Martin 404

Flight 181 originated at Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, for Miami, Florida. Several stops were scheduled including Indianapolis, Indiana, and Louisville, Kentucky, the latter a point of crew change. Departure, scheduled for 0955, was at 1001, with a crew of Captain Clarence G. Chambers, Pilot Harold D. Bingham, and Stewardess Shirley Michael. To Indianapolis the flight was routine, with Captain Chambers flying, and arrival was on schedule. Departure from Indianapolis was on schedule, at 1105, with 31 passengers and 450 gallons of fuel. The aircraft’s gross weight was 41,126 pounds, 3,774 less than the maximum takeoff allowable of 44,900, and its center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. Captain Chambers instructed Pilot Bingham to do the flying and, accordingly, Bingham, seated on the right, made the takeoff and flew this segment of the flight. The aircraft proceeded along V-53 airway at 5,000 feet altitude on a VFR flight plan in clear weather. At 1133 the flight advised Standiford (Louisville) tower that it was over New Albany, Indiana, eight miles to the north-northwest, and requested clearance to the airport. At 1134 the flight asked landing information of its company radio station and was given the Louisville pressure altitude as 340 feet and the Louisville altimeter setting as 30.10 inches. A minute later the flight advised the tower that it was over the city and received clearance to land on runway 11. Wind conditions were given as southeast five to eight knots, variable both sides. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited. The “Fasten Seat Belt” sign had been put on. Pilot Bingham descended from 5,000 feet to 2,000 feet and then reduced both rate of descent and power. An airspeed of 165 knots was established, the landing gear was lowered, and the flaps were placed in takeoff position. Bingham then started a turn for final approach, and the flaps were placed in approach position. Captain Chambers saw that the aircraft was too high and reduced power still further; Bingham lowered the flaps to full down. The pre-landing checklist had been accomplished. At this point (the altitude was then 1,000 to 1,500 feet higher than the runway) the captain took over control. He nosed down sharply, holding as closely as possible to an airspeed of 100 knots. The landing gear remained down, flaps remained fully down, and throttles were pulled fully back. Neither pilot read the rate-of-climb (descent) indicator during the approach. When approximately over the threshold of the runway and while about 100 feet above it, the captain pulled back on the yoke to flare out. No power was used. The aircraft’s attitude was observed to change from nose-down to nose-up but its rate of descent did not seem to lessen markedly. The aircraft struck the runway on its main landing gear, the left wing separated inboard of the left engine nacelle, and the remainder of the aircraft half rolled to an inverted position. It slid along in that attitude, turning and coming to rest headed nearly opposite its direction at touchdown. Two minutes later, by estimate, all occupants were out of their inverted seats, in which they were belted, and away from the wreckage which had developed a small fire. This was confined by a passenger using a hand extinguisher until emergency apparatus, which had been alerted by the tower, arrived quickly and took the necessary steps to prevent further fire.

Trans World Airlines Flight 163 is a regularly scheduled domestic operation between Kansas City, Missouri, and Los Angeles, California, with intermediate stops at Topeka and Wichita, Kansas; Amarillo, Texas; Santa Fe and Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Las Vegas, Nevada. A scheduled crew change is made at Albuquerque. There, on November 15, 1956. Captain Arthur G. deFabry, First Officer James P. Rapattoni, and Hostess Anne J. Zeman boarded Flight 163 as its crew to complete the remaining segments. The flight was routine to Las Vegas where it landed at 1440. During the short ground time at Las Vegas the aircraft was serviced and the crew performed routine duties for continuation of the flight to Los Angeles. There was no apparent need for maintenance on the aircraft and none was performed. An Instrument Flight Rules flight plan was prepared and filed because of instrument weather conditions over the latter portion of the flight segment to Los Angeles. Weather conditions at Las Vegas, however, were clear. At 1449 Captain deFabry, seated in the captain’s position, taxied N 40404 from the Las Vegas terminal to runup position beside runway 7 where the required pretakeoff checks were accomplished. The aircraft and equipment responded normally. The flight was issued an instrument clearance by Air Route Traffic Control. At this time, according to the company load manifest, the gross weight of the aircraft was 41.801 pounds, well under the maximum allowable for takeoff, 43,650 pounds. The load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limitations of the aircraft. With Captain deFabry operating the aircraft, Flight 163 took off at 1456. The takeoff was routine and was followed by a climbing left turn to gain altitude and establish a southwesterly course toward Los Angeles. At 1501, when over the northern perimeter of the city, First Officer Rapattoni radioed the Las Vegas tower stating the flight was returning to the airport, engine out. The Las Vegas tower controllers immediately notified all other traffic to remain clear and alerted emergency equipment. Flight 163 was cleared to land, any runway, and informed that the wind was calm. Captain deFabry elected to use runway 7 and First Officer Rapattoni notified the tower. Emergency equipment was then dispatched into position on the taxiway parallel to that runway. N40404 was soon observed on a wide base leg for runway 7 and as it turned onto the final approach. Position and altitude of the flight seemed normal. As the aircraft drew closer its extended gear could be seen and its left propeller was clearly visible, stopped and feathered. As the aircraft passed over the runway threshold its alignment position, and altitude seemed good; however, to nearly all observers excessive speed was apparent. The aircraft floated a considerable distance down the runway before touching it. It then bounced several times, after which an application of power was heard, obviously :m an attempt to go around. The Martin climbed, veered to the left, and its left wing gradually lowered. It seemed to “struggle” to continue flight and its airspeed decreased visibly. Seconds later the aircraft struck the ground, left wing low, just inside the airport boundary. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were clear, visibility 65 miles, and the wind was calm. A large cloud of dust, raised by the accident, hung over the scene and gradually lifted nearly vertically in evidence of the calm wind.

Flight 400 was regularly scheduled between Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Newark, New Jersey, with stops at Harrisburg. Reading. and Allentown, Pennsylvania. Captain Raymond F. McQuade, First Officer Harlan V. Jesperson, and Hostess Vary Jane Fanning, comprised the crew. Prior to departure the pilots were briefed on the en route weather and received the sequence and forecast reports. Although the en route weather was generally good the night was dispatched to Newark on an IFR flight plan via airways as is customary. Upon departure the gross weight of the aircraft was 41,822 pounds (the certificated allowable takeoff gross is 44,900 pounds and TWA's own limit is 43.,650 pounds) and the center of gravity of the loaded aircraft was located within the prescribed limits. Scheduled departure time was 1915; the flight asked for and received taxi clearance at 1916, was then given the wind as calm, and was cleared to runway 23. Takeoff clearance was requested and granted at 1919. About one minute later tower personnel observed a seemingly normal takeoff and initial climb immediately followed by a left turning descent, crash, and erupting fire just beyond the southwest boundary of the airport. Passengers extricated themselves from the jumbled wreckage through and ahead of the fire as best they could; some helped others while a few found themselves thrown out through tears and rents in the shattered fuselage. Although airport based fire fighting equipment was dispatched with no loss of tune some 20 minutes elapsed before it reached the site because of the necessity of traversing circuitous country lanes. Once there, the conflagration, which by that time had nearly consumed the wreckage, was quickly smothered. The stewardess and 21 passengers were killed while 14 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 156 of February 17 was a scheduled operation between Evansville, Indiana, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops at Owensboro and Louisville, Kentucky. It utilized the aircraft and flight crew of Trip 157 from Chicago, which terminated at Evansville. The crew consisted of Captain Charles R. Hard, Pilot Raymond F. Rozman, and Flight Attendant Robert T. Schroeter. The Chicago to Evansville flight arrived at 1422, 43 minutes late because of traffic and ground delays. It was reported routine in all other respects. During the short ground time at Evansville Captain Bard reviewed the weather forecasts for the flight Evansville to Chicago, and received the latest weather observation reports for Owensboro, the first stop. These indicated the flight to Owensboro would be in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules and that an instrument approach to the airport there would be necessary. Accordingly, an IFR flight plan was filed and an instrument clearance was given the crew before departure. Clearance was direct to Owensboro at 2,000 feet. Flight 156 departed at 1441. Gross takeoff weight was 41,471 pounds, which was less than the maximum allowable, 43,306 pounds. The load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limits of the aircraft. The crew reported its position en mute to ATC (Air Traffic Control) according to its clearance and thereafter at 1447 called the company radio located on the Owensboro Airport. Routine information exchanged between flight and ground personnel included giving the flight the latest weather and altimeter information. There being no control tower at Owensboro, the company there advised the flight that surface wind favored landing on runway 05. A few minutes later N445A was observed to descend below the clouds just north of the airport, flying on a southerly heading toward the field. It was observed to level out and turn right onto a downwind leg for runway 05. In the limited visibility, reported as one mile in rain and fog, the aircraft disappeared from view near the southwest boundary of the airport while still, on its downwind leg. Shortly thereafter it came back into view, proceeding toward the landing runway. It suddenly struck the ground, right wing down, rolled to an inverted position, and slid to a stop beside runway 05. The aircraft lost its both wings and was partially destroyed. All 23 occupants were evacuated.

Flight 260 received an IFR clearance from the tower at 0703 hours: "ATC clears TWA260 for approach at the Santa Fe Airport via Victor 19 climb northbound on the back course of the ILS localiser". The flight departed Albuquerque at 0705 hours. The tower requested the flight to report over-the Weiler Intersection (formerly the Alameda Intersection), however, after taking off there were no further radio contacts with the flight. The aircraft was last seen at an estimated altitude of 3000 feet (8300 feet mean sea level) in a high speed shallow climb continuing its heading towards Sandia Ridge, the upper portion of which was obscured by clouds. The wreckage was sighted the following morning at 9243 feet mean sea level, just below the crest of Sandia Mountain, approximately 13 miles north-east of the Albuquerque Airport and almost directly on a straight line course of 30 degrees magnetic from that airport (elevation 5340 feet mean sea level) to the Santa Fe Airport (elevation 6 344 feet mean sea level). An investigation was initiated by the Civil Aeronautics Board immediately after the accident. This included examination of the wreckage at the crash site which was discontinued because of deep snow and dangerous footing in the mountainous terrain. On May 3, 1955, a second trip was made to the scene of the accident and study of the wreckage was continued. On October 12, 1955, the Board’s Accident Investigation Report was released. The probable cause was determined to have been lack of conformity with prescribed en route procedures and a deviation from airways at an altitude too low to clear obstructions ahead. Because of controversy over certain elements of the report of October 12, 1955, additional study was given to the facts and circumstances of the accident and an amended report thereon was issued by the Board on August 26, 1957. The probable cause of the accident in this report was identical to that of the first report although the analysis portion was altered to revise the statement that the direct course was intentional. On October 10, 1958, the Air Line Pilots Association presented to the Bureau of Safety certain factual information and theories concerning the cause of the accident. On November 24, 1958, a third trip to the accident site was made. While there a new determination was made of the airplane’s heading at the time of impact. Because of these developments since the August 26, 1957, accident report was issued, active investigation and study was resumed. Additional testimony and documentary material were received from representatives of the ALPA, TWA, CAB, Eclipse-Pioneer Division of the Bendix Aviation Corporation, and the Collins Radio Company at Kansas City, Missouri, on January 15 and 16, 1959. In addition, a later study and presentation of facts concerning the instrumentation of the airplane and an analysis of tests made of the fluxgate compass system by Eclipse-Pioneer and ALPA were considered.