Pawtucket-North Central State

The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.

The pilot was conducting the localizer approach to runway 15 when the aircraft overran the runway and struck an obstacle. According to the pilot, a loss of power occurred in both engines as he attempted to do a missed approach, and the airspeed subsequently decreased from 105 to 80 knots. The pilot reported that he pushed the nose over to avoid a stall, broke out of the clouds over the mid-point of the runway, landed long and continued off the end of the runway into terrain and a tower structure. A witness reported the 'aircraft broke out of the clouds just above the trees north of runway 5 and west of runway 15. Reportedly, the aircraft as being banked from a right to left to get aligned with runway 5, flaps appeared to be up, and the gear was down. The witness said the engines sounded to be at idle and at high rpm, and the aircraft appeared to be 50 feet above the ground at midfield when it went out of sight behind hangar.' The weather observed at the time of the accident was in part: ceiling 100 feet overcast, visibility 0.5 mile with fog and rain. The published landing minimums for the approach was ceiling 400 feet and visibility 0.75 mile. Recorded radar data of the flight indicated a descent below the minimum descent altitude at a constant airspeed. Both engines started immediately and ran during a postaccident check of the aircraft.

The pilot was issued runway 05, 7,500 feet, for IFR departure with favoring 4 knots quartering headwind. Pilot requested runway 14, 4,498 feet, for takeoff with a 4 knots quartering tailwind. Ground witness and control tower observed aircraft use nearly all of the runway on takeoff roll. After an abrupt rotation, the controller observed aircraft yaw to left and make a low altitude left turn. Seconds later the aircraft rapidly descended into trees and caught fire. The left propeller was found in the feathered position and the left engine was consumed by a ground fire. There was no evidence of any internal engine failure. The engine time smoh was 43 hours. Witness heard the aircraft takeoff with a series of loud backfires 25 days prior to the accident. Injector nozzles on the right engine were learned to correct the problem after 6 hours of operation one week later. The pilots log failed to show any recent training in single engine procedures. Both occupants were killed.