Washington

The pilot reported that the start, taxi and run-up were normal. The engines were producing full power for the takeoff ground roll. The pilot stated that the airplane lifted off and attained an altitude of approximately five feet when it began to bank and roll to the left. The pilot applied corrective action, however, the airplane would not respond. The pilot elected to abort the take off and reduced engine power. The airplane touched down in the soft dirt/grass next to the runway. The main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. The pilot reported that there was no indication of a mechanical failure or malfunction with the engines. An FAA inspector verified flight control continuity with no abnormalities noted.

Witnesses reported that following takeoff from a river, the aircraft climbed to approximately 100 to 400 feet above the water, then initiated a left turn of approximately 45 degrees bank. The majority of the witnesses reported that after the aircraft had turned about 180 degrees, its nose abruptly dropped and it impacted the water. Witnesses did not report observing any evidence of problems with the aircraft before impact, and did not report hearing any abnormal engine sounds or sudden changes in engine pitch. Upon water impact, the aircraft went inverted and its cabin submerged. Efforts by witnesses to gain entry to the aircraft cabin to render assistance were unsuccessful due to aircraft damage. Rescue divers found all occupants deceased in the aircraft upon arrival, but were able to remove the two rear-seat victims without removing any passenger restraints. Autopsies disclosed that all four aircraft occupants had drowned. Investigators did not find any evidence of pre-impact aircraft or engine malfunctions during post-accident examinations of the wreckage, but did find that a cabin entry door was jammed shut due to impact damage, and that the range of travel of both pilot doors was restricted by damaged aircraft components.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) departed Lake Union seaplane base with four British Broadcasting Company passengers aboard the De Havilland DHC-2 'Beaver.' The passengers were engaged in aerial videography of an east/west geological fault line crossing from south Seattle through Blakely Harbor near the south end of Bainbridge Island. An onboard video recorder captured a voice instructing 'Keep as low as you can and slow as you can while we're doing this please... .' The PIC's first pass over the south end of Bainbridge Island was uneventful and the aircraft was maneuvered for a second pass. The PIC reported that approaching the upsloping, tree covered terrain he applied climb flaps and power but shortly thereafter realized the climb rate was less than he expected. He attempted a shallow left turn towards down sloping terrain and then leveled the wings as the aircraft descended into the treetops. The scenario was corroborated by two onboard video recordings. The pilot reported no powerplant or control system malfunction during the accident flight. He also reported encountering a downdraft condition over the tree covered terrain. Winds remained below 12 knots throughout the day at reporting stations near the accident site, and the video recordings showed no wind streaking and only sporadic whitecaps on the surface of Puget Sound during the transit from Seattle to the south end of Bainbridge Island.

The flight was operating into the Yakima airport at night during the period the airport operates as non-towered. Some witnesses reported the aircraft initially appeared lower than normal and that it descended and impacted the ground at a steep angle, and some witnesses reported an abrupt entry into the descent. The aircraft crashed 2.2 nautical miles east of the runway threshold, slightly right of the localizer course The pilot was 'cleared for approach' by air traffic control (ATC) and he subsequently initiated an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27. The last radar position showed the aircraft approximately on the localizer, at glide slope intercept altitude, 9 nautical miles east of the airport. Three minutes after the last radar position, the pilot reported to ATC he had broken out and had the airport in sight, and canceled instrument flight rules (IFR). ATC then terminated service and approved a frequency change.. Ceiling was 1,500 feet overcast with 6 miles visibility in mist, with no significant icing forecast. No evidence of mechanical problems was found; however, much of the aircraft was consumed by an intense post-crash fire.

The Beech 1900C cargo aircraft was loaded with more than 4,962 pounds of cargo during an approximate 20 minute period. No scale was available at the aircraft, forcing loaders to rely on tallying either waybill weights or estimates of total cargo weight and center of gravity (CG) during the brief loading period. Additionally, a strike had shut down a major cargo competitor at the time with substantial cargo overflow to the operator. Post-crash examination determined the cargo load was 656 pounds greater than that documented on the pilot's load manifest, and the CG was between 6.8 and 11.3 inches aft of the aft limit. The airplane behaved normally, according to the pilot, until he initiated full flaps for landing approaching the threshold of runway 34L at the Seattle-Tacoma International airport. At this time, the aircraft's airspeed began to decay rapidly and a high sink rate developed as the aircraft entered into a stall/mush condition. The aircraft then landed hard, overloading the nose and left-main landing gear which collapsed. A post-impact fuel system leak during the ground slide led to a post-crash fire.

The pilot-under-instruction (PUI) who possessed an expired medical, and the pilot-in-command (PIC), an ATP pilot with 1240 hours in the Cessna 340, departed on the third training flight for the PUI in the aircraft. The second training flight, flown the previous Saturday, had included single-engine work. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the Richland airport by witnesses, several of whom reported the left propeller turning slowly. All witnesses reported seeing the aircraft descending rapidly to the ground in a nose down attitude and several witnesses described the descent as a spin. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near vertical, nose low attitude and was destroyed by fire. Postcrash examination of the aircraft revealed the left propeller in the feathered position and power signatures on the blades of the right propeller. Disassembly of both engines revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. The gear and flaps were up and the rudder trim tab showed about 5 degrees of left tab trim. The information manual for the Cessna 340 indicates that the air minimum control speed (single engine), Vmca is 82 KIAS. The manual also indicates that a more suitable airspeed for one engine inoperative training events is 91 KIAS.

The pilot received abbreviated weather briefing for emergency medical service (EMS)/air ambulance flight. Before flight, he expressed anxiety about possible low visibility for landing and timely transport of dying patient. During ILS runway 03 approach (rwy 03 approach), the aircraft remained well above the glide slope until close to the middle marker; aircraft's speed decreased from 153 to 100 kts, while vertical speed increased from 711 feet/min to about 1,250 feet/min descent. About 1 mile from runway and 500 feet agl (in fog), the aircraft abruptly turned left of localizer course and gradually descended with no distress call from pilot. The aircraft hit a pole, then flew into a building and burned. Low ceiling, fog and dark night conditions prevailed. Pilot (recent ex military helicopter pilot) had logged/reported 3,500 hours of flight time and about 150 hours in multiengine airplanes, but there was evidence he lacked experience with actual instrument approaches in fixed wing aircraft; he had difficulty with instrument flying during recent training and FAA check flights. No preimpact mechanical problem was found with aircraft/engines. No ILS anomalies were found. Flight nurse was using cellular phone, but no evidence was found of interference with aircraft's navigational system. Visibility and ceiling at destination were less than forecast at time of pilot's preflight weather briefing. Paramedic was only survivor.

Before the ferry flight, the pilot (PIC) & inexperienced copilot noted the left & right, float-type, underwing, fuel gauges indicated about 3,900 & 4,050 lbs of fuel, respectively. After takeoff, they noted that the cockpit gauges showed an opposite fuel imbalance of 4,100 & 3,600 lbs in the left & right tanks. Due to this indication, the PIC crossfed fuel from the left tank to both engines for about 30 min to rectify the perceived fuel imbalance. Later as they approached the destination, the left tank was exhausted of fuel, & the left engine lost power, although the left gauge indicated about 500 lbs of fuel remaining in that tank. The PIC then crossfed fuel from the right tank to both engines, & left engine power was restored. ATC vectored the flight for an emergency ILS runway 3 approach. The PIC was distracted during the approach & maneuvered the airplane to re-intercept the localizer. About 500' agl in IMC, both engines lost power. During a forced landing at night, the airplane struck a raised berm & was damaged. No evidence of fuel was found in the left tank; 125 gal of fuel was found in the right tank. Unusable fuel was published as 3 gal. During an exam of the engines & fuel system components, no preimpact failure was found. Historical data from the manufacturer indicated that when the airplane had a low fuel state, unporting of fuel tank outlets could occur during certain maneuvers. This information was not in the Convair 340 flight manual, although unporting of the outlets on this flight was not verified.

The pilot's departure plans were changed, when, instead of flying direct to his originally planned destination, he was asked to pick up a passenger at another airport prior to returning home. He departed for his alternative destination in dark night conditions, leveled off at his cruise altitude and impacted the side of a mountain in level flight about 25 miles from his departure point. Air Traffic Control vectored another aircraft to the vicinity after communications and radar contact were lost. The crew of that aircraft stated that instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time in the vicinity of the crash site.

In preparation for the 1994 Fairchild Airshow, the Pilot Lt Col Arthur A. "Bud" Holland was again selected as the command pilot for the B-52 demonstration flight. On 15 June 1994, Holland briefed the new wing commander, Colonel William Brooks, on the proposed flight plan. Holland's demonstration profile violated numerous regulations, including steep bank angles, low-altitude passes, and steep pitch attitudes. Brooks ordered Holland not to exceed 45° bank angle or 25° pitch attitude during the demonstration. During the first practice session, on 17 June, Holland repeatedly violated these orders. Brooks witnessed this, but took no action. Pellerin flew with Holland on that flight and reported to Brooks that, "the profile looks good to him; looks very safe, well within parameters." The next practice flight on 24 June ended with the fatal crash. The demonstration profile designed by Holland included a 360° turn around Fairchild's control tower, a maneuver which he had not attempted in previous air show demonstrations. During the final flight, Holland performed a series of 60° bank turns and a 68° pitch climb in violation of Brooks' orders. There is no evidence to suggest that either McGeehan or Wolff attempted to intervene as Holland carried out these dangerous maneuvers. Pellerin was originally scheduled to fly in this mission, as he had done on the 17 June flight, but he was unavailable for the 24 June flight and Wolff was selected as the replacement aircrew member. Due to the short notice of his assignment to the mission, Wolff did not participate in the pre-flight briefing and boarded the aircraft after the engines were started. He was therefore unaware of the planned mission profile and had no opportunity to raise any objections before take-off. All of the four aircrew involved in the crash had only limited flying time in the months before the crash. It would appear that none of them had noticed that the aircraft had stalled until shortly before impact, as indicated by a failure to apply standard recovery techniques to the aircraft once it entered the stall. The investigation reported that even if the proper stall recovery techniques had been applied, it was unlikely that the accident could have been prevented as the aircraft was already flying too low to be recovered.
Crew:
Lt Col Arthur A. "Bud" Holland, pilot,
Lt Col Mark C. McGeehan, copilot,
Col Robert E. Wolff, observer,
Lt Col Kenneth "Ken" Huston, operations officer.