Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100

Weather in Kinshasa was bad at the time of the accident, ATC failed to inform the crew about the degradation of the weather conditions and the runway in use was not closed to traffic while the visibility was below the minima. Despite this situation, the crew took the decision to continue the approach procedure while the aircraft was unstable and the approach speed was too high (180 knots). It is reported that the following factors contributed to the accident:
- the crew ignored the published approach procedures,
- improper crew resources management during the execution of the flight,
- during the go around process, the crew encountered adverse weather conditions with vertical wind gusts, downdrafts and a 'magenta' effect. This caused the aircraft to adopt nose down attitude while it was in the final stage of the flight, preventing the pilot to take over the control,
- the pilot training program was inadequate and did not include a proportionate number of flight in the simulator,
- the authority for civil aviation of Georgia has probably approved a small training program for upgrading the captain to his position,
- lack of oversight of the operator by the Georgian Civil Aviation Authority.
In conclusion, investigators believe that the most probable cause of the accident is the fact that the plane encountered a very dangerous meteorological phenomena similar to a microburst, to a very low level during the overshoot process. The dangerous vertical downdraft and gust caused a sudden and remarkable change in the attitude of the aircraft and a substantial loss of altitude. Flying at very low altitude, recovery of such disturbance was not possible.

The flight crew’s failure to identify corrective action and their lack of knowledge of applicable airplane and engine systems in response to a jammed thrust lever, which resulted in the number 1 engine operating at high power and the airplane configured in an unsafe condition that led to the need to apply heavy braking during landing. Also causal was the flightcrew failure to recognize the safety hazard that existed from overheated brakes and the potential consequence on the braking action needed to park the airplane. Contributing factors included the possible failure by maintenance crew to correctly stow the upper core cowl support strut after maintenance, Flight crew’s failure to follow standard operating procedures, the company’s failure to be availed to manufacturer safety literature on the subject, and the susceptibility of the cowl core support shaft to interfere with the throttle control mechanism when the core strut is not in its stowed position.

The accident involving aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of lift of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after liftoff from the runway, the left wing tip contacting the ground, the subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of lift of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollutes" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel icing, while the aircraft was parked at the airport and during taxiing for the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight. The situation could be aggravated when exceeding the values recommended by the operations manual of the angular velocity when lifting the nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated" wings when it is impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally. Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future. An Airworthiness Directive on the need to include anti-icing systems on the wing in the final stage of taxiing at the actual weather conditions was issued by Transport Canada after the accident. This probably could have prevented the accident.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. On final approach, the captain diverted his attention from monitoring the flight, leaving most of the decision making and control of the aircraft to the first officer, who was significantly less experienced on the aircraft type. As a result, the first officer was not fully supervised during the late stages of the approach.
2. The first officer did not adhere to the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) in the handling of the autopilot and thrust levers on short final, which left the aircraft highly susceptible to a bounce, and without the bounce protection normally provided by the ground lift dump (GLD) system.
3. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. Given the low-energy state of the aircraft at the time of the bounce, the first officer attempted to salvage the landing.
4. When the thrust levers were reduced to idle after the bounce, the GLD system activated. The resultant sink rate after the GLD system deployed was beyond the certification standard for the landing gear and resulted in the landing gear trunnion fitting failures.
5. There was insufficient quality control at the landing gear overhaul facility, which allowed non-airworthy equipment to enter into service. The condition of the shock struts would have contributed to the bounce.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Several passengers took carry-on items with them as they exited the aircraft, despite being instructed not to do so.
2. The location of the stored megaphone did not allow the flight attendant to have ready access after the passengers started moving to the exit door.