Alaska

The commercial certificated pilot was attempting to land on a remote runway during a Title 14, CFR Part 135, cargo flight. The approach end of the runway is located at the edge of a river. During the pilot's fourth attempt to land, the airplane collided with the river embankment, and sustained structural damage. The director of operations for the operator reported that he interviewed several witnesses to the accident. They told him that the weather conditions in the area had been good VFR, but as the pilot was attempting to land, rain and mist moved over the area, reducing the visibility to about 1/4 mile. Within 30 minutes of the accident, the weather conditions were once again VFR. The pilot told an FAA inspector that the weather conditions consisted of a 500 foot ceiling and 2 miles of visibility. The pilot reported that he made 3 passes over the runway before attempting to land. On the last landing approach, while maintaining 80 knots airspeed, the pilot said the nose of the airplane dropped, he applied full power and tried to raise the nose, but the airplane collided with the river bank.

The airline transport pilot was departing to the north from a narrow stream in a float-equipped airplane with lodge guests aboard, on a Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight. Northerly winds between 25 and 35 knots, were reported at the time of the accident. The accident pilot reported that after departure, he turned left, and a strong downdraft "threw the airplane to the ground." The passengers said that the airplane started its takeoff run directly into the strong winds, but shortly after becoming airborne, the pilot made a steep turn to the left, about 150 feet above the ground. The passengers indicated that as the airplane continued to turn left, it began to shudder and buffet, then abruptly descended nose low into the marsh-covered terrain. During the impact, the right wing folded, and the airplane's fuselage came to rest on its right side. One of the occupants, seated next to the right main cabin door, was partially ejected during the impact sequence, and was pinned under the fuselage and covered by water. Rescue efforts by the pilot and passengers were unsuccessful. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he reported that there were no pre accident mechanical anomalies with the airplane, and during the on-site examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The private pilot and the sole passenger were in the first of two airplanes of a flight of two, operating as a personal flight under Title 14, CFR part 91. The pilot of the second airplane reported that both airplanes were in radio contact, and the accident airplane was about one mile ahead as they entered a mountain pass along the intended flight route. As the flight progressed, both airplanes descended due to deteriorating weather conditions as they neared the narrowest part of the pass. The second pilot said that visibility deteriorated to a point that it was difficult to discern topographical features, and he told the accident pilot that he was uncomfortable with the lack of visibility and was turning around. The second pilot stated that the accident pilot responded by saying, in part: "Turn around if you can... I am not able to." The second pilot indicated that the last time he saw the accident airplane was as it entered a cloudbank. During the accident pilot's final radio transmission, prompted by the second pilot's inquiry about how he was doing, he responded that he was just trying to get through the pass. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. There was no ELT signal, and the search for the airplane was unsuccessful until three days later. The wreckage was located at the 3,100-foot level of the mountain pass, in an area of steep terrain. Impact forces and a post crash fire had destroyed the airplane. During the IIC's on-site examination of the wreckage, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The crew of the missing airplane was conducting a local area familiarization flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91. At the time of the flight, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, with occasional moderate turbulence forecast for the area. The airplane was routinely contracted for animal and bird counts, and the flight was to include low level flight simulating such a mission. The three occupants of the airplane were the pilot, company check pilot, and another company pilot riding along as a passenger. Both the pilot and the check pilot held airline transport certificates, and were experienced in the make and model of the accident airplane. The airplane was equipped with a satellite position reporting device that updated position, groundspeed, and altitude every 2 minutes. Radar and GPS track information indicated the accident airplane was flying low and slow along a peninsula coast over a saltwater inlet, and turned toward the center of the inlet. The track stopped about 3 miles offshore. The data indicated that while flying along the inlet, the airplane descended to 112 feet above ground level (water), and climbed as high as 495 feet, which was the airplane's altitude at the last data point. The airplane's groundspeed varied between 97 and 111 knots. The area of the presumed crash site experiences extreme tides and strong currents, with reduced visibility due to a high glacial silt content. An extensive search was conducted, but the airplane and its occupants have not been located. An examination of the airplane's maintenance logs did not disclose any unresolved maintenance issues.

The aircraft departed Kodiak on a cargo flight to Saint Paul Island, carrying nine crew members and a 19,000 litres fuel truck. Upon landing on runway 36, the airplane fish tailed twice, causing the right wing to struck the runway surface. The wingtip was sheared off as well as the engine n°4 propeller. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overrun, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The commercial certificated pilot was departing a remote bay with five passengers in an amphibious float-equipped airplane on the return portion of a Title 14, CFR Part 135 sightseeing flight. The pilot began the takeoff run toward the north, with the wind from the north between 15 to 20 knots, and 4 to 6 foot sea swells. When the airplane had climbed to about 10 to 15 feet, the pilot said a windshear was encountered, which pushed the airplane down. The airplane's floats struck a wave, missed about 4 to 5 swells, and then struck another wave, which produced a loud "bang." The company guide, seated in the right front seat, told the pilot that the right float assembly was broken and displaced upward. The airplane cleared a few additional swells, and then collided with the water. Both float assemblies were crushed upward, and the left float began flooding. The guide exited the airplane onto the right float, and made a distress call via a satellite telephone. All occupants donned a life preserver as the airplane began sinking. The pilot said that after about 15 minutes, the rising water level in the airplane necessitated an evacuation, and all occupants exited into the water, and held onto the right float as the airplane rolled left. The airplane remained floating from the right float, and was being moved away from shore by wind and wave action. The pilot said that one passenger was washed away from the float within about 5 minutes, and two more passengers followed shortly thereafter. Within about 5 minutes after entering the water, the pilot said he lost his grip on the float, and does not remember anything further until regaining consciousness in a hospital. He was told by medical staff that he had been severely hypothermic. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were already airborne on a training mission, and diverted to rescue the occupants. About 1320, a C-130 flew overhead, and began dropping inflatable rafts. The company guide was the only one able to climb into a raft. When the helicopters arrived, they completed the rescue using a hoist and a rescue swimmer. The passengers reported that they also were unable to hold onto the airplane after entering the water, became unconscious, and were severely hypothermic upon reaching a hospital. The airplane was not equipped with a life raft, and was not required to be so equipped.

The flight crew, an airline transport certificated captain, and a commercial certificated co-pilot, were flying a restricted category, icing research equipped airplane in instrument meteorological icing conditions under Title 14, CFR Part 91. The purpose of the flight was to locate icing conditions for a prototype helicopter's in-flight icing tests. While in cruise flight, the airplane encountered icing conditions, and had accumulated about 1" of ice on the leading edges of the wings. The captain reported that he activated the wing deicing pneumatic boots, and the ice was shed from both wings. About 4 minutes after activating the deice boots, both engines simultaneously lost all power. The crew attempted several engine restarts, but were unsuccessful, and made a forced landing on frozen, snow-covered terrain. During the landing, the airplane struck several small, burned trees, and sustained substantial damage. The airplane's ice control system is comprised of two separate systems, one an anti-ice, the other, a deice. The majority of the wings' surfaces are deiced by pneumatic, inflating boots. The inboard section of the wings, directly in front of the engine air inlets, and the engine air inlets themselves, utilize a heated, anti-ice surface to preclude any ice accretion and potential for ice ingestion into the engines. The anti-ice system is not automatic, and must be activated by the flight crew prior to entering icing conditions. A researcher in the aft cabin photographed the airplane's wings before and after the activation of the deice boots. The photographs taken prior to the deice boot activation depicted about 1" of ice on the wings, as well as on the anti-ice (heated) inboard portion of the wings. The photographs taken after the deice boot activation revealed that the ice had been removed from the booted portion of the wings, but ice remained on the inboard, anti-ice segment. An engineer from the airplane's manufacturer said that if the anti-ice system was activated after ice had accumulated on the wings, it would take 2-4 minutes for the anti-ice portion of the wings and engine inlets to heat sufficiently to shed the ice. A postaccident inspection of the anti-ice components found no anomalies, and there was no record of any recent problems with the anti-ice system. The flight crew reported that the anti-ice activation switch is on the captain's side, and they could not recall if or when the anti-ice system was activated. They stated that they did not discuss its use, or use a checklist that addressed the use of the anti-ice system. A section of the airplane's flight manual states: "Failure to switch on the [anti-ice] system before ice accumulation has begun may result in engine damage due to ice ingestion." An inspection by an NTSB power plant engineer disclosed catastrophic engine damage consistent with ice ingestion.