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Crash of a Vickers 812 Viscount in Amarillo

Date & Time: Jul 8, 1962 at 0706 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N243V
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Amarillo – Lubbock – Midland – San Angelo – Austin
MSN:
354
YOM:
1958
Flight number:
CO210
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
16466
Captain / Total hours on type:
1338.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4470
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1798
Aircraft flight hours:
11164
Aircraft flight cycles:
11976
Circumstances:
A Continental Air Lines Vickers-Armstrongs Viscount Model 812, N243V, was landed wheels-up, almost immediately following takeoff from the Amarillo Municipal Airport, Amarillo, Texas, on July 8, 1962, at approximately 0706LT. There were no serious injuries to any of the 13 passengers or 3 crew members. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. After normal lift-off and landing gear retraction, the captain was momentarily distracted by rainwater from the window channel falling on his left shirt sleeve and he inadvertently allowed the aircraft to settle until Nos. 2 and 3 propellers struck the runway. No. 4 engine and propeller were damaged by pieces of metal thrown from the No. 3 propeller. Increasingly severe vibration, a rapidly developing right wing heaviness, and sudden and excessive rise of exhaust gas temperatures of Nos. 2 and 3 engines dictated an immediate emergency landing. This was effected, wheels up, in a harvested wheat field approximately 6,930 feet beyond the end of runway 21 and in a direction 21 degrees to the right of its extended centerline.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's diversion of his attention during takeoff which allowed the aircraft to settle to the runway striking the Nos. 2 and 3 propellers.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-124 near Unionville: 45 killed

Date & Time: May 22, 1962 at 2117 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N70775
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chicago – Kansas City – Los Angeles
MSN:
17611
YOM:
1959
Flight number:
CO011
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
45
Captain / Total flying hours:
25000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
14500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
600
Aircraft flight hours:
11945
Circumstances:
On the night of May 22, 1962, a Continental Air Lines Boeing 707-124, N70775, operating as Flight 11 en route from O’Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, to Kansas City, Missouri, was flying via Jet Route 26V at an altitude of 39,000 feet. A few minutes after Flight 11 had made a northerly deviation from course to circumnavigate a thunderstorm, in the vicinity of Centerville, Iowa, the radar image of the aircraft disappeared from the scope of the Waverly, Iowa, Flight Following Service. At approximately 2117 an explosion occurred in the right rear lavatory resulting in separation of the tail section from the fuselage. The aircraft broke up and the main part of the fuselage struck the ground about 6 miles north-northwest of Unionville, Missouri. All 37 passengers and crew of 8 sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was totally destroyed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the disintegrating force of a dynamite explosion which occurred in the right rear lavatory resulting in destruction of the aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-340-35 in Midland

Date & Time: Mar 16, 1954 at 0838 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90853
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
El Paso – Midland – Kansas City
MSN:
44
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
CO046
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11038
Captain / Total hours on type:
620.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2742
Copilot / Total hours on type:
659
Aircraft flight hours:
3099
Circumstances:
At 0833 Trip 46 was cleared to Runway 10 for takeoff. At this time the aircraft carried 585 gallons of fuel and was loaded to a gross takeoff weight of 36,345 pounds which was 10,655 pounds less than the maximum allowable. The load was properly distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the approved limits. A pre-takeoff check was conducted adjacent to Runway 10 at which time the propellers, engines and instruments gave normal Indications. A part of this check included moving the control column fore and aft and turning the wheel left and right in order to check the control system for freedom of movement and full travel. At 0838 the flight was cleared for takeoff which was made using normal takeoff power. Immediately after becoming airborne the crew noted a slight vibration which was attributed to an unbalanced condition of the spinning main landing gear wheels. Captain Persing applied brakes during the landing gear retraction to eliminate this vibration; however, it not only continued but rapidly increased in severity. The aircraft reached an altitude of approximately 75 feet, the highest attained, and was near the airport boundary when the vibration stopped with a sudden jolt and the aircraft assumed a nose-down attitude. The first officer immediately sensing the situation joined the captain and both exerted their entire strength applying back pressure to their respective control columns to keep the aircraft from plunging into the ground. The captain quickly reduced power; however, the nose-down pressure could not be completely overcome. The first officer used nose-up trim control in an effort to relieve the nose-down pressure; this action had no appreciable effect and during the last attempt the trim tab control wheel appeared to be stuck. The captain established a shallow left turn with the thought of returning to the airport and continued the turn about 45 degrees from the takeoff heading. As air speed decreased power was momentarily increased whereupon it became evident to the crew that using power sufficient to maintain flight resulted in an insurmountable nose-down pressure. The captain therefore decided to make a wheels-up landing straight ahead. Close to the ground the first officer closed the throttles and the captain pulled the electrical crash bar. Contact with the ground followed with the aircraft in a near-level attitude and at approximately 100 m.p.h. Although the passengers and crew received injuries of varying degrees, they were able to get out of the aircraft unassisted in an orderly manner. The evacuation was mainly through the rear service door (emergency exit) and was accomplished in about 30 seconds. There was no fire.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was loss of control due to a failure of the right elevator trim tab push-pull rod caused by a reversed installation of the right elevator trim tab idler as a result of the carrier’s reliance on the Manufacturers Illustrated Parts Catalog as a maintenance reference. The following findings were reported:
- Immediately following a normal takeoff the right elevator trim tab push-pull rod failed and the stub end became wedged, holding the trim tab in a full-up or aircraft nose-down position,
- The trim tab position resulted in the crew being unable to control the aircraft and a wheels-up landing resulted,
- The push-pull rod failed as a result of excessive stresses caused by interference resulting from a reversed idler installation,
- The right elevator trim tab assembly as removed, reinstalled, inspected and functionally checked by company maintenance personnel 14:40 flight hours prior to the accident,
- Correct positioning of the right idler component could not be determined from the Maintenance Manual figure, 7.4.101, which the carrier considered appropriate for the installation,
- The Manufacturers Illustrated Parts Catalog was used in accordance with company policy as an installation reference to determine the idler position,
- Under conventional interpretation of the appropriate exploded diagram of the Parts Catalog, the idler was installed in reverse,
- The Illustrated Parts Catalog was not intended and should not have been used as a maintenance reference.
Final Report: