Key West

The pilot was enroute to the destination airport and overflying the Gulf of Mexico when about 15 nautical miles from the airport and at an altitude of 3,000 ft, the right engine suddenly lost power. The pilot described that about that time, the fuel totalizers indicated that 48 gallons of fuel were onboard, and his fuel quantity gauge indicated similarly. He then contacted air traffic control and declared an emergency. Shortly thereafter, the left engine also suddenly lost power. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the issue and restart both engines but was unsuccessful. He subsequently ditched the airplane and was rescued from the water without injury. The airplane was not recovered and could not be examined after the accident, therefore the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

The pilot landed the seaplane into an easterly wind, then noticed that the surface wind was greater than forecast. Unable to taxi to the beaching location, he elected to return to his destination. He maneuvered the airplane into the wind and applied takeoff power. He described the takeoff run as "bumpy" and the water conditions as "rough." The pilot reported that the left float departed the airplane at rotation speed, and the airplane subsequently nosed into the water. The pilot and passengers were assisted by a nearby vessel and the airplane subsequently sank into 50 ft of water. Inclement sea and wind conditions prevented recovery of the wreckage for 52 days, and the wreckage was stored outside for an additional 13 days before recovery by the salvage company. Extensive saltwater corrosion prevented metallurgical examination of the landing gear components; however, no indication of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure was found.

The instrument-rated private pilot and four passengers boarded the multiengine airplane inside a hangar. The pilot then requested that the airplane be towed from the hangar to the ramp, since he did not want to hit anything on the ramp while taxiing in the dense fog. Witnesses heard the pre-takeoff engine run-up toward the end of the runway but could not see the airplane as it departed; the engines sounded normal during the run-up and takeoff. A witness video recorded the takeoff but the airplane was not visible due to the dense fog. During the takeoff roll the airplane's tires chirped, which is consistent with the wheels touching down on the runway with a side load. The video ended before the accident occurred. The witnesses stated that the takeoff continued and then they heard the airplane impact the ground and saw an explosion. The weather conditions at the time of the accident included visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and an overcast ceiling at 300 ft above ground level. The airplane's weight at the time of the accident was about 105 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight, which exceeded the center of gravity moment envelope. The excess weight would have likely extended the takeoff roll, decreased the climb rate, and increased the amount of elevator pressure required to lift off of the runway. A majority of the airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. The ground impact marks and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane rolling left over the departure end of the runway and impacting the ground inverted in a nearly vertical, nose-low attitude. Examination of the engines revealed operating signatures consistent with takeoff power at the time of impact. The elevator trim tab and actuator were found beyond their full up travel limits and the trim cable exhibited tension overload separations near the actuator. It is likely that, when the cable separated in overload, the chain turned the sprocket and extended the actuator rod beyond full travel. No anomalies were observed with the airframe, engines, or cockpit instrumentation that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation was unable to determine the status of the autopilot during the accident takeoff. Based on the evidence it's likely that when the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions the pilot experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

The pilot of the multiengine airplane was flying two passengers at night on an instrument-flight-rules flight plan. One of the passengers had been on an organ recipient waiting list and his wife was accompanying him. A viable matched organ was available at a distant hospital and the passenger had to arrive on short notice for surgery the following morning. All radio communications during the flight between the pilot and air traffic control (ATC), a flight service station (FSS), and a fixed-based operator (FBO) were routine. The pilot was aware of the weather at the destination airport, and had commented to ATC about 75 miles from the destination that the weather was "going up and down…like a real thin fog layer.” Additionally, better weather conditions prevailed at nearby suitable airports. The pilot mentioned one of those airports to ATC in the event he decided to divert. According to an employee at an FBO located at the destination airport, the pilot contacted him via radio and asked about the current weather conditions. The employee replied that the visibility was low due to fog and that he could not see the terminal lights from the FBO. The pilot then asked which of the two alternate airports was closer and the employee stated that he did not know. The employee then heard the pilot “click” the runway lights and contact the local FSS. about 5 miles from runway 29, just prior to the initial approach fix, the pilot radioed on the common traffic advisory frequency and reported a 5-mile final leg for runway 29. The FSS reported that the current weather was automated showing an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet vertical visibility and 1/4 mile visibility in fog. The pilota cknowledged the weather information. The weather was below the minimum published requirements for the instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach at the destination airport. Radar data showed that the flight intercepted and tracked the localizer, then intercepted the glideslope about 1 minute later. There were a few radar targets without altitude data due to intermittent Mode C transponder returns. The last recorded radar target with altitude indicated the airplane was at 600 feet, on glideslope and heading for the approach; however, the three subsequent and final targets did not show altitude information. The last recorded radar target was about 1.4 miles from the runway threshold. The airplane flew below glideslope and impacted 100-foot-tall trees about 4,150 feet from the runway 29 threshold. On-ground facility checks and a postaccident flight check of the ILS runway 29 approach conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration did not reveal malfunctions with the ILS. The cabin and cockpit area, including the NAV/COMM/APP, equipment were consumed by a postimpact fire which precluded viable component testing. Detailed examination of the wreckage that was not consumed by fire did not reveal preimpact mechanical malfunctions that may have contributed to the accident. Given that the pilot was aware of the weather conditions before and during the approach, it is possible that the pilot’s goal of expeditiously transporting a patient to a hospital for an organ transplant may have affected his decision to initiate and continue an instrument approach while the weather conditions were below the published minimum requirements for the approach.

The flightcrew had completed a 14 cfr part 135 charter flight and had landed in the harbor at Key West, Florida. They had moored the seaplane and departed. About an hour later, they reboarded the seaplane to fly it to an airport for refueling, then to return to the harbor to board the passengers. During takeoff, the seaplane was observed to pitch nose up, roll left, and crash nose down in the harbor. Due to the damage done by tidal flow and recovery attempts, the exact condition of the aft bilge drain plugs was unknown. During a check of the CVR recording, the crew was not heard to call out the bilge pumps during the before-takeoff checklist. After lift-off, both pilots made comments about keeping the nose down due to water in the aft portion of the aircraft. Both pilots were killed.

As the aircraft (N21ST) was en route on a flight from Key West to Naples, FL, the pilot of another aircraft saw a 'fireball' in the vicinity of where N21ST subsequently crashed. When N21ST did not arrive, a search was initiated. The wreckage was found the next day at 1704 est, in the Everglades National Park, near Flamingo, FL. During impact, the main wreckage was buried in 30 feet of mud. The left outboard wing section (from just outboard of the engine nacelle to the wing tip) was found approximately 1 mile from the main wreckage. An exam revealed the wing had failed where the nacelle fuel tank and the aux fuel tank boost pumps were mounted. No exhaust system failure or leakage from the fuel tanks was found in the area of the fire. The greatest fire damage was at a point where the left nacelle fuel tank boost pump was mounted and aft from there to where the rear wing spar had burned thru. The electrical fuel boost pumps were not recovered after the accident. The ignition source for the fire was not determined. All three occupants were killed.