Del Rio

The cargo flight was cleared for a visual approach to the 5,000-foot long, by 150-foot wide asphalt runway. Based on estimated landing weight of the aircraft, the Vref was estimated at 116 KIAS. Air traffic Control (ATC) radar data revealed that the flight maintained a ground speed above 190 knots on final approach, to include the touchdown zone for runway 13. The first evidence of braking was noted at a point 1,247 feet from the departure end of the runway. Braking signatures on the asphalt as well as off the pavement were consistent with an operational anti-skid system. Witnesses at the airport also observed the airplane flying very fast and touching down long. Both crewmembers, the 4,689-hour captain and the 2,873-hour first officer, were familiar with the airport, and the flight was 20 minutes ahead of its scheduled arrival time. The airplane overran the departure end of runway 13, impacted the airport perimeter fence, proceeded across a roadway, took out another fence, and collided with two trees in a cemetery. The airplane was found to be within weight and balance limits for all phases of the flight. The installed cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was found not to be functional.

The Mishap Student pilot (MSP) was flying an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 21 at Keesler AFB. They were in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) at night and the runway was wet. After some deviations on the approach, they arrived over the threshold on a normal glide slope and faster (about 114 kts) than the computed approach speed of 108 kts. The aircraft touched down approximately 1500 feet down the runway. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) actuated the speed brakes/spoilers switch and the student began to immediately apply brake pressure. After 4-5 seconds, the instructor recognized that the aircraft was not decelerating and declared that she was taking control of the aircraft. The instructor immediately applied maximum braking with no perceived deceleration. She then grabbed the glare shield in an attempt to gain additional leverage on the brakes and again felt no perceived deceleration. At this point, the aircraft was rapidly running out of available runway. The instructor selected the emergency brakes just prior to arriving at the departure end threshold and the brakes locked resulting in a hydroplane skid. The aircraft departed the prepared surface and came to a halt 190 feet later. As a result of the runway departure, the right main and nose gear collapsed, and the forward fuselage and both wings were heavily damaged.

The twin engine turbofan powered airplane was ditched into a river after a complete loss of power from both engines. The airplane was on a second approach to land on runway 30R after having been instructed by air traffic control (ATC) to climb during the final approach segment of the first approach due to inadequate separation from another airplane. Subsequent to the first approach, the airplane was issued vectors for the second approach by ATC. Communications transcripts show that the flight crew asked ATC how far they would be vectored during the second approach, but the flight crew did not inform ATC of their low fuel state until the airplane was already on a "base turn...to join final." The airplane subsequently lost power from both engines. During interviews, both pilots stated that there were no problems with the airplane. The second-in-command (SIC) stated that the airplane "ran out of fuel" and that the fuel quantity indicators read 0 and 100 pounds when each respective engine stopped producing power. The SIC also stated that after being instructed to climb to 5,000 feet after their first approach, he questioned the pilot-in-command about landing at another airport located about 14 nautical miles west-southwest of the destination airport. The SIC said that the PIC elected to continue with the second approach to the original destination. Research indicated that the flight crew did not obtain a weather briefing prior to the accident flight. Additionally, the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast that was valid at the time the aircraft's flight plan was filed showed a forecast ceiling consisting of overcast clouds at 1,500 feet above ground level at the aircraft's arrival time at the destination. 14 CFR Part 91.169 requires that an alternate airport be listed in the flight plan when forecast ceilings are less than 2,000 feet. No alternate was listed in the flight plan for the accident flight. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 91.167 requires that aircraft operated in instrument meteorological conditions maintain fuel reserves that allow flight to the intended destination and then continued flight to the listed alternate, and an additional 45 minutes at normal cruise speed. In 1993, the FAA/industry advisory committee developed advisory material for fuel planning and management for 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carrier flight operations, but the material was never published.

Upon arrival at the destination airport, the commercial pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight reported to the tower that he was 7 miles to the east, intending to land on runway 13. Subsequently, the pilot reported that he would circle the airport a few times "because he was having trouble with his autopilot." After circling, the pilot positioned the airplane on final approach to runway 13. The pilot of another airplane in the traffic pattern observed the accident airplane on a "one to two mile final, in a normal flight attitude but possibly a little low." After looking at her instruments for several seconds, she made visual contact again and observed the airplane impact the ground with the "tail of the aircraft falling forward on top of a fence." She further stated that all of the radio transmissions from the accident airplane were "calm and completely un-alarmed prior to the accident." Another witness, who was located at a fixed base operator at the airport, observed the airplane turn onto final. He stated that the airplane "suddenly stalled and slammed into the ground from about two hundred feet." The 1,140 hour pilot had accumulated a total of 70 hours in the Cessna 402. The airplane was found to be within its prescribed weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident. Ground impressions and airframe deformations indicated that the impact angle was approximately 25 degrees nose down on a magnetic heading of 155 degrees with the landing gear extended and the flaps partially extended. A post-impact fire destroyed the airplane. Flight control continuity was established from the aft section of the cockpit to the rudder and elevator flight control surfaces. The elevator trim tab (located on the right elevator) was measured with a protractor and found to be in the 28 degrees tab-up position (aircraft nose down). According to the airplane manufacturer's specifications, the maximum tab-up travel limit (when connected) is 5 degrees. The trim tab would not move freely by hand forces and appeared to be jammed. The elevator skin was cut open (top side) to observe the trim tab connecting hardware. It was observed that the clevis end of the trim tab actuator rod was wedged against the front spar of the elevator's internal structure. Additionally, the bolt which connected the clevis end of the tab actuator rod to the actuator screw, was missing. After further inspection, neither the bolt nor the nut were found in the cavity of the elevator structure or the surrounding area. The clevis end of the actuator rod and the actuator screw were not damaged, and no impact damage was apparent on the trim tab. The operator's maintenance records showed that the right elevator had been replaced 10 flight hours prior to the accident.

The pilot lost control of the airplane following the loss of engine power from the right engine during takeoff. The pilot stated that the engine power loss was not sudden, but rather a slow continued reduction of power. The pilot further stated that the loss of power occurred after he placed the landing gear selector in the retract position. He added that his airspeed at the time of the power loss was between Vmc (86 mph) and Vy (120 mph). The airplane started to roll towards the right (dead) engine as the pilot reduced the power on the left engine. The outboard portion of the right wing impacted the ground short of a taxiway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the left engine was torn from the airframe. The reason for the loss of engine power was not determined.

Shortly after takeoff from Del Rio Airport, while climbing, the airplane went out of control and crashed. All three occupants were killed. They were completing a search and rescue mission to Alamogordo.