Crash of a Raytheon 390 Premier IA in New Delhi

Date & Time: Sep 22, 2012 at 1129 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-UPN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lucknow - New Delhi
MSN:
RB-236
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Lucknow Airport in the morning on a flight to New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport with a crew of three (two pilot and a cabin crew) and three passengers, among them Shivpal Yadav, Minister by the Uttar Pradesh Government. Following an uneventful flight, the crew completed the approach to runway 27. After touch down, the left main gear collapsed and the aircraft slid on runway for about one km when the right main gear collapsed as well. Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway to the right and came to rest in a grassy area. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Raytheon 390 Premier IA in Samedan: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 19, 2010 at 1502 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-IAYL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Zagreb - Samedan
MSN:
RB-249
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
GQA631V
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4306
Captain / Total hours on type:
244.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1071
Copilot / Total hours on type:
567
Aircraft flight hours:
1047
Aircraft flight cycles:
820
Circumstances:
After an uneventful flight, the IFR flight plan was cancelled at 13:53:09 UTC and the flight continued under visual flight rules. When the crew were requested at 13:54:01 UTC by the Zurich sector south air traffic controller (ATCO) to switch to the Samedan Information frequency, they wanted to remain on the frequency for a further two minutes. The aircraft was on a south-westerly heading, approx. 5 km south of Zernez, when the crew informed the ATCO at 13:57:12 UTC that they would now change frequency. After first contact with Samedan Information, when the crew reported that they were ten miles before the threshold of runway 21, the aircraft was in fact approximately eight miles north-east of the threshold of runway 21. When at 13:58:40 UTC the crew of a Piaggio 180 asked the flight information service officer (FISO) of Samedan Information about the weather as follows: "(…) and the condition for inbound still ok?", the crew of D-IAYL responded at 13:58:46 UTC, before the FISO was able to answer: "Yes, for the moment good condition (…)". D-IAYL was slightly north-east of Zuoz when the crew asked the FISO about the weather over the aerodrome. D-IAYL was over Madulein when at 13:59:46 UTC the FISO informed the crew that they could land at their own discretion. Immediately afterwards, the crew increased their rate of descent to over 2200 ft/min and maintained this until a final recorded radio altitude (RA) of just under 250 ft, which they reached over the threshold of runway 21. The crew then initiated a climb to an RA of approximately 600 ft, turned a little to the left and then flew parallel to the runway centre line. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were set to 20 degrees with a high probability. At the end of runway 21 the crew initiated a right turn onto the downwind leg, during which they reached a bank angle of 55 degrees; in the process their speed increased from 110 to 130 knots. Abeam the threshold of runway 21, the crew turned onto the final approach on runway 21. The bank angle in this turn reached up to 62 degrees, without the speed being noticeably increased. The aircraft then turned upside down and crashed almost vertically. Both pilots suffered fatal injuries on impact. A power line was severed, causing a power failure in the Upper Engadine valley. An explosion-type fire broke out. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The accident is attributable to the fact that the aircraft collided with the ground, because control of the aircraft was lost due to a stall.
- The following causal factors have been identified for the accident:
- The crew continued the approach under weather conditions that no longer permitted safe control of the aircraft
- The crew performed a risky manoeuvre close to ground instead of a consistent missed approach procedure
- The fact that the flight information service did not consistently communicate to the crew relevant weather information from another aircraft was a contributing factor to the genesis of the accident
As a systemic factor that contributed to the genesis of the accident, the following point was identified:
- The visibility and cloud bases determined on Samedan airport were not representative for an approach from Zernez, because they did not correspond to the actual conditions in the approach sector.
Final Report:

Crash of a Raytheon 390 Premier I in Oshkosh

Date & Time: Jul 27, 2010 at 1816 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N6JR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Detroit - Oshkosh
MSN:
RB-161
YOM:
2007
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9095
Captain / Total hours on type:
1406.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1265
Aircraft flight cycles:
930
Circumstances:
The accident occurred during the Experimental Aircraft Association’s Airventure 2010 fly-in convention. Because of the high density of aircraft operations during the fly-in, the Federal Aviation Administration implemented special air traffic control procedures to accommodate traffic demand and maximize runway capacity. Arriving aircraft were issued landing instructions and clearances by a tower controller using a specified tower radio frequency. Departing aircraft were handled by another team of controllers operating on a separate radio frequency that was associated with a mobile operations unit located near the runway. Air traffic control data indicated that the accident airplane established contact with the tower controller and entered a left traffic pattern for runway 18R. As the accident airplane was turning from downwind to base leg, the controller handling departures cleared a Piper Cub for an immediate takeoff and angled departure (a procedure used by slower aircraft to clear the runway immediately after liftoff by turning across the runway edge). The accident pilot was not monitoring the departure frequency, and, therefore, he did not hear the radio transmissions indicating that the departing Piper Cub was going to offset to the left of the runway after liftoff. The accident pilot reported that, while on base leg, he became concerned that his descent path to the runway would conflict with the Piper Cub that was on takeoff roll. He stated that he overshot the runway centerline during his turn from base to final, and, when he completed the turn, his airplane was offset to the right of the runway. The pilot stated that, at this point, he decided not to land because of a perceived conflict with the departing Piper Cub that was ahead and to the left of his position. The pilot reported that he initiated a go-around, increasing engine power slightly, but not to takeoff power, as he looked for additional traffic to avoid. He estimated that he advanced the throttle levers "probably a third of the way to the stop," and, as he looked for traffic, the stall warning stick-shaker and stick-pusher systems activated almost simultaneously as the right wing stalled. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a nose down, right wing low attitude. A postaccident review of available air traffic control communications, amateur video of the accident sequence, controller and witness statements, and position data recovered from the accident airplane indicated that the Piper Cub was already airborne, had turned left, and was clear of runway 18R when the accident airplane turned from base to final. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane flight manual states that, in the event of a go-around, the pilot should first advance engine thrust to takeoff power and then establish Vref (reference landing approach speed). The pilot's decision not to select takeoff power during the go-around directly contributed to the development of the aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision not to advance the engines to takeoff power during the go-around, as stipulated by the airplane flight manual, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.
Final Report: