Charleston-Executive (Johns Island)

The purpose of the flight was for the pilot to accomplish a flight review with a flight instructor. According to air traffic control records, after takeoff, the pilot handling radio communications requested maneuvering airspace for airwork in an altitude block of 13,000 to 15,000 feet mean sea level (msl). About 8 minutes later, the air traffic controller asked the pilot to state his heading, but he did not respond. A review of recorded radar data revealed that, about 14,000 msl and 3 miles southeast of the accident site, the airplane made two constant-altitude 360-degree turns and then proceeded on a north-northeasterly heading for about 2.5 miles. The airplane then abruptly turned right and lost altitude, which is consistent with a loss of airplane control. The airplane continued to rapidly descend until it impacted trees and terrain on a southerly heading. No discernible distress calls were noted. The wreckage was found generally fragmented, and all of the airplane’s structural components and flight control surfaces were accounted for within the wreckage debris path. Subsequent examination of the engines revealed evidence of rotation and operation at impact and no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

According to an airport employee at the Charleston Executive Airport (JZI), Charleston, South Carolina, the pilot contacted the JZI UNICOM radio frequency to request an airport advisory. The airport employee informed the pilot that the "winds were from 180 at 12 knots gusting to 17." The pilot then responded that he would be landing on runway 18, and was advised by the employee that there was no "runway 18." The pilot then stated that he would land on runway 27, and shortly thereafter said that he would land on runway 22. The employee said that out of curiosity he stepped outside to witness the approach of the airplane. He said that the airplane was southwest of the airport moving northeast perpendicular to runway 22, at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. He watched as the airplane was on a left base for runway 22. He said that the airplane overshot the runway and began a "tight, low right turn" away from the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane stalled and completed two revolutions before it was lost from his sight. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assemblies and accessories revealed no evidence of a pre-crash mechanical failure or malfunction. A forensic toxicology test was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The specimens contained, Tramadol (also known by the trade name Ultram), which is used for the management of moderate to severe pain. The level of Tramadol found in the pilot's blood on post-mortem toxicology testing was at least twice that of maximal regular doses of the substance. Single doses have been shown to cause mild impairment of psychomotor abilities in healthy volunteers. Diphenhydramine was also found in the blood of the pilot. The pilot may have been impaired, at that time, due to the use of Tramadol or Diphenhydramine or both.

A witness at a nearby maintenance facility stated the pilot telephoned him and told him that, during engine start, one engine sputtered and abruptly stopped. The witness stated the pilot told him he wanted to fly the airplane over to have the problem looked at. A witness, who was an airline transport-rated corporate pilot, observed the airplane on takeoff roll and stated the airplane rotated "really late," using approximately 4,000 feet of runway. He stated the airplane climbed to about 400 or 500 feet, then descended in a left spin into the trees. The airplane collided with the ground and caught fire. Examination of the right engine revealed external fire damage and no evidence of mechanical malfunction. Examination of the left engine revealed external fire damage. Disassembly examination of the left engine revealed the rear side of the No. 5 piston from top to bottom was eroded away with characteristics consistent with detonation. The spark plugs displayed "normal" deposits and wear, except the No. 5 bottom plug was contaminated with a fragment of piston ring material, the No. 5 top plug had a dark sooty appearance, and the nose core of the No. 2 bottom plug was fragmented. Flow bench examination of the left fuel servo revealed no abnormalities. The fuel flow manifold diaphragm was heat-damaged. Flow bench examination of the fuel injector lines and nozzles on a serviceable fuel flow manifold revealed the lines and nozzles were free of obstruction. A review of Emergency Operating Procedures for the Aerostar 601P revealed the following: "Normal procedures do not require operation below the single engine minimum control speed, however, should this condition inadvertently arise and engine failure occur, power on the operating engine should immediately be reduced and the nose lowered to attain a speed above ... the single engine minimum control speed."