Osh

It was determined that the accident occurred in poor weather conditions with an horizontal visibility reduced to 50 meters and a vertical visibility limited to 130 feet. It was reported that the accident was caused by the combination of the following factors:
- the crew decided to leave Bishkek Airport for Osh without taking into consideration the weather forecast and the possibility of deteriorating weather,
- the competences of the captain for a missed approach procedure in poor weather conditions were limited to a simulator training despite the fact that he was certified for Cat IIIa approaches,
- failure of the crew to comply with the standard operating procedures for a missed approach,
- wrong actions on part of the pilot in command while crossing the runway threshold at a height of 125 feet and about five seconds after the initiation of the TOGA procedure, disrupting the go around trajectory and causing the aircraft to continue the descent,
- lack of reaction of the copilot who did not try to correct the wrong actions of the pilot in command,
- lack of concentration on part of the crew who failed to control the approach speed and failed to recognize the pitch angle that was increasing,
- it is possible that the crew suffered somatogravic illusions caused by fatigue due to a duty time period above 13 hours,
- a non proactive reaction of the crew when the GPWS alarm sounded.

On Apr 22nd 2013 a letter of Kyrgyzstan's Transport Prosecutor to Kyrgyzstan's Parliament of April 2012 became known indicating that the airport had been approved to operate in Category I weather minima without being properly equipped and should never have been approved to operate in these conditions, as a result of the investigation the aerodrome has been limited to operate according to visual flight rules only. The aircraft was not properly equipped to conduct the flight lacking a GPWS as well as passenger oxygen, the crew was not qualified to conduct the flight and the oversight by the airline's dispatch and chief pilot was insufficient, the Transport Prosecutor mentioned that the responsibles to oversee flight operation could not answer even the most basic questions. Kyrgyzstan's Civil Aviation Authority failed to oversee the operation of the airline as well. While on approach to Osh the crew was informed about weather conditions permitting an approach, the data transmitted however were incorrect and the actual weather did not even permit an approach. Instead of being established on the approach 10.5km/5.6nm before touchdown the aircraft was established on the extended centerline only about 4.02km/2.17nm before touchdown, however was above the glidepath. A steep dive to reach the runway resulted in a touch down at a high rate of descent and vertical forces beyond the design limit of the aircraft (more than 2.5G), as result of the high impact forces the aircraft did not even bounce but just started to disintegrate, reaching 58 degrees of right roll 270 meters past the runway threshold, between 270 and 550 meters past the threshold the tail fin separated, the aircraft was completely upside down 600 meters past the threshold and came to a stop about 1000 meters past the threshold of the runway. The main door was jammed, the occupants escaped through other doors and the overwing exits. No serious injury occurred, 6 people needed hospital treatment with minor injuries.

In-flight structural damages caused by severe downdrafts in altitude.

The crew decided to continue in adverse weather conditions and failed to return. Controlled flight into terrain.