Papua New Guinea

On the afternoon of 13 October 2011, an Airlines PNG Bombardier DHC-8-103, registered P2-MCJ (MCJ), was conducting a regular public transport flight from Nadzab, Morobe Province, to Madang, Madang Province under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). On board the aircraft were two flight crew, a flight attendant, and 29 passengers. Earlier in the afternoon, the same crew had flown MCJ from Port Moresby to Nadzab. The autopilot could not be used because the yaw damper was unserviceable so the aircraft had to be hand-flown by the pilots. At Nadzab, the aircraft was refuelled with sufficient fuel for the flight to Madang and a planned subsequent flight from Madang to Port Moresby. MCJ departed Nadzab at 1647 LMT with the Pilot-in-Command as the handling pilot. The aircraft climbed to 16,000 ft with an estimated arrival time at Madang of 1717. Once in the cruise, the flight crew diverted right of the flight planned track to avoid thunderstorms and cloud. The Pilot-in-Command reported that communications between Madang Tower and an aircraft in the vicinity of Madang indicated a storm was approaching the aerodrome. He recalled that he had intended to descend below the cloud in order to be able to see across the sea to Madang and had been concentrating on manoeuvring the aircraft to remain clear of thunderstorms and cloud, so he had been looking mainly outside the cockpit. Because of the storm in the vicinity of the airport, he said there had been „some urgency‟ to descend beneath the cloud base to position for a right base for runway 07 at Madang, the anticipated approach. On this route, the descent to Madang was steep (because of the need to remain above the Finisterre Ranges until close to Madang) and, although the aircraft was descending steeply, the propellers were at their cruise setting of 900 revolutions per minute (RPM). Neither pilot noticed the airspeed increasing towards the maximum operating speed (VMO); the Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he had been „distracted‟ by the weather. When the aircraft reached VMO as it passed through 10,500 ft, with a rate of descent between 3,500 and 4,200 ft per minute, and the propellers set at 900 RPM, the VMO overspeed warning sounded. The Pilot-in-command reported that he had been about to ask the First Officer to increase the propeller speed to 1,050 RPM to slow the aircraft when this occurred. He raised the nose of the aircraft in response to the warning and this reduced the rate of descent to about 2,000 ft per minute, however, the VMO overspeed warning continued. The First Officer recalled the Pilot-in-Command moved the power levers back „quite quickly‟. Shortly after the power levers had been moved back, both propellers oversped simultaneously, exceeding their maximum permitted speed of 1,200 RPM by over 60 % and seriously damaging the left hand engine and rendering both engines unusable. Villagers on the ground reported hearing a loud „bang‟ as the aircraft passed overhead. The noise in the cockpit was deafening, rendering communication between the pilots extremely difficult, and internal damage to the engines caused smoke to enter the cockpit and cabin through the bleed air and air conditioning systems. The emergency caught both pilots by surprise. There was confusion and shock on the flight deck, a situation compounded by the extremely loud noise from the overspeeding propellers. About four seconds after the double propeller overspeed began, the beta warning horn started to sound intermittently, although the pilots stated afterwards they did not hear it. The left propeller RPM reduced to 900 RPM (in the governing range) after about 10 seconds. It remained in the governing range for about 5 seconds before overspeeding again for about 15 seconds, then returned to the governing range. During this second overspeed of the left propeller, the left engine high speed compressor increased above 110 % NH, becoming severely damaged in the process. About 3 seconds after the left propeller began overspeeding for the second time, the right propeller went into uncommanded feather due to a propeller control unit (PCU) beta switch malfunction, while the right engine was still running at flight idle (75% NH). Nine seconds after the double propeller overspeed event began, the Pilot-in-command shouted to the First Officer „what have we done?‟ The First Officer replied there had been a double propeller overspeed. The Pilot-in-command then shouted a second and third time „what have we done?‟. The First Officer repeated that there was a double propeller overspeed and said that the right engine had shut down. The Pilot-in-Command shouted that he could not hear the First Officer, who – just as the left propeller began governing again and the overspeed noise subsided – repeated that the right engine had shut down and asked if the left engine was still working. The Pilot-in-command replied that it was not working. Both pilots then agreed that they had „nothing‟. At this point, about 40 seconds after the propeller overspeed event began, the left propeller was windmilling and the left engine was no longer producing any power because of the damage caused to it by the overspeed. The right engine was operating at flight idle, although the propeller could not be unfeathered and therefore could not produce any thrust. On the order of the Pilot-in-Command, the First Officer made a mayday call to Madang Tower and gave the aircraft's GPS position; he remained in a radio exchange with Madang Tower for 63 seconds. The flight crew did not conduct emergency checklists and procedures. Instead, their attention turned to where they were going to make a forced landing. The aircraft descended at a high rate of descent, with the windmilling left propeller creating extra drag. The asymmetry between the windmilling left propeller and the feathered right propeller made the aircraft difficult to control. The average rate of descent between the onset of the emergency and arrival at the crash site was 2,500 ft per minute and at one point exceeded 6,000 ft per minute, and the VMO overspeed warning sounded again. During his long radio exchange with Madang Tower, the First Officer had said that they would ditch the aircraft, although, after a brief discussion, the Pilot-in-command subsequently decided to make a forced landing in the mouth of the Guabe River. The First Officer asked the Pilot-in-command if he should shut both engines down and the Pilot-in-command replied that he should shut „everything‟ down. Approximately 800 feet above ground level and 72 seconds before impact, the left propeller was feathered and both engines were shut down. The Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he ultimately decided to land beside the river instead of in the river bed because the river bed contained large boulders. The area chosen beside the river bed also contained boulders beneath the vegetation, but they were not readily visible from the air. He recalled afterwards that he overshot the area he had originally been aiming for. The aircraft impacted terrain at 114 knots with the flaps and the landing gear retracted. The Flight Attendant, who was facing the rear of the aircraft, reported that the tail impacted first. During the impact sequence, the left wing and tail became detached. The wreckage came to rest 300 metres from the initial impact point and was consumed by a fuel-fed fire. The front of the aircraft fractured behind the cockpit and rotated through 180 degrees, so that it was inverted when it came to rest. Of the 32 occupants of the aircraft only the two pilots, the flight attendant, and one passenger survived by escaping from the wreckage before it was destroyed by fire.

The aircraft was conducting a charter flight from Jackson’s International Airport, Port Moresby, National Capital District, Papua New Guinea (PNG), to Bwagaoia Aerodrome, Misima Island, Milne Bay Province, PNG (Misima). There were two pilots and three passengers on board for the flight. The approach and landing was undertaken during a heavy rain storm over Bwagaoia Aerodrome at the time, which resulted in standing water on the runway. This water, combined with the aircraft’s speed caused the aircraft to aquaplane. There was also a tailwind, which contributed the aircraft to landing further along the runway than normal. The pilot in command (PIC) initiated a baulked landing procedure. The aircraft was not able to gain flying speed by the end of the runway and did not climb. The aircraft descended into terrain 100 m beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft impacted terrain at the end of runway 26 at 1615:30 PNG local time and the aircraft was destroyed by a post-impact, fuel-fed fire. The copilot was the only survivor. Other persons who came to assist were unable to rescue the remaining occupants because of fire and explosions in the aircraft. The on-site evidence and reports from the surviving copilot indicated that the aircraft was serviceable and producing significant power at the time of impact. Further investigation found that the same aircraft and PIC were involved in a previous landing overrun at Misima Island in February 2009.

On 11 August 2009, a de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft, registered P2-MCB, with two pilots and 11 passengers, was being operated on a scheduled regular public transport service from Port Moresby to Kokoda Airstrip, Papua New Guinea (PNG). At about 1113, the aircraft impacted terrain on the eastern slope of the Kokoda Gap at about 5,780 ft above mean sea level in heavily-timbered jungle about 11 km south-east of Kokoda Airstrip. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. There were no survivors. Prior to the accident the crew were manoeuvring the aircraft within the Kokoda Gap, probably in an attempt to maintain visual flight in reported cloudy conditions. The investigation concluded that the accident was probably the result of controlled flight into terrain: that is, an otherwise airworthy aircraft was unintentionally flown into terrain, with little or no awareness by the crew of the impending collision.

Damaged beyond repair following structural failure due to fatigue upon landing at Efogi, PNG. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and dismantled.

Following an uneventful flight, the pilot started the approach to Goroka Airport in poor weather conditions. After landing on runway 17R, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest few dozen metres further. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was refueled with 640 litres (L) of Jet-A1 (AVTUR) in preparation for an early morning departure to Hoskins, New Britain, on 30 March. On 30 March, the crew lodged a flight plan, which stated that the total fuel on board was 2,100 pounds (lbs) (1,208 L). The first sector of the planned route was from Port Moresby to Hoskins. The pilot-in-command (PIC) obtained an area forecast for the flight, which indicated that there were areas of rain and scattered cloud from 1500-5000 feet (ft), with deteriorating conditions forecast for the period between 0400-0800 hours (hrs); for their arrival at Hoskins. The forecast required 30 minutes holding fuel in addition to the flight and statutory fuel requirements. These conditions were normal for their destination at this time of the year.The aircraft departed Port Moresby at 0402, as flight number ND304 for Hoskins. It initially climbed to the planned Flight Level (FL) 140 (14,000 ft), which was 300 ft above the lowest safe altitude (LSA) on the initial RNC track between Port Moresby and Girua, an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) reporting point on the north coast of the PNG mainland. The LSA for the sector between Girua and the en-route reporting point Maran was 3,300 ft, and the PIC had planned to cruise at 9,000 ft. The sector between Maran and Hoskins was planned at 9,000 ft, with a LSA of 8,300 ft. The purpose of the flight was to transport newspapers and general freight to Hoskins and Rabaul. Flight Information Area (FIA) communications with Nadzab Flight Service used High Frequency (HF) radio, and a Very High Frequency (127.1 MHz) repeater transceiver located near the township of Popondetta. This service was usually monitored by Nadzab Flight Service during their normal hours of operation, for aircraft operating on the Girua to Hoskins track. One of the functions of the Nadzab Flight Service Unit was to record all transmissions received via the Girua repeater site. The crew made a position report, intercepted by Port Moresby Flight Service, advising that they were overhead Maran at 0506, cruising at FL 110 (11,000 ft), and gave an estimated time of arrival (ETA) Hoskins at 0540. That was 2,000 ft higher than the planned level. The position report was received by Port Moresby Flight Service, because Nadzab Flight Service had not commenced operations. It subsequently commenced operations for the day at 0540. Because Nadzab was responsible for the airspace in which ALU was operating, Port Moresby Flight Service advised Nadzab of ALU’s position report, once Nadzab opened. The Maran position report was the last recorded radio contact with the aircraft. No transmission declaring the intention to descend below FL110 was heard from the crew of ALU. No MAYDAY transmission was reported by ATS or other aircrew. When the crew of ALU failed to report their arrival at Hoskins, a search was commenced of the Hoskins aerodrome. At 0650 a DISTRESFA Search and Rescue Phase (SAR) was declared indicating the degree of apprehension held for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. Later that morning verbal reports were received from a coastal logging company in an area east of Kandrian, that an aircraft had crashed. The wreckage of ALU was found 27 km east of Kandrian, at an elevation of 780 ft above sea level. Both crew members had not survived the impact. The wreckage was located at position 06° 11′ 39.8′′ S, 149° 52′ 58.9′′ E, and was dispersed along a 500 m wreckage trail after colliding with numerous trees and impacting the terrain. The investigation estimated the time of the accident to be about 0523.

On approach to Bimin-Wobagen Airport runway 30, the twin engine aircraft lost height and crashed in a wooded area. Both pilots (New Zealand citizens) were killed instantly and all 11 other occupants were injured, some seriously. They walk away to the village to find help and receive care. The aircraft has a single 11/29 grass/dirt runway located at an altitude of 1,767 metres and offer a 10° slope. Runway 29 is for landing only and runway 11 for takeoff only.

While descending to Ononge, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and decided to divert to the Yongai Airfield located about 27 km northeast of Ononge. Few minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 2,286 metres in clouds, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain. Rescuers arrived on scene a day later. The loadmaster was seriously injured while both pilots were killed.

During the takeoff roll from a grassy runway (780 metres long), the pilot noted standing water on the ground. He attempted to take off prematurely to avoid these puddles but the aircraft stalled and crash landed. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff from Tep Tep Airstrip, the twin engine aircraft collided with a cliff located in the Finisterre Mountain Range. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed. This was the inaugural flight from the newly constructed Tep Tep Airstrip.