Denmark

The accident occurred during an IFR air taxi flight from Oslo (ENGM) to Aarhus (EKAH). The flight was uneventful until the landing phase. The commander was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. En route, the flight crew set the Vapp 15° to 123 knots (kt) and the Vref 35° to 116 kt and agreed upon, if foggy at EKAH, to pull the curtains between the cockpit and the passenger cabin in order to avoid blinding from lights in the passenger cabin. During the descent, the flight crew decided not to descend below Flight Level (FL) 170, if the weather did not allow an approach and landing in EKAH. Instead they would continue to a pre-planned destination alternate. The pre-planned and nearest useable destination alternate was Billund (EKBI) at a great circle distance of 60 nautical miles southwest of EKAH. At 22:09 hrs, the first officer established preliminary radio contact with Aarhus Tower (118.525 MegaHertz (MHz)) in order to obtain the latest weather report for EKAH. The air traffic controller at Aarhus Tower communicated the following landing details:
- Expected landing on runway 10R.
- Wind conditions to be 140° 2 kt.
- Meteorological visibility to be 250 meters (m).
- Runway Visual Range (RVR) at landing to be 900 m, 750 m, and 400 m in fog patches.
- Few clouds at 200 feet (ft), few clouds at 6500 ft.
- Temperature 16° Celcius (C) and Dewpoint 15° C.
- QNH 1008 Hectopascal (hPa).
The first officer read back a meteorological visibility of 2500 m to the commander. The flight crew discussed the reported RVR values and agreed that runway 10R would be the preferable landing runway. The commander made an approach briefing for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 10R including a summary of SOP in case of a missed approach. The first officer pulled the curtain between the cockpit and the passenger cabin. At established radio contact with Aarhus Approach (119.275 MHz) at 22:20 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to descend to altitude 3000 feet on QNH 1008 hPa and to expect radar vectors for an ILS approach to runway 10R. The flight crew performed the approach checklist. The flight crew discussed the weather situation at EKAH with expected shallow fog and fog patches at landing. At 22:28 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn right by 10°, descend to 2000 ft on QNH 1008 hPa, and informed that Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) were in operation at EKAH. Due the weather conditions, the air traffic controller radar vectored the aircraft for a long final allowing the flight crew to be properly established before the final approach. The commander called out the instrument presentation of an operative radio altimeter. At 22:31 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn left on heading 130° and cleared the flight crew to perform an ILS approach to runway 10R. The commander armed the approach mode of the aircraft Automatic Flight Control System and ordered a flap setting of 15°. When established on the LLZ for runway 10R and shortly before leaving 2000 ft on the GS, the commander through shallow fog obtained and called visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. At that point, the first officer as well noted the approach and runway lighting system including the position of the green threshold identification lights. The commander ordered a landing gear down selection. The flight crew observed that a fog layer was situated above the middle of the runway. Though visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, the commander requested altitude call-outs on approach. The commander ordered a flap setting of 35°. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration. At 22:32 hrs, the first officer reported to Aarhus Approach that the aircraft was established on the ILS for runway 10R. The air traffic controller reported the wind conditions to be 150° 2 kt and cleared the aircraft to land on runway 10R. The flight crew initiated the final checklist. The landing lights were on. The first officer noted two white and two red lights of the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) to the left of runway 10R. Passing approximately 1500 ft Radio Height (RH), the first officer reported to the commander visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, fog above the middle of the runway, and that the touchdown zone and the runway end were both visible. The commander confirmed. At approximately 900 ft RH, the commander disengaged the autopilot, and the flight crew completed the final checklist. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration at a recorded computed airspeed of approximately 128 kt. The first officer called: 500 to minimum (passing approximately 800 ft RH), and the commander called: Runway in sight. The commander confirmed that the intensity of the approach and runway lighting system was okay. The commander informed the first officer that the intention was to touch down at the beginning of the runway. In order to avoid entering fog patches during the landing roll, the commander planned flying one dot below the GS, performing a towed approach, and touching down on the threshold. However, the commander did not communicate this plan of action to the first officer. The aircraft started descending below the GS for runway 10R. The first officer asked the commander whether to cancel potential Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) GS warnings. The commander confirmed. At approximately 500 ft RH, the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) recorded cancellation of potential EGPWS GS warnings. The aircraft aural alert warning system announced passing 500 feet RH. The recorded computed airspeed was 125 kt, the recorded vertical speed was approximately 700 ft/minute, and the GS deviation approached one dot below the GS. The commander noted the PAPI indicating the aircraft flying below the GS (one white and three red lights). The first officer called: Approaching minimum. Shortly after, the aircraft aural alert warning system announced: Minimums Minimums. The SSFDR recorded a beginning thrust reduction towards flight idle and a full scale GS deviation (flying below). The commander called: Continue. The commander had visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. It was the perception of the first officer that the commander had sufficient visual cues to continue the approach and landing. The first officer as pilot monitoring neither made callouts on altitude nor deviation from GS. The commander noticed passing a white crossbar, a second white crossbar and then red lights. To the commander, the red lights indicated the beginning of runway 10R, and the commander initiated the flare. The aircraft collided with the antenna mast system of the LLZ for runway 28L, touched down in the grass RESA for runway 28L, and the nose landing gear collided with a near field antenna (LLZ for runway 28L) and collapsed. The aircraft ended up on runway 10R. Throughout the sequence of events and due to fog, the air traffic controller in the control tower (Aarhus Approach) had neither visual contact with the approach sector, the threshold for runway 10R nor the aircraft on ground, when it came to a full stop. Upon full stop on runway 10R, the first officer with a calm voice reported to Aarhus Approach: Aarhus Tower, Delta Whiskey Mike, we had a crash landing. The air traffic controller did not quite perceive the reporting and was uncertain on the content of the reporting and replied: Say again. The cabin crewmember without instructions from the flight crew initiated the evacuation of the passengers via the cabin entry door. The aircraft caught fire. Aarhus Approach and the Aerodrome Office in cooperation activated the aerodrome firefighting services and the area emergency dispatch centre. Upon completion of the on ground emergency procedure and the evacuation of the aircraft, the flight crew met the cabin crewmember and the passengers at a safe distance in front of the aircraft.

The accident occurred during a private VFR flight from EDXR (Rendsburg-Schachtholm) to Endelave (EKEL). When arriving overhead EKEL, the pilot made a visual inspection of the airstrip conditions. Upon a low approach at a shallow angle to runway 29 at EKEL, the pilot on short final reduced engine power and initiated the flare. Approximately 10 meters in front of the beginning of runway 29, the aircraft landed in a wheat field, and the main landing gear touched down at and collided with an upslope roadside next to a road crossing perpendicularly to the beginning of runway 29. When colliding with the upslope roadside, the left main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft started veering uncontrollably to the left and ran off the side of the airstrip. In the grass parking area next to the airstrip, the left wing of the aircraft collided with the nose landing gear of a parked aircraft. The aircraft continued veering to the left, impacted with a tree and a farm building, and came to rest. After impact with the tree and the farm building, the aircraft caught an explosive fire. Witnesses observing the landing and the impact with the tree and the farm building initiated a rescue mission. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were injured.

The aircraft was engaged in a bird control mission over the center of Denmark and departed Billund Airport in the afternoon with one passenger and one pilot on board. While returning to Roskilde, on approach to runway 03, the pilot initiated a go-around procedure due to the presence of a slower aircraft on the runway. While climbing, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed near runway 03. Both occupants were killed.

The accident occurred during a private IFR flight from Strausberg Airport (EDAY), Germany, to Bornholm Airport (EKRN), Denmark. Before the flight, an ATS flight plan was filed. Before takeoff at EDAY, the aircraft was refueled with 200 liters of jet fuel. According to the ATS flight plan, the pilot stated the total endurance to be 01:30 hrs and the Estimated Elapsed Time (EET) to be 00:30 hrs. The pilot informed the AIB DK that the estimated total endurance before takeoff at EDAY was approximately 01:00 hrs. The aircraft departed EDAY at 10:58. Enroute, the pilot observed a low fuel quantity warning light. Otherwise, the flight was uneventful until the approach to EKRN. At 11:32:00 hrs and at a distance of approximately18 nm southwest of EKRN, the pilot cancelled the IFR flight plan and continued VFR for a visual approach to runway 29. While descending inbound EKRN, the airspeed was decreasing. At 11:37:08 hrs, the pilot reported to Roenne Tower that the aircraft was turning final for runway 29. The aircraft was cleared to land. The wind conditions were reported to be 280° 19 knots maximum 29 knots. The aircraft was configured for landing (the landing gear was down and the flaps extended to 40°). On a left base to runway 29, both engines suffered from fuel starvation. At 11:39:18 hrs, the pilot three times declared an emergency. The aircraft entered a stall and impacted terrain in a field of sweet corn. A search and rescue mission was immediately initiated.

The accident flight was a scheduled domestic flight from Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup (EKCH) to Aalborg Airport (EKYT). The flight was uneventful until the landing gear was selected down during the approach to EKYT runway 26R. The nose landing gear and the left main landing gear (MLG) indicated down and locked. The right MLG indicated “in transit” (not down and locked). The Aalborg Tower was informed about the problem with the right MLG indication. A go-around was initiated at 1100 feet MSL with a climb towards 2000 ft. The flight crew consulted the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). An alternate landing gear procedure was initiated. The right MLG indication remained in “transit”. A mayday call was made to Aalborg Tower and they were informed about the unsafe landing gear. The flight crew reset the alternate gear extension system and subsequently they tried to make a normal gear up selection. The nose landing gear and the left MLG retracted normally, however the right main landing gear indication remained in “transit”. A second attempt to use the alternate landing gear extension procedure was performed without any changes to the right MLG indication. The aircraft entered a holding pattern in order to reduce the amount of fuel and at the same time to brief the passengers about the situation and to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. Passengers seated at rows 6, 7 and 8 seats D and F were reseated away from the right propeller area. During the approach the flaps were selected to 10° and the landing gear horn started. The warning horn continued throughout the remaining flight. During the emergency landing the left MLG touched down on the runway first, followed by the right MLG. Shortly after the right MLG contacted the runway the right MLG collapsed. The aircraft departed the runway to the right and came to rest on a heading of 340° at 1357:26 hrs.