Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

The aircraft crashed while maneuvering at low airspeed and altitude right after takeoff. The pilot said the left engine started losing power intermittently at 90 knots. The pilot had rotated the aircraft and tried to continue the takeoff. He was cleared to land on any runway and in attempting a turn with landing gear and partial flaps extended control was lost and a crash occurred. The aircraft flight manual states that if an engine fails below 105 mph the takeoff should be aborted. An on scene examination revealed no evidence to suggest a pre-impact failure or malfunction. Both propellers showed evidence of torsional overload damage. When the engines were further examined the left engine fuel strainer was partially clogged with dirt. During a run-up test the left engine would not develop more than 23 inches hg. At 2,750 rpm and magneto rpm drop was erratic. The engine would not run with the aux fuel boost pump off. The reason for the low power output was a disconnected pressure line for the turbocharger which appeared to have been disconnected for some time. All five occupants were injured, two of them seriously.

The aircraft crashed in a wooded area during a forced landing following a power loss on both of its engines. The aircraft had been flown to Bimini from Opa-Locka, FL. About 75 gallons of fuel was drained from the aircraft. Upon the return to Fort Lauderdale, FL, the landing gear had to be manually operated because of a known pre-existing electrical problem. This also precluded radio communications. Upon executing a touch and go landing at Fort Lauderdale the fuel pressure lights which had been flickering now came on steady on the right engine. The pilot cut the mixture on that engine at 500 feet agl. Almost immediately the left engine light came on and it quit also. The aircraft was crash landed. Post accident examination revealed that all fuel tanks were empty. The aircraft owner said the aircraft had 145 gallons on board prior to leaving Florida. The aircraft flew about one hour and 20 minutes at 50 gallons an hour plus offloading 75 gallons at Bimini.

The aircraft was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean following engine failure. The pilot estimated fuel on board during pre-flight from the electronic fuel gauges. The aircraft flew two hours and 16 minutes before the engines quit in a mode of fuel exhaustion with surging prior to stopping. Post accident investigation using fuel slips revealed a fuel burn within 10 to 15 gallons of fuel exhaustion. The fuel gauges failed on the last leg of the flight and the passengers stated the pilot paid a lot of attention to these gauges. The pilot wanted to divert to Freeport but did not because the weather was below minimums. After ditching the aircraft sank in 800 feet of water. All three occupants were rescued.

The flight departed Fort Lauderdale at 1626 and at 1654 in the vicinity of Bimini was advised to contact Nassau radio. The flight failed to contact Nassau and there were no further communications with the flight. Search efforts produced negative results. IMC prevailed on the proposed route of flight. Radar depictions showed the most severe weather to be between Miami and Bimini. Sigmet 7 issued at 1455 showed an area of embedded thunderstorms extending to a point 100 miles east of Miami with tops to 40,000 feet that was moving ne at 15 knots. The wreckage and all three occupants were not recovered.

Air Florida Flight 90 was scheduled to leave Washington National Airport at 14:15 EST for a flight to Fort Lauderdale International Airport, FL (FLL), with an intermediate stop at the Tampa, FL (TPA). The aircraft had arrived at gate 12 as Flight 95 from Miami, FL, at 13:29. Because of snowfall, the airport was closed for snow removal from 13:38 to 14:53. At about 14:20 maintenance personnel began deicing the left side of the fuselage with deicing fluid Type II because the captain wanted to start the deicing just before the airport was scheduled to reopen (at 14:30) so that he could get in line for departure. Fluid had been applied to an area of about 10 feet when the captain terminated the operation because the airport was not going to reopen at 14:30. Between 14:45 and 14:50, the captain requested that the deicing operation be resumed. The left side of the aircraft was deiced first. No covers or plugs were installed over the engines or airframe openings during deicing operations. At 15:15, the aircraft was closed up and the jet way was retracted and the crew received push-back clearance at 15:23. A combination of ice, snow, and glycol on the ramp and a slight incline prevented the tug, which was not equipped with chains, from moving the aircraft. Then, contrary to flight manual guidance, the flight crew used reverse thrust in an attempt to move the aircraft from the ramp. This resulted in blowing snow which might have adhered to the aircraft. This didn't help either, so the tug was replaced and pushback was done at 15:35. The aircraft finally taxied to runway 36 at 15:38. Although contrary to flight manual guidance, the crew attempted to deice the aircraft by intentionally positioning the aircraft near the exhaust of the aircraft ahead in line (a New York Air DC-9). This may have contributed to the adherence of ice on the wing leading edges and to the blocking of the engine’s Pt2 probes. At 15:57:42, after the New York Air aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the captain and first officer proceeded to accomplish the pre-takeoff checklist, including verification of the takeoff engine pressure ratio (EPR) setting of 2.04 and indicated airspeed bug settings. Takeoff clearance was received at 15:58. Although the first officer expressed concern that something was 'not right' to the captain four times during the takeoff, the captain took no action to reject the takeoff. The aircraft accelerated at a lower-than-normal rate during takeoff, requiring 45 seconds and nearly 5,400 feet of runway, 15 seconds and nearly 2,000 feet more than normal, to reach lift-off speed. The aircraft initially achieved a climb, but failed to accelerate after lift-off. The aircraft’s stall warning stick shaker activated almost immediately after lift-off and continued until impact. The aircraft encountered stall buffet and descended to impact at a high angle of attack. At about 16.01, the aircraft struck the heavily congested northbound span of the 14th Street Bridge and plunged into the ice-covered Potomac River. It came to rest on the west end of the bridge 0.75 nmi from the departure end of runway 36. When the aircraft struck the bridge, it struck six occupied automobiles and a boom truck before tearing away a 41-foot section of the bridge wall and 97 feet of the bridge railings. Four persons in vehicles on the bridge were killed; four were injured, one seriously.

On approach to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport by night, while completing touch-and-go manoeuvres, the pilot decided to make a go-around. With gear down and in full flaps configuration, the twin engine airplane stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

On final approach, the twin engine airplane was too low when it struck trees and crashed in a wooded area short of runway threshold. Seven occupants were injured while a passenger was killed.

During the takeoff roll at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport, the twin engine airplane sank on its belly, slid for several yards and came to rest in flames on the runway. The airplane burst into flames and was quickly destroyed by fire. Both occupants were killed.

On final approach to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport, the airplane stalled and crashed near Dania. A pilot was seriously injured while seven other occupants were slightly injured.

The pilot started the approach to New York-LaGuardia Airport by night and poor weather conditions due to a low ceiling, rain falls and thunderstorm activity. He initiated a go-around and started a second approach few minutes later. On final, the twin engine airplane crashed in the East River few hundred yards offshore. The aircraft was lost and both occupants were killed.