Piper PA-31 Cheyenne

At the conclusion of a dark night IMC cross-country flight, the pilot was being vectored onto the ILS approach. After stabilizing, the approach "was normal." At decision altitude, the pilot indicated that he could see the approach lights and the runway, but was not in a position to land so he executed a missed approach. After being vectored around for another approach, he stated that he was on the localizer but was "high" on the glide slope. After giving "a little" nose down pitch, he became distracted when the autopilot became "accidentally disengaged." The pilot stated that he "inadvertently descended through the glide slope and impacted the ground short of the runway." He further stated that the "first indication" that he was low was when the aircraft "struck the ground." The aircraft was destroyed on impact. A facility check conducted by the FAA of the ILS found all parameters within normal specifications.

At 2144, the pilot contacted air traffic control and requested visual flight rules (VFR) flight following to his destination. The flight was the final leg of a four-leg trip, which the pilot had begun approximately 1120 that morning. At 2220, the flight began a slow descent toward the destination airport. Radar data confirmed that the airplane executed a steady descent, and flew a straight line course toward Graham. The final radar return occurred 37 minutes later at an altitude of 3,000 feet (radar coverage is not available below 3,000 feet), 8 miles southeast of the Graham Municipal Airport. Two minutes after the final radar return, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the flight was two miles out, and he canceled VFR flight following. No further communications or distress calls were received from the airplane. The pilot did not request or receive updated weather from the air traffic controllers during the flight. According to witnesses who lived near the accident site, they heard an airplane flying low, observed dense fog and heard the sounds of an airplane crashing. According to the nearest weather reporting station, near the time of the accident, the temperature- dew point spread was within 2 degrees, visibilities were reduced to between 3 and 4 miles in fog, and the ceiling was decreasing from 600 feet broken to 400 feet overcast. At the time of the accident, the pilot's duty day exceeded 12 hours. Examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact anomalies and that the gear was extended and the flaps were retracted. Examination of both engines revealed evidence of power at the time of impact.

About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut the engine down. The flight had just leveled at 23,000 feet. The controller told the pilot that he was near Jackson, Tennessee, and that he could descend to 7,000 feet. About 10 minutes later, the pilot reported he was at 8,000 feet and requested radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, at Jackson. The pilot told the controller he had the left engine shut down. About 5 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a propeller runaway. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported he was in visual conditions and requested radar vectors direct to the airport. About 2 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a cloud layer under him and that he had the localizer frequency for runway 2 set. About 1 minute later, the pilot was told to contact the McKellar Airport control tower. The pilot acknowledged this instruction. No further transmissions were received from the flight. Examination of the left engine at the accident site showed the left propeller control was found disconnected at the point the propeller control extension bracket attaches to the propeller governor. The propeller control cable had also pulled loose from a swaged point at the control rod and was also separated further aft due to overstress. The housing for the propeller control rod was found securely attached to the engine and the control rod was securely attached to the extension bracket. The propeller governor control arm, which was disconnected from the propeller control cable and rod, was found spring loaded into the high RPM position. Examination of the fractured left propeller bracket assembly was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The bracket assembly was fractured in the area of the outermost eyehole, at the point a bolt passes through the bracket assembly and the propeller governor arm. The fracture surface contained small amounts of dirt, grease, and minor corrosion. The fracture surface features include flat areas that lie on multiple planes separated by ratchet marks, features typically left behind by the propagation of a fatigue crack. The fatigue crack emanated from multiple origins on opposite sides of the bracket. The total area of the fatigue crack occupied approximately 85 percent of the fracture surfaces. The fatigue fractures initiated on the outer edges of the surface and propagated inward toward the center. The remaining 15% of the fracture surface had features consistent with overstress separation. Near the middle of each fatigue region were microfissures suggesting that the crack propagated under high-stress conditions. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined the separation point between the left propeller control flexible cable and the rigid rod that connects to the bracket assembly. The cable and the swaged part of the rigid rod were in good condition with no fractures or damage. The Piper PA-31-T2 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, does not contain a procedure for loss of propeller control. Section 3 did contain a procedure for "Over speeding Propeller", which stated that if a propellers speed should exceed 1,976 rpm, to place the power lever of the engine with the over speeding propeller to idle, feather the propeller, place the engine condition lever in the stop position, and complete the engine shutdown procedures. Pilot logbook records show the pilot completed a simulator training course for the accident model airplane about 9 days before the accident and had about 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2.

The twin engine aircraft departed Douala on a charter flight to N'Djamena, carrying one pilot, one steward and two members of the Chadian Government. While approaching N'Djamena Airport, weather conditions deteriorated and the visibility was limited due to a sand storm. Probably to establish a visual contact with the ground, the pilot reduced his altitude when the aircraft struck a tree and crashed about 3 km from the runway 05 threshold, near Kousséri, Cameroon. The steward was seriously injured while all three other occupants were killed, among them the pilot, a Spanish citizen and both passengers who were Amderamane Dadi, General Secretary of the Presidency, and Ali Ahmed Lanine, Chadian Minister for Economic Promotion and Development.

The twin engine aircraft departed Goiânia on a private flight to Ribeirão Preto, carrying four passengers and two pilots, the aircraft's owner and a friend. Three minutes after being cleared by Brasilía Control Center, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC about poor weather conditions and severe turbulences. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a sugarcane field located near Água Comprida. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.