Crash of a De Havilland Dash-8-100 in Seattle

Date & Time: Apr 16, 1988 at 1832 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N819PH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seattle - Spokane
MSN:
061
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
QX2658
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9328
Captain / Total hours on type:
981.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3849
Copilot / Total hours on type:
642
Aircraft flight hours:
3106
Aircraft flight cycles:
4097
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Seattle-Tacoma Intl Airport, the crew noted a right engine power loss and decided to return for a precautionary landing. After lowering the landing gear, a massive fire was discovered in the right engine nacelle. After landing, directional control and all braking were lost. The aircraft departed the left side of the runway 16L after the left power lever was moved to flight idle. The f/o advised tower that the aircraft was out of control. The aircraft rolled onto the ramp area where it struck a runway designator sign, ground equipment, and jetways B7 and B9. The aircraft was subsequently destroyed by fire. Investigation revealed that during overhaul the high pressure fuel filter cover was improperly installed on the engine and the improper installation was not discovered drg company installation of the engine on the aircraft. This led to a massive fuel leak and the nacelle fire. The fire/explosion caused the loss of the engine panels, reducing the effectiveness of the fire suppression system and allowing other systems to be damaged.
Probable cause:
Improper installation of the high-pressure fuel filter cover that allowed a massive fuel leak and subsequent fire to occur in the right engine nacelle. The improper installation probably occurred at the engine manufacturer; however, the failure of airline maintenance personnel to detect and correct the improper installation contributed to the accident. Also contributing to the accident was the loss of the right engine centre access panels from a fuel explosion that negated the fire suppression system and allowed hydraulic line burn-through that in turn caused a total loss of airplane control on the ground.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander in Seattle: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 26, 1974 at 1805 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N66HA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Seattle - Oak Harbor
MSN:
31
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
HG308
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2000
Captain / Total hours on type:
342.00
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Seattle-Tacoma Airport, while climbing in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a residential area located in Riverton Heights, near the airport. Two passengers were seriously injured while four other occupants including the pilot were killed.
Probable cause:
Diverted attention from operation during initial climb caused the aircraft to crash. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Instruments-misread or failed to read,
- Low ceiling,
- Snow,
- High obstructions,
- Flight and navigation instruments: airspeed, obstructed,
- Foreign materials affecting normal operations,
- Unknown matter in Pitot static system affected the airspeed indicator.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell 1121B Jet Commander in Salt Lake City: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 16, 1969 at 0610 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N403M
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Salt Lake City - Seattle
MSN:
1121-132
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
9423
Captain / Total hours on type:
1195.00
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Salt Lake City Airport, the crew completed the rotation too early. The aircraft stalled then crashed in flames near the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Premature liftoff on part of the flying crew. The following factors were considered as contributing:
- The pilot-in-command failed to obtain flying speed,
- Physical impairment,
- Crew fatigue,
- Improperly loaded aircraft-weight and/or CofG,
- Icing conditions including sleet and freezing rain,
- Obstructions to vision.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-62 off Los Angeles: 15 killed

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1969 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LN-MOO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Copenhagen – Seattle – Los Angeles
MSN:
45822/272
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
SK933
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Captain / Total flying hours:
11135
Captain / Total hours on type:
900.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5814
Copilot / Total hours on type:
973
Aircraft flight hours:
6948
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in Santa Monica Bay, approximately 6 nautical miles west at 1921LT. The aircraft was operating as flight SK933 from Seattle, Washington, to Los Angeles, following a flight from Copenhagen, Denmark. A scheduled crew change occurred at Seattle for the flight to Los Angeles. The accident occurred in the waters of Santa Monica Bay while the crew attempting an instrument approach to runway O7R at Los Angeles International Airport. Of the 45 persons aboard the aircraft, 3 passengers and one cabin attendant drowned, 9 passengers and 2 cabin attendants are missing and presumed dead; 11 passengers and 6 crew members including the captain, the second pilot, and the systems operator, were injured in varying degrees; and 13 passengers escaped without reported injury. The aircraft was destroyed by impact. The fuselage broke into three pieces, two of which sank approximately 350 feet of water. The third section including the wings, the forward cabin and the cockpit, floated for about 20 hours before being towed into shallow water where it sank. This section was later recovered and removed from the water. The weather at Los Angeles International Airport was generally: 1,700 feet broken, 3,500 feet overcast; visibility 4 miles in light rain and fog, wind 060° at 10 knots; and the altimeter setting was 29.87 inches of mercury. The weather in the accident area was reported to be similar.
Probable cause:
The lack of crew coordination and the inadequate monitoring of the aircraft position in space during a critical phase of an instrument approach which resulted in an unplanned descent into the water. Contributing to this unplanned descent was an apparent unsafe landing gear condition induced by the design of the landing gear indicator lights, and the omission of the minimum crossing altitude at an approach fix depicted on the approach chart.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 377 Stratocruiser 10-26 in Juneau

Date & Time: Apr 10, 1959
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1033V
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seattle – Juneau
MSN:
15933
YOM:
1949
Location:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Juneau Airport, the four engine aircraft was too low and struck an embankment. On impact, the undercarriage were sheared off and the airplane belly landed, slid for several yards and came to rest in flames. All ten occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was written off. For unknown reason, the pilot-in-command completed a too-low approach.

Crash of a Curtiss C-46F-1-CU Commando on Panther Peak: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1959
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N1240N
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Burbank – Seattle
MSN:
22404
YOM:
1945
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
While cruising in marginal weather conditions at an altitude of 8,500 feet, the airplane struck trees and crashed on the slope of the Panther Peak. The aircraft was destroyed and both crew members were killed. At the time of the accident, the crew was not following the assigned route from Burbank to Seattle-Tacoma Airport for unknown reason. Apparently following a navigation error, the aircraft was 45 miles to the east from the intended route and at an insufficient altitude of 8,500 feet instead of the minimum 14,500 feet required.

Crash of a Douglas C-54B-20-DO Skymaster near Blyn: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 2, 1957 at 1719 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90449
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Fairbanks – Seattle
MSN:
27239
YOM:
1944
Flight number:
AS100
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
12033
Captain / Total hours on type:
8023.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10791
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4532
Aircraft flight hours:
28835
Circumstances:
Alaska Airlines, Inc., is an air carrier certificated to conduct scheduled operations within the Territory of Alaska and between Alaska and the continental United States. Flight 100 of March 2 originated at Fairbanks, Alaska, as a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Seattle, Washington. The aircraft, N 90449, had arrived from Seattle at 0717 March 2 as Trip 101/1. Two minor discrepancies reported by the inbound crew were corrected during a turnaround inspection and by 0930 that morning the aircraft was ready for the return flight to Seattle. The crew assigned to Flight 100, Captain Lawrence F. Currie, Copilot Lyle O. Edwards, and Stewardess Elizabeth Goods, arrived at operations and made the normal routine preparations for the flight. The pilots discussed the flight with the station agent and all necessary flight papers were completed. Weather for the route was given to the pilots. The weight and balance were determined and both were well within allowable limits. The aircraft was serviced with 2,380 gallons of fuel. The following IFR flight plan was filed with Fairbanks ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control): Alaska 100, a DC-4, departing 10,000 feet Amber 2 Snag, 12,000 Blue 79 Haines, 10,000 Blue 79 Annette, 9,500 direct Port Hardy, 10,000 Amber 1 Seattle; airspeed 185; estimating 7 hours, 44 minutes en route; proposing 0955. At 0940 the two passengers and crew boarded the aircraft. Takeoff was made in VFR weather conditions at 0958. Shortly thereafter Fairbanks center called N 90449 and relayed the ATC clearance, approving the flight plan as filed. The weather conditions at Fairbanks and en route were forecast to be generally good and the flight proceeded in the clear as planned, making routine position reports as it progressed. At 1240, when over Haines, Alaska, at 12,000 feet, Flight 100 canceled its instrument flight plan and informed ARTC that they would proceed VFR to Annette and would file DVFR 2 (Defense Visual Flight Rule) after Annette and before entering the CADIZ (Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone). Thereafter the flight proceeded, reporting its position as DVFR at 1,000 feet. The flight was observed at Patricia Bay, British Columbia, at an estimated 3,000 feet m. s. l. by a tower operator. It was also observed leaving the CADIZ. At 1717 the Alaska Airlines Seattle dispatch office received the following position report by radio from Flight 100: "Dungeness at 16 VFR estimating Seattle at 34." This was the last contact with the flight, which crashed shortly thereafter. All five occupants were killed. N 90449 crashed in heavily timbered mountainous terrain March 2 and was not located until March 3, 1957. The crash occurred approximately in the center of the "on course" zone of the northwest leg of the Seattle low frequency radio range, about 11 nautical miles southeast of the Dungeness fan marker. This leg of the Seattle range defines the center of Amber Airway 1 between the Dungeness intersection and the range station. The minimum instrument en route altitude for this segment is 5,000 feet. Because of adverse weather and inaccessibility of the location, CAB investigators were unable to reach the scene until March 6. The investigators noted that the wreckage had been disturbed prior to their arrival; some components were missing, presumably carried away by persons unknown. The path of the aircraft during the final seconds of flight was clearly defined in the heavy timber growing on the steep slope against the aircraft smashed. The aircraft’s first contact with the trees was at a point 650 feet from the wreckage. From this point it cut a level swath on a heading of 106 degrees magnetic, the width of its wing span, into the steeply rising wooded slope at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet m. s. l. The terrain immediately ahead of the aircraft‘s path rose to an altitude of 2,000. 2,100 feet MSL.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a navigational error and poor judgment exhibited by the pilot in entering an overcast in a mountainous area at a dangerously low altitude. The following findings were reported:
- No malfunction or emergency existed and the aircraft was intact prior to its initial contact with the mountain,
- Several errors and omissions in the course of the flight Indicate the crew was lax and not giving proper attention to their duties,
- A navigational error resulted in the aircraft being three to four miles west of the flight path assumed by the crew,
- The pilot flew into instrument weather without obtaining a proper clearance,
- The aircraft crashed in terrain obscured by clouds.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation in McChord AFB

Date & Time: Sep 6, 1953 at 0231 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N6214C
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seattle – Chicago
MSN:
4014
YOM:
1952
Flight number:
NW008
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
26
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10863
Captain / Total hours on type:
263.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4230
Copilot / Total hours on type:
206
Aircraft flight hours:
4509
Circumstances:
Northwest Airlines' Flight 8 departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0148, September 6, 1953, for a nonstop flight to Chicago, Illinois. Gross weight on takeoff was 105,839 pounds; maximum allowable for takeoff was 116,740; maximum allowable for landing was 98.500 pounds. The location of the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. Weather at Seattle-Tacoma Airport during takeoff was: ceiling 200 feet and one-fourth mile visibility. Just after the aircraft became airborne No. 3 propeller oversped. Attempts by the flight engineer to correct this condition were unsuccessful and feathering was started one and one-half minutes later. However, the propeller continued to rotate at about 400 r.p.m. The flight's takeoff alternate was Yakima, Washington (a distance of 122 miles), but due to high terrain en route the captain elected to request clearance to proceed to Portland, Oregon (a distance of 132 miles), at 5,000 feet. This clearance was granted immediately. Using METO 2 power the aircraft reached 5,000 feet, well above the overcast, about 14 minutes after takeoff. Near the end of this climb the oil temperature of No. 4 engine was exceeding limits and the oil supply was being rapidly reduced. The flight engineer attempted to lower the temperature by fully opening the oil cooler flap. Temperature, however, remained high and the oil quantity continued to dwindle fast. Accordingly, the No. 4 propeller was feathered at about 0205 at the order of the captain who then declared an emergency and elected to land at McChord Air Force Base. Radio communication was established with McChord and arrangements made for a GCA approach after a short delay in establishing a frequency. No. 3 propeller had not feathered fully and was still windmilling at approximately 400 r.p.m. Meanwhile the captain had requested "takeoff" flaps, but the flaps would not extend hydraulically, and the copilot went to the cabin to crank them down. He stated that he turned the crank about 15-20 turns, at which point he found that it would no longer turn freely, whereupon he backed it to its original position. He was then called back to the cockpit to assist the captain in controlling the aircraft. Control difficulty had been continuously experienced with the aircraft yawing sharply and dropping a wing. The captain had placed the trim controls approximately in neutral, believing that he had a better feel and control of the aircraft without them at the recommended minimum speed of 130 knots. The aircraft, which had re-entered the overcast at about 2,000 feet, was then several miles from McChord Field under GCA direction on its first approach when its position and heading became such that the GCA operator directed a box pattern be flown to establish a proper approach. The second approach was executed in accordance with the directed pattern and the final approach was in line with Runway 34. The landing gear control was not actuated for gear extension until the aircraft broke out of the overcast at an altitude estimated at between 500 and 800 feet on a GCA controlled straight-in approach to Runway 34. At this time the captain ordered that No. 3 be unfeathered but it would not unfeather and continued to windmill. Only the right main gear extended fully and locked, as Indicated by its green light, but the landing was then committed. Shortly after touchdown retraction of the unlocked nose and left main gears allowed the aircraft to veer off the runway to the left. It then skidded sideways to its right, folding the right main gear inward, and the No. 2 engine was torn free. The aircraft came to rest on a heading of 212 degrees some 3,000 feet from the point of touch and about 7,000 feet short of the far end of the 10,000-foot runway. At about that time a gasoline fire started and spread rapidly over the ground below the airplane. Previously alerted fire apparatus, already standing by, kept the fire from spreading while all passengers and four of the crew left quickly by the main cabin door, the door sill being five or six feet above the ground. The flight engineer and the captain left by the cockpit crew door after ascertaining the cabin to be empty. All 32 occupants ware clear within an estimated two minutes. There were no fatalities although several persons were treated for burns at the McChord Air Force Base Hospital.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a sequence of mechanical failures resulting in an emergency landing under adverse weather conditions with insufficient hydraulic pressure in the secondary system to extend fully the landing gear in the time available. A contributing factor was the design of the hydraulic system which did not permit use of the available pressure in the primary system for that purpose. The following findings were pointed out:
- Shortly after takeoff the aircraft lost the use of No. 3 engine due to an overspeeding propeller, and continued windmilling,
- Weather conditions at Seattle-Tacoma were satisfactory for takeoff but were below landing minimums and the captain elected to proceed to Portland,
- After reaching cruising altitude No. 4 propeller was feathered because of high engine oil temperature and depletion of oil supply,
- After losing the use of No. 4 engine, the captain declared an emergency and set up a GCA approach to McChord Air Force Base,
- A malfunction of the landing gear selector valve prevented normal use of the diminished hydraulic pressure to extend the flaps,
- A GCA instrument approach to McChord was necessary because of weather conditions. The captain decided that he would extend the gear only after breaking out under the low overcast,
- The short time interval between breaking out and touchdown was insufficient for extension and locking of all three landing gears with the existing hydraulic pressure,
- After touchdown the unlocked and partially extended left main and nose gears were forced up into their wheel wells with complete loss of control of the aircraft's ground movement, and fire occurred after rupture of the fuel tanks,
- The functional failure of No. 3 propeller governor was due to foreign metallic particles,
- The reason for the loss of oil supply for No. 4 engine was undetermined,
- The landing gear selector valve was improperly seated, resulting in insufficient hydraulic pressure.
Final Report: