Crash of a Hawker-Siddeley HS.121 Trident 1E in Öndörkhaan: 9 killed

Date & Time: Sep 13, 1971
Operator:
Registration:
256
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
2131
YOM:
1966
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
While parked at Qinhuangdao Shanhaiguan Airport, east of Pekin, the three engine aircraft was 'stolen' by nine officers of the Chinese Air Force who apparently wanted to desert. While cruising over Mongolia, the airplane crashed in unclear circumstances near the city of Öndörkhaan. All nine occupants, among them Lin Biao, were killed. It is unclear if the accident was the consequence of a loss of control due to fuel exhaustion or if the aircraft was shot down by the pilot of a fighter aircraft.

Crash of a Hawker-Siddeley HS.121 Trident in London

Date & Time: Jul 3, 1968
Operator:
Registration:
G-ARPT
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
2121
YOM:
1965
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While parked on apron at Heathrow Airport, the three engine airplane was struck by a BKS Air Transport Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador 2 that crashed on landing. The aircraft was empty so there were no injuries but it irreparable.

Crash of a Hawker-Siddeley HS.121 Trident 1C in Kuwait City

Date & Time: Jun 30, 1966 at 2346 LT
Operator:
Registration:
9K-ACG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Beirut - Kuwait City
MSN:
2118
YOM:
1965
Flight number:
KU032
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
72
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total hours on type:
95.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
107
Aircraft flight hours:
361
Circumstances:
Flight KU32 was a scheduled international flight from Beirut, Lebanon to Kuwait. It departed Beirut at 1855 hours GMT and apart from a tendency for the autopilot pitch lock to disconnect the flight to the descent point was uneventful. The aircraft was cleared to commence descent at 2028 hours GMT from flight level 300 to flight level 95 by the DY NDB - the pilot-in-command decided to carry out a visual approach and advised the co-pilot accordingly. The aircraft reached flight level 95 some three minutes before reaching the DY NDB and it maintained this level until passing the beacon at about 2039 hours GMT at which time it was cleared to descend to 3 000 ft it being agreed the aircraft would report on left base for runway 33R. By visual navigation and ADF indications from the MG NDB the aircraft was positioned on a left hand base leg for runway 33R passing abeam the MG NDB 1 - 2 miles to the south. The rate of descent was 1500 ft/min with the outboard engines at idle and 10 400 rpm on the centre engine. At about this time and when at flight level 50 the flight reported the field in sight - the pilot-in-command and flight engineer having sighted the airport rotating beacon and the co-pilot the rotating beacon and some airport lights - and the aircraft was cleared for final. A left turn on to final was cow menced at about 4 000 ft and the flight reported its position as 6 miles from the airport when at 2 300 ft. Rate of descent was 1 500 ft/min and airspeed was 178 kt. During all these manoeuvres the aircraft was being flown on the autopilot and the co-pilot had been requested to set 1 500 ft in the "acquire height" box of the autopilot. The ADF was tuned to the KWS locator which is 2 224 m from the runway threshold, and the co-pilot was occupied with the landing checks. At this stage of the flight the aircraft was at 1 830 ft almost abeam of the MG NDB inbound and 80 seconds from impact with the ground. Desired approach speed was 154 kt with a descent rate of 700 ft/min and a threshold speed of 134 kt. The aircraft struck the ground and crashed approximately 4 km short of the runway threshold, slightly to the left of the centreline at an elevation of approximately 185 ft. (Latitude 29013'25"N, Longitude 47058'05"E). The accident occurred at approximately 2046 hours GMT at night.
Probable cause:
High rate of descent and non-observance of Company's regulations. Corrective action carried out in calling for 10 500 rpm was not sufficient to re-establish level flight. A further demand for additional power was too late to be of any use. The pilot-in-command did not follow the procedures laid down in the operations manual for approach and landing of the aircraft type. The cockpit check for the approach and landing was still being carried out when the aircraft hit the ground and the pilot-in-command's altimeter was set on the QNH instead of the QFE.
Final Report:

Crash of a Hawker Siddeley HS.121 Trident in Felthorpe: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 3, 1966 at 1835 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-ARPY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Hatfield - Hatfield
MSN:
2126
YOM:
1965
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6800
Aircraft flight hours:
1
Aircraft flight cycles:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft took-off from Hatfield at 1652 hours to carry out the first of a series of production test flights for the purpose of qualifying for a Series Certificate of Airworthiness. The schedule for the flight called for stalling tests should the aircraft and the flight conditions be suitable. After take-off the aircraft climbed towards the north-east and at about 1830 hours, after completing the greater part of the flight test schedule, the stalling tests were begun. Three approaches to the stall were made in order to check the aircraft's stall warning and stall recovery systems and the flight engineer's log shows that with the aircraft in the landing configuration the stick shaker operated at 102 kt and the stall recovery system at 93 kt. The fourth stalling run was made at a height of 11 600 ft with the aircraft still in the landing configuration but, in accordance with the requirements of the test schedule, the stall warning and stall recovery systems had been made inoperative. Radio telephony communication with the aircraft consisted only of routine 11 messages until at 1834 hours when the pilot-in-command reported We are in a superstall at the moment". This was the last radiocommunication received. At about this time the aircraft was seen over Felthorpe flying very slowly heading south-west at about 10 000 ft. The nose was seen to go up 30 to 40 degrees and the aircraft began to turn to port; the starboard wing then dropped sharply and, following a short burst of engine power, the aircraft went into a flat spin to starboard. The spin continued, the aircraft turning once every 6 to 8 seconds until it reached the ground about a minute and a half later. All four crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
During a stalling test decisive recovery action was delayed too long to prevent the aircraft from entering a superstall from which recovery was not possible. The flight was being conducted in accordance with an agreed test schedule. No evidence of pre-crash failure of the aircraft has come to light. During the final stalling run speed was reduced at a rate greater than 1 kt per second and recovery action was not initiated until the speed had fallen beyond the limit set by the test schedule.
Final Report: