Anchorage-Merrill Field

The airline transport pilot was cleared for the localizer approach. The airplane impacted the ground 3.2 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 560 feet msl, which is 263 feet above touchdown. Night, instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The surrounding terrain was flat, snow-covered, and featureless. The reported weather was 200 feet overcast, 1 1/2 miles visibility in snow, and winds of 12 knots, gusting to 32 knots. The pilot reported he was established on the final approach course, descending to the MDA, and then woke up in the snow. He said he did not remember any problems with the airplane. No pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered with the airplane during the investigation. The airport has high intensity runway lights, sequenced flashing lead-in lights, and visual approach slope indicator lights. All airport lights and navigation aids were functioning. The airplane was not equipped with an autopilot. Captains have the option of requesting a copilot, but, the captain's pay is reduced by a portion equal to one-half the copilot's pay. The pilot had returned from the previous nights trip at 0725. He had three rest periods, four hours, two hours, and five hours 15 minutes, since his previous nights flight. Each rest period was interrupted by contact with the company. The company indicated that it is the pilot's responsibility to tell the company if duty times are being exceeded. 14 CFR 135.267 states, in part: '(d) Each assignment ... must provide for at least 10 consecutive hours of rest during the 24 hours that precedes the planned completion of the assignment.'

The pilot had departed a remote airstrip on the return portion of a cargo flight. An instrument flight plan was on file with the ARTCC. After departure, the pilot attempted to contact ARTCC to open his flight plan but communications were not established. The airplane struck mountainous terrain about 6 miles south of the departure airport. Radar data showed that after departure, the airplane climbed westbound and then turned southbound toward higher terrain. It circled southwest of the airport and turned eastbound while climbing to 5,300 feet msl. The airplane then turned southbound again toward the accident site. The last recorded radar data was at 5,200 feet msl. The airplane struck a ridgeline about 4,800 feet msl. Airmets were in effect for IFR conditions, low ceilings, mountain obscurations, rain, fog, and icing in clouds and in precipitation. A witness reported that when the airplane arrived at the airport, the airframe had a coating of ice. When the airplane departed, snow was falling at the airport.

The airplane became missing while on an IFR flight in instrument conditions from Yakutat, Alaska to Anchorage, Alaska. There was not further radio communication with the airplane after the pilot reported level at his assigned altitude of 12,000 feet msl. After listening to FAA air traffic control tapes of communications with the pilot, his wife stated that several minutes after the point which the FAA said was the last transmission from the pilot, she heard her husband say something about '6,000' and 'icing conditions'. An enhancement examination of the tapes by the FBI laboratory failed to confirm this information. Aircraft damage and occupant injuries are presumed.

The aircraft was on the last leg of a scheduled commuter flight, when it crashed in a heavily wooded area while making a VFR approach to Merrill Field, Anchorage, AK. The captain and his sole passenger were killed in the crash when the airplane struck the ground upside-down in a near vertical attitude. The airplane's copilot, who had deplaned minutes before the accident flight, said he did not see the captain use the aircraft's auxiliary fuel tanks at any time during that evening's earlier flights. The airplane's main fuel tanks hold 100 gallons of useable fuel; it is estimated that the airplane would have consumed slightly more than 100 gallons of fuel at the time of the accident. Ample fuel remained in the auxiliary tanks, but an engine restart cannot be readily accomplished if the auxiliary tanks are not selected prior to the engine's quitting. Both occupants were killed.