Private

The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were flying from their home, which was located at a residential airpark where no fuel services were available, to an airport located about 37 miles away. According to the passenger, shortly after departure, she queried the pilot about the airplane's apparent low fuel state. The pilot responded that one of the fuel gauges always indicated more available fuel than the other, and that if necessary they could use fuel from that tank. However, about 15 minutes after departure, the pilot advised air traffic control that the airplane was critically low on fuel. About 5 minutes later, both engines lost total power, and the airplane descended into trees and terrain. Examination of the airframe and engines after the accident confirmed that all of the airplane's fuel tanks were essentially empty, and that the trace amounts of fuel recovered were absent of contamination. Based on the autopsy and toxicology results, the pilot had emphysema, hypertension, dilated cardiomyopathy, and severe coronary artery disease; however, given that the passenger did not report any signs of acute incapacitation, and that the pilot did not communicate any medical issues to air traffic control, it does not appear that these conditions affected his performance on the day of the accident. The pilot did not report any chronically painful conditions to the FAA in his most recent medical certificate applications; however, postaccident toxicology tests indicated that the pilot was taking several pain medications (diclofenac, gabapentin, and oxycodone) and one illegal substance (marijuana). Based on the medications' Food and Drug Administration warnings, gabapentin and oxycodone may be individually impairing and sedating; their combined effect may be additive. The effects of the underlying conditions that necessitated the medication could not be determined. It is impossible to determine from the available information what direct effect the marijuana alone may have had on the pilot's judgment and psychomotor functioning; however, the combination of marijuana, oxycodone, and gabapentin likely significantly impaired the pilot's judgment and contributed to his failure to ensure the airplane had sufficient fuel to complete the planned flight.

The private pilot and passenger departed on the 875-nautical-mile cross-country flight and leveled off at a cruise altitude of 24,000 feet mean seal level, which, based on the radar data, was accomplished with the use of the autopilot. About 1 hour 40 minutes after departure, the pilot contacted air traffic control personnel to request that he would “like to leave frequency for a couple of minutes.” No further radio transmissions were made. About 20 seconds after the last transmission, the airplane banked to the right, continued in a spiral while rapidly descending, and subsequently broke apart. At no time during the flight did the pilot indicate that he was experiencing difficulty or request assistance. Just prior to departing from the flight path, the pilot made an entry of the engine parameters in a flight log, which appeared to be consistent with his other entries indicating the airplane was not experiencing any difficulties. Portions of the wings, along with the horizontal stabilizers and elevators, separated during the breakup sequence. Analysis of the fracture surfaces, along with the debris field distribution and radar data, revealed that the rapid descent resulted in an exceedance of the design stress limits of the airplane and led to an in-flight structural failure. The airplane sustained extensive damage after ground impact, and examination of the engine components and surviving primary airframe components did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was flying on a flight path that the pilot was familiar with over largely unpopulated hilly terrain at the time of the upset. The clouds were well below his cruising altitude, giving the pilot reliable external visual cues should the airplane have experienced a failure of either the flight instruments or autopilot. Further, no turbulence was reported in the area. The airplane was equipped with a supplemental oxygen system, which the pilot likely had his mask plugged into and available in the unstowed position behind his seat; the passenger’s mask was stowed under her seat. The airplane’s autopilot could be disengaged by the pilot by depressing the appropriate mode switch, pushing the autopilot disengage switch on the control wheel, or turning off the autopilot switch on the control head. All autopilot servos were also equipped with a clutch mechanism that allowed the servo to be manually overridden by the pilot at any time. It is likely that the reason the pilot requested to “leave the frequency” was to leave his seat and attend to something in the airplane. While leaving his seat, it is plausible he inadvertently disconnected the autopilot and was unable to recover by the time he realized the deviation had occurred.

During the cross-country instrument flight rules flight, the pilot was in contact with air traffic control personnel. The controller cleared the airplane to flight level 210 and gave the pilot permission to deviate east of the airplane's route to avoid weather and traffic. A review of radar data showed the airplane heading southward away from the departure airport and climbing to an altitude of about 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned north, and the controller queried the pilot about the turn; however, he did not respond. The airplane wreckage was located on ranch land with sections of the airplane's outer wing, engines, elevators, and vertical and horizontal stabilizers separated from the fuselage and scattered in several directions, which is consistent with an in-flight breakup before impact with terrain. A review of the weather information for the airplane's route of flight showed widely scattered thunderstorms and a southerly surface wind of 30 knots with gusts to 40 knots. An AIRMET active at the time advised of moderate turbulence below flight level 180. Three pilot reports made within 50 miles of the accident site indicated moderate turbulence and mountain wave activity. An assessment of the humidity and freezing level noted the potential for clear, light-mixed, or rime icing between 10,700 and 17,300 feet msl. Postaccident airplane examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airframe and engines that would have precluded normal operation. It's likely the airplane encountered heavy to extreme turbulence and icing conditions during the flight, which led to the pilot’s loss of control of the airplane and its subsequent in-flight breakup.

On December 8, 2012, at 1334 eastern standard time, a Cessna 421C, N297DB, operated by a private individual, was destroyed when it collided with trees and terrain following a loss of control after takeoff from North Palm Beach County Airpark (LNA), Lantana, Florida. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot took delivery of the airplane from a maintenance facility that had just completed an annual inspection and repainting of the airplane. According to the owner of the facility, who was a certificated pilot and an airframe and powerplant mechanic, the pilot completed the preflight inspection and the airplane was towed outside. The pilot started the airplane, but then shutdown to resolve an alternator charging light. Afterwards, the pilot stated that he planned to fly to Okeechobee, Florida, complete a few landings, and then continue to Miami. According to the mechanic, the pilot performed a ground run of the airplane for several minutes before taxiing to the approach end of Runway 3 for takeoff. The airplane lifted off about halfway down the runway and climbed at a "normal" rate. The mechanic then observed the airplane suddenly yaw to the left "for a second or two" and the airplane's nose continued to pitch up before rolling left and descending vertically, nose-down, until it disappeared from view. Several witnesses provided similar accounts to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector and the local sheriff's department. One witness, a certificated flight instructor said, "The airplane just kept pitching up, and then it looked like a VMC roll."

The instrument-rated private pilot was executing a non precision instrument approach procedure at night in deteriorating weather conditions. According to GPS track data, the pilot executed the approach as published but descended below the missed approach point's minimum altitude before executing a climbing right turn. This turn was not consistent with the published missed approach procedure. The airplane then began a series of left and right ascending and descending turns to various altitudes. The last few seconds of recorded data indicated that the airplane entered a descending left turn. Two witnesses heard the airplane fly overhead at a low altitude and described the weather as foggy. Reported weather at a nearby airport about 26 minutes before the accident was visibility less than 2 miles in mist and an overcast ceiling of 300 feet. A friend of the pilot flew the same route in a similarly equipped airplane and arrived about 30 minutes before the accident airplane. He said he performed the same approach to the missed approach point but never broke out of the clouds, so he executed a missed approach and diverted to an alternate airport. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Federal Aviation Administration Flight Training Handbook Advisory Circular 61-21A cautions that pilots are particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation during periods of low visibility due to conflicts between what they see and what their supporting senses, such as the inner ear and muscle sense, communicate. The accident airplane's maneuvering flightpath, as recorded by the GPS track data, in night instrument meteorological conditions is consistent with the pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

On November 28, 2012, about 1435 eastern standard time, an experimental amateur-built Comp Air 8 (CA-8), N155JD, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during a go-around, while attempting to land at the Merritt Island Airport (COI), Merritt Island, Florida. The certificated commercial pilot sustained serious injuries and a passenger sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight that was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot reported that he flew from Smithfield, North Carolina, to Marion, South Carolina (MAO), without incident. After refueling, he departed MAO for COI. While en route, approximately 150 miles north of Ormond Beach, Florida, the airplane began to experience a left rolling tendency, which required right aileron control inputs to counteract. He configured the fuel selector to the left fuel tank in an attempt to lighten the wing and compensate for the turning tendency; however, the force required to maintain directional control became greater as the flight progressed. The pilot subsequently entered the traffic pattern at COI for runway 29, a 3,601-foot-long, 75- foot-wide, asphalt runway. While maneuvering in the traffic pattern, full right aileron control was required to maintain straight and level flight, and only a slight relaxing of right aileron control was needed to turn left. The pilot had difficulty compensating for a northwest crosswind, which resulted in the airplane drifting to the southern edge of the runway. He performed a go-around and lined-up on the northern side of the runway 29 approach course for a second landing attempt, which again resulted in a go-around. When the pilot applied engine power, the airplane began to slowly roll to the left despite right aileron and rudder control inputs. He decreased engine power; however, the airplane's left wing struck the ground and the airplane flipped-over. The left wing, propeller, and empennage separated during the impact sequence. The airplane's flight controls were electrically actuated. On site examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions, which would have precluded normal operation. The fuel tanks were compromised during the accident. The airplane's rudder, elevator, and aileron control servos were removed for further examination. According to the FAA inspector, the rudder and elevator control servos functioned normally; however, the aileron control servo sustained impact damage during the accident sequence and could not be tested. The six seat, high-wing, tail-wheel, turboprop airplane, serial number 998205, was constructed primarily of composite material and was equipped with a Walter M601D series, 650 horsepower engine, with an AVIA 3-bladed constant-speed propeller. According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate on April 26, 2001. The airplane was purchased from one of the builders, by the commercial pilot, through a corporation, on September 30, 2012. At that time, the airplane had been operated for about 925 total hours and had undergone a condition inspection. The pilot reported about 5,570 hours of total flight experience, which included about 100 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. In addition, the pilot had accumulated about 23 hours and 5 hours in make and model, during the 30 and 90 days preceding the accident, respectively. Winds reported at an airport located about 8 miles southeast of the accident site, about the time of the accident, were from 340 degrees at 16 knots.

While descending to La Crete Airport, the pilot encountered foggy conditions and the visibility dropped to 100 metres. By night, the single engine aircraft descended too low, impacted ground and crashed in a snow covered field located few km northeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft impacted terrain following an in-flight breakup near Shaver Lake, California. The private pilot/registered owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence, and was partially consumed by postimpact fire. The cross-country flight departed Salinas Municipal Airport, Salinas, California, at 1837, with a planned destination of Eppley Airfield, Omaha, Nebraska. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The pilot was the son of the passenger. Both had spent the weekend attending a driving academy at the Laguna Seca Raceway, having arrived in the accident airplane earlier in the week. According to the pilot's wife, they had encountered strong headwinds during the outbound flight from Omaha, and had decided to take advantage of tailwinds for the return flight that night, rather than stay in a hotel. The pilot planned to return his father to Omaha, and then fly to his residence in Missouri the following day. Radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that prior to departure, the pilot was given an IFR clearance to Omaha, and that during his interaction with clearance delivery personnel he read back the clearance correctly. A few minutes after departing Salinas the airplane was cleared to fly direct to the Panoche VORTAC (co-located very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) beacon and tactical air navigation system). The airplane followed a direct course of 60 degrees; reaching Panoche at a mode C reported altitude of 17,200 feet, about 14 minutes later. The airplane continued on that course, reaching the Clovis VOR at 1912, coincident to attaining the pilots stated cruise altitude of 27,000 feet. The pilot reported leveling for cruise, and flying direct to Omaha. The sector controller reported that the pilot should fly direct to the Coaldale VOR and then to Omaha, and the pilot responded, acknowledging the correction. For the next 5 minutes, the airplane continued at the same altitude and heading, with no further transmissions from the pilot. The airplane then began a descending turn to the right, with a final mode C reported radar target recorded 60 seconds later. During that period, it descended to 22,600 feet, with an accompanying increase in ground speed from about 190 to 375 knots. For the remaining 6 minutes, a 6.5-mile-long cluster of primary targets (no altitude information) was observed emanating from the airplane's last location, on a heading of about 150 degrees. Following the initial route deviation, the air traffic controller made five attempts to make contact with the pilot with no success. Throughout the climb and cruise portion of the flight, the airplane flew directly to the assigned waypoints with minimal course variation, in a manner consistent with the pilot utilizing the autopilot.

The aircraft collided with a fence and a ditch when it overran runway 8R (2,272 feet by 38 feet, asphalt) while landing at the Sylvania Airport (C89), Sturtevant, Wisconsin. The commercial pilot was not injured and his passenger received minor injuries. The airplane sustained damage to its fuselage and both wings. The airplane was registered to Direct Action Aviation LLC, and was operated by Skydive Midwest. The accident flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a flight plan. The flight originated from the Jackson County Airport-Reynolds Field (JXN), Jackson, Michigan, about 1800. The pilot reported that the landing approach was normal and when the airplane crossed the runway threshold it floated and he pulled the engine power levers to the stops. He stated that although he did not remember the airplane bouncing, his passenger told him that it had. He pulled the power levers to reverse, but there was no immediate reverse thrust. He applied brakes and felt the airplane accelerate. He recognized that he would not be able to stop the airplane on the remaining runway and attempted to steer it to the north. The airplane left the runway, impacted two ditches and came to rest on a highway. The pilot stated that he should have recognized that braking action would be significantly reduced with the possibility of hydroplaning, that pulling the power levers to the stops before touchdown induced a lag in realization of reverse thrust, and that he should have executed a go-around when the airplane floated before landing. The pilot reported no mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane. At 1853, weather conditions reported at the Kenosha regional Airport (ENW), located 6 miles south of the accident site, included heavy rain.

The privately owned SOCATA TBM 700N (registration C-FBKK, serial number 621) departed from Ottawa/Carp Airport, Ontario, on an instrument flight rules flight plan to Goderich, Ontario. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot and sole occupant altered the destination to Wiarton, Ontario. Air traffic control cleared the aircraft to climb to flight level 260 (FL260). The aircraft continued climb through FL260 and entered a right hand turn, which quickly developed into a spiral dive. At approximately 1219 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft struck the ground and was destroyed. Small fires broke out and consumed some sections of the aircraft. The pilot was fatally injured. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter on board the aircraft was damaged and its signal was not sensed by the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT) system.