 14:39:54 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 to climb to an altitude of 13,000 feet, and the instruction was read back by an SJY182 pilot at 14:39:59 LT. This was the last known recorded radio transmission by the flight. At 14:40:05 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft altitude was about 10,900 feet, which was the highest altitude recorded in the FDR before the aircraft started its descent. The AP system then disengaged at that point with a heading of 016°, the pitch angle was about 4.5° nose up, and the aircraft rolled to the left to more than 45°. The thrust lever position of the left engine continued decreasing while the right engine thrust lever remained. At 14:40:10 LT, the FDR data recorded the autothrottle (A/T) system disengaged and the pitch angle was more than 10° nose down. About 20 seconds later the FDR stopped recording. The last aircraft coordinate recorded was 5°57'56.21" S 106°34'24.86" E. At 14:40:37 LT, the TE controller called SJY182 to request for the aircraft heading but did not receive any response from the pilot. At 14:40:48 LT, the radar target of the aircraft disappeared from the TE controller radar screen. At 14:40:46 LT, the TE controller again called SJY182 but did not receive any response from the pilot. The TE controller then put a measurement vector on the last known position of SJY182 and advised the supervisor of the disappearance of SJY182. The supervisor then reported the occurrence to the operation manager. The TE controller repeatedly called SJY182 several times and also asked other aircraft that flew near the last known location of SJY182 to call the SJY182. The TE controller then activated the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz and called SJY182 on that frequency. All efforts were unsuccessful to get any responses from the SJY182 pilot. About 1455 LT, the operation manager reported the occurrence to the Indonesian Search and Rescue Agency (Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan/BNPP). At 1542 LT, the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provider declared the uncertainty phase (INCERFA) of the SJY182. The distress phase of SJY182 (DETRESFA) was subsequently declared at 1643 LT.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a cargo flight to Cobán. After takeoff from Guatemala City-La Aurora runway 02, while in initial climb, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in trees located in a garden along the 4th Avenue, in the Zone 9 district, approximately 980 metres from the end of runway 02. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the pilot was killed.

After takeoff from Rottweil-Zepfenhan Airport, while climbing, the crew encountered technical problems. The pilot reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located in Dauchingen, about 15 km southwest of Rottweil Airport. The aircraft landed gear down but and eventually came to rest on a path with its undercarriage and both wings partially torn off. Both occupants were slightly injured.