Cessna 402

At approximately 0423UTC on April 21, 2006 the pilot reported that approximately 20 miles out of Freeport, both hydraulic pressure lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. He extended the gear and noticed only the right gear safe light illuminated. The pilot obtained the assistance of a passenger, who retrieved the aircraft pilot operating handbook and read the appropriate procedures as the pilot followed the instructions for emergency gear extension. The pilot stated that he landed the aircraft on the right main gear, hoping this action would release the left main and nose gear. After realizing that this manoeuvre was not successful, he decided to initiate a go-around. Before he could get the aircraft airborne the left propeller made contact with the ground. The aircraft touched down approximately 9,000 feet from the threshold of runway 06; which has a total length of 11,000 feet. The aircraft travelled approximately 1,500 feet on its right main wheel before it veered off the left shoulder of the runway, struck several trees and finally came to rest pointing in a northwesterly direction. The approximate final position was measured to be 180 feet from the side of the runway. The aircraft left wing burst into flames. The left wing and left side of the fuselage was substantially damaged by fire. The four occupants escaped with only minor injuries.

On March 31, 2004, about 1235 eastern standard time, a Cessna 402B, N269JH, registered to and operated by Tropic Air Charters, Inc., experienced collapse of all landing gears at the Walker's Cay Airport, Walker's Cay, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 on-demand, non-scheduled, international, cargo flight from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to the Walker's Cay Airport, Walker's Cay, Bahamas. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The flight originated about 45 minutes earlier from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport. The pilot stated that after landing, the right wing tipped down in what appeared to be a flat tire. He attempted to maintain control of the airplane using the rudder and was successful until the airplane rolled approximately 1,000 feet. The airplane then veered to the right and collided with a tree. The left wing and fuselage were damaged.

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system approach during night instrument meteorological conditions. The airplane was observed to descend toward the runway threshold to an altitude consistent with the approach decision height. A witness reported that he heard the airplane overhead, and assumed that the pilot had performed a missed approach. He described the engine noise as "cruise power" and did not hear any unusual sounds. Shortly thereafter, he received a call from airport operations stating that an airplane had crashed. The airplane impacted the ground about 1/4 mile to the left of the runway centerline, about 3,500 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. A weather observation taken around the time of the accident, included a visibility 1/2 statue mile in fog, and an indefinite ceiling at 100 feet. The witness described the weather at the time of the accident as thick fog, and "pitch black."

While cruising under VFR mode at an altitude of 8,400 feet in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near Tecalitlán. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all eight occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor over State of Jalisco due to a tropical storm with heavy rain falls and strong winds.

Shortly after takeoff, the twin engine lost height and crashed in a cornfield. All seven occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On July 13, 2003, about 1530 eastern daylight time, Air Sunshine, Inc. (doing business as Tropical Aviation Services, Inc.), flight 527, a Cessna 402C, N314AB, was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean about 7.35 nautical miles west-northwest of Treasure Cay Airport (MYAT), Treasure Cay, Great Abaco Island, Bahamas, following the in-flight failure of the right engine. Four of the nine passengers sustained no injuries, three passengers and the pilot sustained minor injuries, and one adult and one child passenger died after they evacuated the airplane. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a scheduled international passenger commuter flight from Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to MYAT. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on a visual flight rules flight plan.

On June 17, 2003, about 1330 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 402B, N3748C, registered to Hamilton Development Company Ltd., operated by Execstar Aviation, Inc., collided with a seawall during the landing roll at a private airstrip located on Little Whale Cay, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 non-scheduled, international, passenger/cargo flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and two passengers were not injured. The flight originated about 10 minutes earlier from Chub Cay, Bahamas. The pilot stated that after takeoff the flight proceeded to the destination airport where he overflew the runway and set up for landing to the southeast on the 2,000 foot-long runway. While on final approach with the flaps fully extended, he maintained 95 knots which was just below blue line, then slowed to 88 knots when the runway was assured. He landed within the first 1/3 on the wet runway and reported inadequate braking and the airplane was possibly hydroplaning. Recognizing that he was unable to clear an approximately 4-foot-tall seawall near the end of the runway, he applied aft elevator control input. He further stated he believes the main landing gear contacted the seawall causing them to structurally separate. The airplane descended and impacted the water where he and the passengers exited the airplane using the emergency window and walked to the beach.

The aircraft was chartered by the Afghan Government to carry a delegation from Karachi to Kabul. After takeoff from Karachi-Quaid-e-Azam Airport, the twin engine aircraft continued to climb to an altitude of 9,000 feet when it entered an uncontrolled descent. At an altitude of 2,500 feet, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens then crashed in the Arabian Sea few km offshore. The stabilizers and the tail were found few hundred metres from the main wreckage. All eight occupants were killed, among them Juma Mohammad Mohammadi, Afghan Minister of Industry and four members of his cabinet as well as one Chinese businessman.

The fuel tanks were filled the day before the accident date, and on the day of the accident, the airplane was flown from that airport to the Miami International Airport, where the pilot picked up 2 passengers and flew uneventfully to Cuba. He performed a preflight inspection of the airplane in Cuba and noted both auxiliary fuel tanks were more than half full and both main tanks were half full. The flight departed, climbed to 8,000 feet; and was normal while in Cuban airspace. When the flight arrived at TADPO intersection, he smelled strong/fumes of fuel in the cabin. The engine instruments were OK at that time. The flight continued and when it was 10-12 miles from Marathon, he smelled something burning in the cabin like plastic material/paper; engine indications at that time were normal. He declared "PAN" three times with the controller, and shortly thereafter the right engine began missing and surging. He then observed fire on top of the right engine cowling near the louvers. He secured the right engine however the odor of fuel and fumes got worse to the point of irritating his eyes. He declared an emergency with the controller, began descending at blue line airspeed, and the fumes/odor got worse. Approximately 5 minutes after the right engine began missing and surging, the left engine began acting the same way. He secured the left engine but the propeller did not completely feather. At 400 feet he lowered full flaps and (contrary to the Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual) the landing gear in preparation for ditching. He intentionally stalled the airplane when it was 5-7 feet above the water, evacuated the airplane with a life vest, donned then inflated it. The airplane sank within seconds and he was rescued approximately 20 minutes later. The pilot first reported 4 months and 19 days after the accident that his passport which was in the airplane at the time of the accident had burned pages. He was repeatedly asked for a signed, dated statement that explained where it was specifically located in the airplane, and that it was not burned before the accident flight; he did not provide a statement. Examination of the airplane by FAA and NTSB revealed no evidence of an in-flight fire to any portion of the airplane, including the right engine or engine compartment area, or upper right engine cowling. Examination of the left engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left magneto operated satisfactorily on a test bench, while the right magneto had a broken distributor block; and the electrode tang which fits in a hole of the distributor gear; no determination was made as to when the distributor block fractured or the electrode tang became bent. The left propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the right engine revealed no evidence or preimpact failure or malfunction. The right hand stack assembly was fractured due to overload; no fatigue or through wall thickness erosion was noted. Both magnetos operated satisfactorily on a test bench. The right propeller was in the feathered position. An aluminum fuel line that was located in the cockpit that had been replaced the day before the accident was examined with no evidence or failure or malfunction; no fuel leakage was noted.

The airplane collided with obstructions following a loss of power in one engine during a missed approach. Following the collision sequence the airplane came to rest upright about 500 feet from the approach end of the runway and was destroyed in a post-impact ground fire. The pilot told a responding sheriff's deputy and a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that he made the ILS approach to land and initiated a missed approach. When he added power, the left engine sputtered and the airplane veered to the left. He activated the fuel boost pump, but the airplane contacted obstructions and crashed. The responding sheriff's deputy also observed the accident. He heard an engine of an airplane making unusual sounds. The engine "seemed to get quiet and then revved higher as if to climb." He looked in the direction of the sound and saw a series of blue flashes and then an orange fireball. The deputy reported that there was a dense fog in the area at the time. At the time of the accident, the airport's weather conditions were reported as 100 feet overcast and 1/4-mile visibility in fog. The landing minimums for the ILS approach are 200 feet and 1/2-mile. According to the operator's records, when the airplane departed from Ukiah, its gross takeoff weight was about 5,909 pounds. The pilot operating handbook (POH) for the airplane lists the following items in the single engine go around checklist: 1) Throttle full forward; 2) wing flaps up; 3) when positive climb rate achieved, gear up; 4) ensure the inoperative engine is feathered. For a gross weight of 5,900 pounds, and the existing atmospheric conditions, the single engine climb performance chart shows an expected positive rate of climb of 500 feet per minute if the airplane was configured correctly. The chart also lists the following subtractions from that performance for the listed condition: 1) -400 fpm for wind milling inoperative engine; 2) -350 feet for landing gear down; 3) -200 fpm for flaps extended to 15 degrees. Examination of the wreckage disclosed that neither engine's propeller was feathered, the landing gear was down and the flaps were extended to 10 degrees. Without the airplane configured correctly for the single engine missed approach, the net climb performance would be a negative 400 feet per minute. There were no discrepancies noted with the airframe examination. The engine examination revealed no mechanical anomalies with either engine that would have precluded normal operation. 14 CFR 135.224 states that a pilot cannot initiate an approach if the weather conditions are below landing minimums if the approach is started outside of the final approach fix. The pilot can continue the landing if they are already established on the approach and the airport goes below landing minimums. According to the operator's FAA approved operating specifications, the operator had not been approved for lower than standard landing minimums.