Beechcraft 200 Super King Air

On 21 February 2017, the pilot of a Beechcraft B200 King Air aircraft, registered VH-ZCR (ZCR), and operated by Corporate & Leisure Aviation, was conducting a charter passenger flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria to King Island, Tasmania. There were four passengers on board. ZCR had been removed from a hangar and parked on the apron the previous afternoon in preparation for the flight. The pilot was first seen on the apron at about 0706 Eastern Daylight-saving Time. Closed-circuit television recorded the pilot walking around the aircraft and entering the cabin, consistent with conducting a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft. At about 0712, the pilot entered ZCR’s maintenance provider’s hangar. A member of staff working in the hangar reported that the pilot had a conversation with him that was unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot exited the hangar about 0715 and had a conversation with another member of staff who reported that their conversation was also unrelated to the accident flight. The pilot then returned to ZCR, and over the next 4 minutes he was observed walking around the aircraft. The pilot went into the cabin and re-appeared with an undistinguishable item. The pilot then walked around the aircraft one more time before re-entering the cabin and closing the air stair cabin door. At about 0729, the right engine was started and, shortly after, the left engine was started. Airservices Australia (Airservices) audio recordings indicated that, at 0736, the pilot requested a clearance from Essendon air traffic control (ATC) to reposition ZCR to the southern end of the passenger terminal. ATC provided the clearance and the pilot commenced taxiing to the terminal. At the terminal, ZCR was refueled and the pilot was observed on CCTV to walk around the aircraft, stopping at the left and right engines before entering the cabin. The pilot was then observed to leave the aircraft and wait for the passengers at the terminal. The passengers arrived at the terminal at 0841 and were escorted by the pilot directly to the aircraft. At 0849, the left engine was started and, shortly after, the right engine was started. At 0853, the pilot requested a taxi clearance for King Island, with five persons onboard, under the instrument flight rules. ATC instructed the pilot to taxi to holding point 'TANGO' for runway 17, and provided an airways clearance for the aircraft to King Island with a visual departure. The pilot read back the clearance. Airservices Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) data (refer to section titled Air traffic services information - Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast data) indicated that, at 0854, ZCR was taxied from the terminal directly to the holding point. The aircraft did not enter the designated engine run-up bay positioned near holding point TANGO. At 0855, while holding at TANGO, the pilot requested a transponder code. The controller replied that he did not have one to issue yet. Two minutes later the pilot contacted ATC and stated that he was ready and waiting for a transponder code. The controller responded with the transponder code and a clearance to lineup on runway 17. At 0858, ATC cleared ZCR for take-off on runway 17 with departure instructions to turn right onto a heading of 200°. The pilot read back the instruction and commenced the takeoff roll. The aircraft’s take-off roll along runway 17 was longer than expected. Witnesses familiar with the aircraft type observed a noticeable yaw to the left after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft entered a relatively shallow climb and the landing gear remained down. The shallow climb was followed by a substantial left sideslip, while maintaining a roll attitude of less than 10° to the left. Airservices ADS-B data indicated the aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 160 ft above ground level while tracking in an arc to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft’s track began diverging to the left of the runway centreline before rotation and the divergence increased as the flight progressed. Following the sustained left sideslip, the aircraft began to descend and at 0858:48 the pilot transmitted on the Essendon Tower frequency repeating the word ‘MAYDAY’ seven times in rapid succession. Approximately 10 seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and 2 seconds after the transmission was completed, the aircraft collided with the roof of a building in the Essendon Airport Bulla Road Precinct - Retail Outlet Centre (outlet centre), coming to rest in a loading area at the rear of the building. CCTV footage from a camera positioned at the rear of the building showed the final part of the accident sequence with post-impact fire evident; about 2 minutes later, first responders arrived onsite. At about 0905 and 0908 respectively, Victoria Police and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade arrived. The pilot and passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. There was significant structural, fire and water damage to the building. Additionally, two people on the ground received minor injuries and a number of parked vehicles were damaged.

Following an uneventful flight, the aircraft belly landed at Unalaska-Tom Madsen Airport runway 13/31. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest and was damaged beyond repair. All three occupants evacuated safely.

The airline transport pilot reported that, before landing following an uneventful flight, he extended the wing flaps to the approach position and extended the landing gear; the gear indicator lights showed "3 green." After touchdown, he heard noises, and the airplane started to sink. After the airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway, he noticed that the landing gear handle was up. The pilot stated to the copilot, "How did the gear handle get up?" then placed the handle to the down position and the flight crew exited the airplane. The copilot reported that he was acting as an observer during the flight and that he also saw three green landing gear down-and-locked indicator lights before landing. The airframe sustained substantial damage from contact with the runway. All three landing gear were found in a partially-extended position. Skid marks from all three tires were observed on the runway leading up to the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies were damaged due to contact with the runway. The pressure vessel was compromised from contact with a propeller blade. The nose landing gear actuator was forced up, into the nose gear well and penetrated the upper nose skin. Examination of the landing gear components did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or malfunction. The skid marks leading to the wreckage and the partially-extended gear were inconsistent with the pilot's account that the gear handle was up after the airplane came to rest and was then lowered. The gear handle consisted of an electrical switch that required it to be pulled out of a detent before placing it up or down. There was no mechanical linkage between the gear handle and the landing gear, as the gear were driven by an electric motor. It is likely that the pilot realized that the gear were not extended just before touchdown and then tried to lower the gear, resulting in a touchdown with the gear only partially extended. The pilot reported that he had experienced several interruptions to his sleep the night before the accident. He also reported that he flew 7 legs on the day of the accident for a total of 5.2 hours, only eating a banana for breakfast during this time period. It is likely that the pilot's fatigue contributed to his failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before landing.

The crew was completing a training flight from Kuala Lumpur-Subang Airport when on final approach to Butterworth Airbase, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, coming to rest against the perimeter fence. The aircraft was partially destroyed by impact forces and one crew member was killed while three other occupants were injured. Weather conditions were considered as good at the time of the accident.

On 13 December 2016, a Beech Aircraft Corporation B200, registered VH-MVL, conducted a medical services flight from Innamincka, South Australia (SA) to Moomba, SA. On board the aircraft were the pilot and two passengers. On arrival at Moomba at about 1250 Central Daylight-saving Time (CDT), the pilot configured the aircraft to join the circuit with flaps set to the approach setting and the propeller speed set at 1900 RPM. They positioned the aircraft at 150–160 kt airspeed to join the downwind leg of the circuit for runway 30, which is a right circuit. The pilot lowered the landing gear on the downwind circuit leg. They reduced power (set 600-700 foot-pounds torque on both engines) to start the final descent on late downwind abeam the runway 30 threshold, in accordance with their standard operating procedures. At about the turn point for the base leg of the circuit, the pilot observed the left engine fire warning activate. The pilot held the aircraft in the right base turn, but paused before conducting the engine fire checklist immediate actions in consideration of the fact that they were only a few minutes from landing and there were no secondary indications of an engine fire. After a momentary pause, the pilot decided to conduct the immediate actions. They retarded the left engine condition lever to the fuel shut-off position, paused again to consider if there was any other evidence of fire, then closed the firewall shutoff valve, activated the fire extinguisher and doubled the right engine power (about 1,400 foot-pounds torque). The pilot continued to fly the aircraft in a continuous turn for the base leg towards the final approach path, but noticed it was getting increasingly difficult to maintain the right turn. They checked the engine instruments and confirmed the left engine was shut down. They adjusted the aileron and rudder trim to assist controlling the aircraft in the right turn. The aircraft became more difficult to control as the right turn and descent continued and the pilot focused on maintaining bank angle, airspeed (fluctuating 100–115 kt) and rate of descent. Due to the pilot’s position in the left seat, they were initially unable to sight the runway when they started the right turn. The aircraft had flown through the extended runway centreline when the pilot sighted the runway to the right of the aircraft. The aircraft was low on the approach and the pilot realised that a sand dune between the aircraft and the runway was a potential obstacle. They increased the right engine power to climb power (2,230 foot-pounds torque) raised the landing gear and retracted the flap to reduce the rate of descent. The aircraft cleared the sand dune and the pilot lowered the landing gear and continued the approach to the runway from a position to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft landed in the sand to the left of the runway threshold and after a short ground roll spun to the left and came to rest. There were no injuries and the aircraft was substantially damaged.

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand passenger flight at night in instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near straight-in approach minimums for the runway. The pilot flew the approach as a non precision LNAV approach, and he reported that the approach was stabilized and that he did not notice anything unusual. A few seconds after leveling the airplane at the missed approach altitude, he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He then disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights. However, before he could turn on the landing lights, the runway became obscured by clouds. The pilot immediately decided to conduct a missed approach and applied engine power, but the airplane subsequently impacted terrain short of the runway in a nose-up level attitude. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely the pilot lost sight of the runway due to the visibility being at/near the straight-in approach minimums and that the airplane got too low for a missed approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. A passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing available shoulder harnesses. The passenger said that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses or told how to adjust the seats. The pilot sustained injuries to his face in the accident.